Saunders v. State
Decision Date | 18 November 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 52,52 |
Citation | 258 A.2d 776,8 Md.App. 143 |
Parties | Ronald Lee SAUNDERS v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Donna C. Aldridge, Hyattsville, for appellant.
Robert A. DiCicco, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, with whom were on brief Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., State's Atty., Donald P. McLaughlin, Asst. State's Atty., Prince George's County, for appellee.
Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.
Ronald Lee Saunders, the appellant, was convicted of larceny in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County and sentenced to a term of three years. Saunders was tried by a jury as was one of Saunders' co-defendants; another co-defendant was tried in the same proceeding by the court without the jury.
In this proceeding appellant raises five contentions. The contentions in the order in which they will be considered are that there was error in: (1) failing to allow a severance as to defendant Saunders (2) failing to dismiss the count of larceny (3) admitting out-of-court statements and confessions of non-testifying co-defendants implicating Saunders and failing to instruct the jury as to the limiting effect to be given to these statements, citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (4) finding the courtroom identification sufficient (5) finding the element of ownership in the larceny count had been proven.
On August 29, 1968, James E. Conner, a special investigator for Giant Foods, Inc., was working at the company's Cottage City warehouse in Prince George's County, Maryland. At or about noon, he discovered two cartons of merchancise were missing from the warehouse. He testified he saw appellant, Saunders, who was employed as a stockclerk near an open security door. Although Saunders' work assignment was in that section of the warehouse, Conner testified Saunders had no authority to open the door. At that time Saunders explained he had opened the door to get fresh air while eating lunch. Conner testified that it was approximately fifteen feet from where Saunders was at the open door to where the two cartons of merchandise were hidden. Conner later found the two cartons as a result of an intensive search of the warehouse premises. He initialed the cartons and, together with a fellow security investigator, Tollie C. Holtzclaw, instituted a surveillance of the two cartons. At approximately 2:45 P.M. on the same day, three men drove up to the warehouse in a vehicle bearing District of Columbia registration. One of the three men lifted the hood to the automobile and appeared to be inspecting the motor while the other two loaded the cartons into the automobile. At this time Conner and Holtzclaw approached the men, who fled; however, two of the three were apprehended at that time. Saunders was not arrested at that time. The two men who were arrested were taken to the Hyattsville Jail and read their Miranda rights. Conner then proceeded to interrogate each of the suspects separately. In their conversations they stated what amounted to a confession. Each suspect also implicated Saunders, which fact was testified to at trial by Conner. On September 4, 1968, Saunders was arrested while at work at the warehouse. Saunders was read his Miranda rights and also interrogated by Conner. Saunders' statement was admitted without objection. Although the record is barren as to what questions Conner asked Saunders in order to receive the responses that appear in the record as Saunders 'confession', it would appear that Conner confronted Saunders with some of the implicating evidence, and that Saunders admitted involvement in the crime. Holtzclaw's testimony supported Conner's. Prior to trial, Saunders moved for a severance from the co-defendants. The State answered with the statement:
'(T)hat all evidence admissible against the defendant, Ronald Lee Saunders, is also admissible against the other defendants * * * that joinder of the defendant's, Ronald Lee Saunders, trial with the trial of the other defendants will not be prejudicial to said defendant * * *.'
The motion was never ruled upon. During the trial the motion was called to the trial judge's attention, but he stated that it had been waived because Saunders had gone to trial without insisting on the ruling, but he indicated that Saunders would, in his opinion, be entitled to relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act on the grounds that counsel was incompetent because he did not insist on a ruling in view of the cross-confessions. The trial judge further stated that at that point in the proceedings, all he could do was instruct the jury that the statement of each accused was admissible only as to the one making the statement. No such instruction was ever given, either at the time the statements were admitted or in the general instructions at the end of the testimony. Counsel never requested such instructions nor was there an exception to the failure to give the instructions.
In the absence of waiver, the failure to rule on a pretrial motion is fatal error. See Brice v. State, 254 Md. 655, 255 A.2d 28. Here, as in Brice, the defendant had made a pretrial motion, the granting of which would have significantly altered the course of the trial. In Brice, it did not alter the result that the defendant himself believed the motion to have been ruled upon and so informed the trial court. Nor did it...
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