Saunders v. Comm'r of Corr.

Citation343 Conn. 1,272 A.3d 169
Decision Date19 April 2022
Docket NumberSC 20430
Parties Willie A. SAUNDERS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut

Vishal K. Garg, West Hartford, for the appellant (petitioner).

Robert J. Scheinblum, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state's attorney, Bruce R. Lockwood, supervisory assistant state's attorney, and Eva B. Lenczewski, former supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

D'AURIA, J.

In this certified appeal, we must determine whether the defense of procedural default, which prevents courts from reaching the merits of a constitutional claim raised for the first time in a habeas proceeding in the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, applies to a due process claim that is based on incompetency to stand trial.

The petitioner, Willie A. Saunders, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which upheld the habeas court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as barred by procedural default. The petitioner claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that (1) the defense of procedural default applies to competency claims, and (2) his pleadings failed to allege sufficient cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default defense. We disagree with the petitioner that competency claims are categorically exempt from being procedurally defaulted because incompetency may satisfy the cause and prejudice standard to excuse a procedural default. In the petitioner's case, our review of the petition leads us to conclude that his pleadings met the standard necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Court's judgment and remand the case to that court with direction to remand it to the habeas court for an evidentiary hearing on the threshold question of whether the petitioner was incompetent at the time of his underlying criminal trial or his direct appeal and, if so, whether he suffered any resulting prejudice, thereby excusing his procedural default.

The Appellate Court's opinion contains the pertinent facts and procedural history; see Saunders v. Commissioner of Correction , 194 Conn. App. 473, 475–81, 221 A.3d 810 (2019) ; which we summarize in relevant part. A jury found the petitioner guilty of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2) and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). Id., at 477, 221 A.3d 810. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to ten years of imprisonment followed by fifteen years of special parole. Id. The petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that "the state adduced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction ... the trial court improperly allowed the state to comment on missing witnesses during final argument, and the ... state engaged in prosecutorial impropriety during final argument and, therefore, deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 477–78 n.3, 221 A.3d 810. The petitioner raised no claim regarding his competency to stand trial. See id. The Appellate Court upheld the petitioner's conviction on direct appeal; see State v. Saunders , 114 Conn. App. 493, 509, 969 A.2d 868, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 917, 973 A.2d 1277 (2009) ; and this court denied his petition for certification to appeal.

State v. Saunders , 292 Conn. 917, 973 A.2d 1277 (2009).

The present case is the petitioner's second in which he seeks a writ of habeas corpus.1 He raises claims of two "due process violations under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution on the grounds that [he] was incompetent to be prosecuted and to stand trial ...." Saunders v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 194 Conn. App. at 478, 221 A.3d 810. Count one of his habeas petition alleges that, at the time of trial, the petitioner suffered from severe intellectual disabilities, including "an inability to read or write, a diagnosis of ‘mental retardation

’ at a young age, and brain functioning equivalent to that of a ten year old child." Id. Because of these deficiencies, the petitioner alleges, he "could not comprehend the nature of the criminal proceedings against him, other than the general nature of the charges and the fact that he was facing incarceration if convicted." Id. Count two of the petition alleges that, at the time of trial, the petitioner also suffered from "significant physiological and mental health afflictions," including "a long history of epileptic seizures, a visibly misshapen head, paranoia, schizophrenia, and depression, and that he had been hospitalized on numerous occasions in North Carolina prior to his arrest ...." Id., at 479, 221 A.3d 810. Both counts allege that his trial counsel, the state, and the trial court failed to request a competency examination during the course of the proceedings, in violation of General Statutes § 54-56d. Id., at 478–79, 221 A.3d 810.

The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a return denying the petitioner's material allegations and asserting several affirmative defenses, including procedural default as to both counts of the petition. Id., at 479, 221 A.3d 810. The respondent argued that the petitioner did not raise his due process claims regarding competency to stand trial during his criminal trial or on direct appeal and, therefore, had procedurally defaulted. Id., at 479–80, 221 A.3d 810. The respondent further contended that the petitioner could not establish sufficient cause and prejudice to excuse the defaults. Id., at 480, 221 A.3d 810.2 The petitioner, in his reply, argued that the defense of procedural default did not apply to his due process claims, that he could not have raised those claims previously because of his developmental and intellectual disabilities, and, in the alternative, that he could establish cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural defaults. Id.

The respondent moved to dismiss the second habeas petition on the ground that the petitioner's due process claims were procedurally defaulted. Id., at 480–81, 221 A.3d 810. The habeas court granted the motion, "determin[ing] that the petitioner's due process claims were procedurally defaulted and that he had failed to allege legally cognizable cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural defaults." (Footnotes omitted.) Id., at 481, 221 A.3d 810.

The habeas court granted the petitioner certification to appeal to the Appellate Court, which upheld the habeas court's judgment. See id., at 481, 504, 221 A.3d 810. We granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) "Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the doctrine of procedural default applies to competency claims?" And (2) "[d]id the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the petitioner's pleadings failed to allege sufficient cause and prejudice to overcome a procedural default?" Saunders v. Commissioner of Correction , 334 Conn. 917, 222 A.3d 103 (2020). We will discuss additional facts and procedural history as necessary to address the petitioner's claims.

I

The petitioner first claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the procedural default defense applies to competency claims. He argues that, because an incompetent defendant cannot waive any rights,3 including fundamental rights, any valid waiver of a fundamental right must be made on the record. Specifically, he argues that (1) this court should follow the guidance of federal courts that have declined to apply procedural default to competency claims because the harm of prosecuting an incompetent defendant outweighs the interests protected by the judge-made doctrine of procedural default, and (2) even if procedural default is a forfeiture rule, and not a waiver rule, this court should reject its applicability to competency claims. In response, the respondent argues that the Appellate Court correctly (1) applied Connecticut's habeas jurisprudence, and followed the majority of federal and other state courts, in holding that procedural default applies to competency claims, (2) declined to follow the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Silverstein v. Henderson , 706 F.2d 361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S. Ct. 195, 78 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1983), and other federal and state court decisions, because they improperly conflate waiver and procedural default, and (3) concluded that the interest in the finality of convictions outweighs the risk that a criminal defendant will be deprived of his right not to be prosecuted while incompetent. We agree with the respondent.

It is well established that, although federal postconviction jurisprudence does not bind us, this court has adopted the procedural default standard articulated in Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977). See, e.g., Hinds v. Commissioner of Correction , 321 Conn. 56, 70–71, 136 A.3d 596 (2016). "Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate good cause for his failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal and actual prejudice resulting from the impropriety claimed in the habeas petition." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 71, 136 A.3d 596. The cause and prejudice standard "is designed to prevent full review of issues in habeas corpus proceedings that counsel did not raise at trial or on appeal for reasons of tactics, [inadvertence] or ignorance ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction , 294 Conn. 165, 191, 982 A.2d 620 (2009). The procedural default doctrine is a prudential limitation on the right to raise constitutional claims in collateral proceedings that vindicates the interests of finality of...

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7 cases
  • Inglis v. Comm'r of Corr.
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • 28 Junio 2022
    ...whether the court properly determined that the petitioner's claim is procedurally defaulted. See Saunders v. Commissioner of Correction , 343 Conn. 1, 10, 272 A.3d 169 (2022).The petitioner argues that good cause existed for the failure of his trial counsel to raise the issue at his crimina......
  • State v. Douglas C.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • 13 Diciembre 2022
    ...the case law of the Second Circuit when "the great weight" of federal jurisprudence conflicts with it. Saunders v. Commissioner of Correction , 343 Conn. 1, 17, 272 A.3d 169 (2022). As discussed previously, the majority of federal courts of appeals apply the test that we adopt today and do ......
  • Inglis v. Comm'r of Corr.
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • 28 Junio 2022
    ...... determined that the petitioner's claim is procedurally. defaulted. See Saunders v. Commissioner of. Correction, 343 Conn. 1, 10, 272 A.3d 169 (2022). . .          The. petitioner argues that ......
  • State v. Douglas C.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • 13 Diciembre 2022
    ...case law of the Second Circuit when "the great weight" of federal jurisprudence conflicts with it. Saunders v. Commissioner of Correction, 343 Conn. 1, 17, 272 A.3d 169 (2022). As discussed previously, the majority of federal courts of appeals apply the test that we adopt today and do not a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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