Saunders v. Holzer Hosp. Found., 2009 Ohio 2112 (Ohio App. 4/30/2009)
| Decision Date | 30 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 08CA11.,08CA11. |
| Citation | 2009 Ohio 2112 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Alicia Saunders, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Holzer Hospital Foundation et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
John M. Alton, 175 South Third Street, Suite 360, Columbus, Ohio 432151, Attorney for Appellants.
D. Patrick Kasson, 65 East State Street, 4th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215, Attorney for Appellees.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Gallia County Common Pleas Court summary judgment in favor of Holzer Hospital Foundation and Michael Z. Hemphil, defendants below and appellees herein, following our remand.2 On remand, the trial court determined that appellees had no liability to Alicia and Charles Saunders, plaintiffs below and appellants herein, for their negligence claim.
{¶ 2} Appellants raise the following assignments of error for review:
{¶ 3} On April 23, 2006, Alicia Saunders suffered a neck injury while employed as a delivery-room nurse at Holzer. She received workers' compensation benefits under Holzer's self-insured program for her injury.3 Part of her workers' compensation claim included physical therapy that she received at Holzer while "on the clock." Saunders allegedly suffered an additional injury while undergoing this physical therapy with Hemphil.
{¶ 4} In her deposition, Saunders admitted that she sought and received additional workers' compensation for the injury that she claimed to have suffered during her physical therapy. She further admitted that Holzer has paid all of her benefits and all of her medical bills for the alleged physical therapy injury and that she continues to receive workers' compensation for the injury. Saunders further stated that she went "to physical therapy as prescribed and required by Holzer under the care of Hemphil for her treatment [of her prior injury]."4
{¶ 5} Following our remand, appellees filed a second motion for summary judgment. They reiterated many of the same arguments raised in their first motion, but asserted that the court should consider Saunders' deposition, which it had not considered when ruling on the first motion.5
{¶ 6} On August 21, 2008, the trial court granted appellees' summary judgment. In reaching its detailed and well-reasoned decision, the trial court relied upon all of the evidentiary materials appellees submitted, including Saunders' deposition. The court determined that the following facts are undisputed: (1) Saunders was an employee of Holzer at the time of her initial injury on April 26, 2003; (2) she sustained this injury "in the course of or ar[ising] out of her employment"; (3) she filed for and received workers' compensation benefits through Holzer's self-insured workers' compensation program and received therapy for her injury through Holzer's Work Link program; (4) part of her workers' compensation plan called for her to receive physical therapy; (5) she received physical therapy; (6) on October 23, 2003, while receiving physical therapy, she allegedly received an injury that aggravated her prior injury; (7) at the time of the second injury, she was in the employ of Holzer in the maternity ward, went from her particular work area to the physical therapy department, and was being paid by Holzer while she attended physical therapy; (8) she filed for and received workers' compensation benefits through Holzer's self-insured workers' compensation program for the second injury; and (9) she did not appeal the award of benefits through Holzer's self-insured workers' compensation program for the second injury. The court stated: The court determined that Saunders could not seek recovery under Holzer's workers' compensation program and also claim negligence. The court explained:
{¶ 7} With respect to Saunders' claim against Hemphil under the fellow-employee doctrine, the court likewise determined that because she received workers' compensation for the injury, she could not now seek to hold Hemphil liable for negligence. The court additionally determined that because a negligence claim against Hemphil is barred, Saunders could not hold Holzer liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The court also rejected Saunders' argument that the dual capacity exception to workers' compensation immunity applied to impose liability on Hemphil or Holzer. The court first concluded that Saunders did not sufficiently plead the doctrine:
The court then concluded that even if Saunders had properly pled the dual capacity doctrine, she failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the doctrine applied to remove Holzer's workers' compensation immunity. The court also determined that Saunders could not invoke the doctrine against a fellow employee. Thus, the trial court entered summary judgment in appellees' favor. This appeal followed.
I
{¶ 8} Appellant's four assignments of error all challenge the propriety of the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in appellees' favor. Accordingly, we jointly consider them.
{¶ 9} In their assignments of error, appellants assert that Holzer failed to demonstrate the absence of a material fact regarding whether (1) it is entitled to immunity under the workers' compensation statute; (2) the fellow-employee immunity statute bars appellants' claims; (3) it is liable to appellants under the dual capacity doctrine; and (4) liability exists under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
{¶ 10} An appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court's summary judgment. See, e.g., Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241. Accordingly, appellate courts independently review the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate and need not defer to the trial court's decision. Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153; Morehead v. Conley (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411-412, 599 N.E.2d 786. Thus, to determine whether a trial court properly granted summary judgment, an appellate court must review the Civ.R. 56 standard as well as the applicable law. Civ.R. 56(C) provides:
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence [in the pending case,] and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party's favor.
{¶ 11} Thus, a trial court may grant summary judgment if the evidentiary materials demonstrate that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) after the evidence is construed most strongly in the nonmoving party's favor, reasonable minds can come to but one conCLUSION AND THAT CONCLUSION IS ADVERSE to the nonmoving party, and (3) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Vahila v. Hall (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429-430, 674 N.E.2d 1164.
{¶ 12} Under Civ.R. 56, the moving party bears the initial burden to inform the trial court of the motion's basis and to identify those portions of the record that...
To continue reading
Request your trial