Saunders v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 23 March 1887 |
| Citation | 10 N.E. 815,144 Mass. 306 |
| Parties | SAUNDERS v. ROBINSON, and another, Trustee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
W.F. & W.S. Slocum, for plaintiff.
The paper mentioned in the trustee's answer as a "benefit certificate" is a policy of insurance upon the life of Carlton W. Robinson for $1,000, payable upon his decease to the defendant. Com. v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149-160. The $1,000 payable by the trustee to the defendant by virtue of this policy is not exempt from attachment under the provisions of Pub.St. c. 115, § 8. Elsey v. Odd Fellows' Mut. Relief Ass'n, 142 Mass. 226, 7 N.E. 844. See Com. v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 160. The fund is not raised as provided by Pub.St. c 115, § 8. The interest of the defendant in the sum of $1,000 payable to her by this policy became fixed and vested in her upon the death of the assured, and liable to be taken for her debts. Norris v. Massachusetts Life Ins. Co., 131 Mass. 294; Troy v. Sargent, 132 Mass. 408, 409. The provisions of Pub.St. c. 115, § 8, exempting the "fund so held," applies to the fund held during the life of the member, but does not exempt it from the debts of the beneficiary after the death of the insured. Pub.St. c. 119, § 167; Norris v. Massachusetts Life Ins. Co. and Troy v Sargent, cited above. St.1885, c. 183, § 11, was passed subsequent to the attachment in the case, and does not affect it. It is not retroactive. The court will not presume that the legislature assumed that it would not be for the benefit of a person to whom the insurance was payable to pay his or her honest debts. Upon the facts disclosed as to the attempted surrender of the certificate, the liability of the trustee to the defendant under it had not changed at the time of the service of the writ on the trustee, or created any liability to James M. Beane, Robinson's brother-in-law. Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 564; Badger v Popular Life Ins. Co., 103 Mass. 244. The term "or other relatives," as used in St.1882, c. 195, § 2, and as used in the by-laws of the trustee corporation, do not include a brother-in-law. They include none but blood relations or next of kin, according to the statute of distribution. Esty v. Clark, 101 Mass. 36; Kimball v. Story, 108 Mass. 382; Drew v Wakefield, 54 Me. 291; Ennis v. Pentz, 3 Bradf.Surr. 382; Elsey v. Odd Fellows' Mut. Relief Ass'n, 142 Mass. 224, 7 [10 N.E. 816] N.E. 844; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24-27; Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643; Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775. There is no presumption or evidence that James M. Beane was dependent upon C.W. Robinson, the insured.
Stearns & Butler, for trustee.
The question is whether a certain fund, held by said association, can be attached and taken by trustee process as the property of the defendant. Carlton W. Robinson, to whom the benefit certificate was issued, was a member of said association within the scope and meaning of Pub.St. c. 115, § 8, and said fund was not liable to attachment by trustee or other process, as therein provided. Any other view or construction would nullify the terms and intent of the statute, as well as the object of the association. American Legion of Honor v. Perry, 140 Mass. 589, 5 N.E. 634. Independently of said freedom from attachment, the defendant had no legal interest in said benefit fund, and said association was not indebted to her at the commencement of said trustee process. The non-issuing of the new certificate concerns only the association and the new beneficiaries. It does not affect said surrender, or revive or keep in force the surrendered certificate.
OPINION
It is the contention of the plaintiff that Carlton W. Robinson was not a member of the association known as the "Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum;" that there were two distinct bodies, and that there is a distinction between such membership and that of the Royal Arcanum, of which he was a member. He therefore urges that, while a benefit certificate was issued to Robinson as a member, it is to be treated as an ordinary insurance on his life, and that, as he cannot be regarded as a member of the corporation that issued it, the rules which apply to policies of insurance on lives govern it, and not those which apply to certificates issued under the provisions of Pub.St. c. 115, § 8. The articles of association, and also the certificate of incorporation, being silent as to who shall be treated as members of the corporation, the plaintiff contends that its constitution, art. 4, § 1,--which provides that "this supreme council shall be composed of its officers, the representatives from grand councils, and all past supreme regents," and that, "no other member of this order shall be admitted under any circumstances," except that original incorporators, if in good standing in their subordinate councils, shall be life-members,--prescribes the only rule for membership, and therefore that Robinson cannot be regarded as a member. There is, it must be admitted, a certain confusion resulting from the fact that the supreme council is sometimes treated in the certificate of incorporation, constitution, and by-laws as the corporation, and sometimes as only its governing body, who directs its operations. It is to the body acting in the latter capacity that the article in question refers. The section quoted contemplates distinctly, by the use of terms referring to them, that there are other members of the order.
An examination of the whole system will show that the association was established, among other things, for the purpose of affording mutual aid to its members, and also for the purpose of establishing what was termed a "widows' and orphans' benefit fund," for the payment of specific sums to the widows, orphans, and other dependents of deceased...
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