Saunders v. People
| Decision Date | 14 May 1872 |
| Citation | 25 Mich. 119 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | The People v. William G. Saunders and another |
Submitted on Briefs April 30, 1872.
Exceptions from Calhoun Circuit.
Dwight May, Attorney-general for the people.
Hughes & O'Brien, for the defendants.
Graves J, did not set in this case.
These defendants were indicted with one Winters for a conspiracy to induce the firm of Amberg & Helmer, who were retail liquor dealers, to violate the United States revenue laws, by a sale of a larger quantity of liquor than was allowed to be made by such dealers, in order that they might extort moneys from said Amberg & Helmer. Winters pleaded guilty, and the other defendants were put on trial. The prosecution claimed to have shown on the trial the conspiracy; that in pursuance thereof Winters bought of Amberg & Helmer, six gallons of whisky; that the conspirators thereupon endeavored to alarm said firm into the payment of a considerable sum of money to save themselves from being prosecuted under the revenue laws, and failing in this, instituted a prosecution against them. The defendants being convicted, now allege certain exceptions to the rulings of the circuit judge.
1. It is complained that the acts and declarations of Winters were allowed to be given in evidence before proof had been made of any conspiracy. As this exception regards the order of proof merely, we think it is not one that can avail in this court. The proper order of proof in cases of conspiracy is, first to give evidence of the unlawful combination, and afterward to show the acts of the conspirators in pursuance thereof, or in some manner to connect them severally therewith. But it often happens that the existence of the conspiracy is only made out by inference from the acts and declarations of the several parties thereto; and to exclude evidence of these until the conspiracy is established in some other way, would, in many cases, give the guilty parties immunity. There is no class of cases in which it is more important that the circuit judge should have a large discretion as to the order in which evidence should be received; and this discretion can not be reviewed on error except in clear cases of abuse, of which we discover no proof here. The opening of the case by the prosecution, and any further explanations that may be called for, will generally enable the judge to exercise his discretion in such manner as, while not shutting out proper evidence, shall at the same time protect the accused from being prejudiced by testimony which, in the end, shall prove irrelevant, or not legally competent to charge the party an trial. And whenever facts are proved which depend upon other facts to give them a bearing upon the guilt of the accused, if such other facts are not put in, he has his remedy by motion to strike out the evidence.
In this case it was sought to connect the several parties charged by evidence of their separate acts and statements. This was, of course, competent. The danger from this is that the statements of one implicating the others as well as himself, may tend unjustly to prejudice the case of the others; but this must be guarded against by proper instructions from the judge.
2. It is next objected that the court erred in admitting evidence that, at the same time and place that complaint was made against Amberg & Helmer, complaint was made by the same party against another firm for a violation of the same law. These two complaints were so closely connected, that in proving one it was almost impracticable to avoid the mention of the other. But even if it had been practicable, we do not think it was essential. If there was a conspiracy in the one case, there probably was in the other, and the evidence of the one would throw light upon the motives inducing the other. Mr. Roscoe justly says that, "The evidence in conspiracy is wider than, perhaps, in any other case. * * Taken by themselves, the acts of a conspiracy are rarely of an unequivocally guilty character, and they can only be properly estimated when connected with all the surrounding circumstances:" Ros. Cr. Ev., 88; and see Hunt's Case, 3 B. & Ald., 573. There are cases in which a party, being charged with fraud in a particular transaction, it was held competent to give evidence of similar fraudulent transactions with other persons: Bottomley v. United States, 1 Story 135; Rankin v. Blackwell, 2 Johns. Cas., 198; and these seem very much in point here. But we do not decide that the evidence of the other complaint would have been admissible, if it had been a distinct transaction at another time; it is enough that the two were so inseparably associated in time, and doubtless in motive also, that each may properly be said to have been intimately connected with the res gestae of the other, and therefore admissible in evidence with the other surrounding circumstances.
3. It was also objected that the prosecution was allowed to give evidence of statements made by Winters on the day following the making of the complaint, going to show that he expected to make several hundred dollars out of it, and that Saunders was concerned with and had instigated it. This was while the complaint was pending, and if Saunders was connected with the conspiracy by independent evidence, we think was admissible against him as well as against Winters. And we also think there was sufficient evidence, exclusive of the statements of Winters and Gregg, to warrant submitting the case of Saunders to the jury.
It was proved, and not disputed, that Saunders was the adviser of Winters and Gregg, as to what the law applicable to the case would be, before the purchase of the whisky was made. It appears that he was not a lawyer, but had been connected with the revenue service; and while the previous consultation might have been for no improper purpose whatever, it becomes exceedingly suspicious when we find it continued after the parties consulting with him had succeeded in entrapping an intended victim into a violation of the law. And when Saunders appears on the stage afterward endeavoring to persuade the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. McCrea
...defendants. The order of proof was within the discretion of the trial court, and we find no abuse of such discretion. In People v. Saunders, 25 Mich. 119, 121, we said: ‘There is no class of cases [conspiracy] in which it is more important that the circuit judge should have a large discreti......
-
The State ex inf. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co.
... ... 197; Pipe and Steel ... Co. v. U.S. 85 F. 764; Railroad v. Searles, 37 ... So. 939; State v. Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137; ... People v. Gas Trust, 130 Ill. 268; People v ... Distilling Co., 156 Ill. 448; Harding v. Glucose ... Co., 182 Ill. 551; Richardson v. Buhl, 77 ... S. v. Gardner, 42 F ... 831; 4 Ency. Pl. & Pr., 713; Com. v. Eastman, 1 ... Cush. 190; State v. Parker, 43 N.H. 84; People ... v. Saunders, 25 Mich. 119; Hazen v ... Commonwealth, 23 Pa. St. 363; Landringham v ... State, 49 Ind. 186; Hazen v. Com., 23 Pa. St ... 364; Cole ... ...
-
State v. Wappenstein
...acts and declarations of a conspirator may be introduced in the first instance before proof of the agreement.' 8 Cyc. p. 682; People v. Saunders, 25 Mich. 119; State Thompson, 69 Conn. 720, 38 A. 868; State v. Miller, 35 Kan. 328, 10 P. 865; State v. Jackson, 82 N.C. 565; Lutterell v. State......
-
People v. Atley
...may fairly infer it. The weight of the evidence upon this, as upon the other facts in the case, is for the jury.' Also see People v. Saunders, 25 Mich. 119 (1872) where Justice Cooley said 'it often happens that the existence of the conspiracy is only made out by inference from the acts and......