Saunders v. White
| Decision Date | 04 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.99-2807 (RCL).,CIV.A.99-2807 (RCL). |
| Parties | Lieutenant Colonel Raymond SAUNDERS Plaintiff, v. Thomas E. WHITE, Secretary of the Army, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Christopher Alexander Sterbenz, Vienna, VA, for Plaintiff.
Vincent Morgan Garvey, Peter Baker Robbins, David Michael Glass, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div., Washington, DC, for Defendant.
On March 19, 2001, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's original complaint. Thereafter, the plaintiff amended his complaint. Now the defendant again seeks dismissal, or in the alternative, summary judgment. In addition, the plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that as a matter of law the defendant's use of racial and gender classifications in its promotion policy violated his Fifth Amendment rights and that the only issue left for the Court to resolve concerns fashioning an appropriate remedy. After a full review of the parties' memoranda, the applicable law, and for the following reasons, the Court DENIES in part and GRANTS in part the defendant's motion and DENIES in part and GRANTS in part the plaintiff's motion.
The facts of this case have already been fully recounted in the Court's March 19, 2001 Memorandum Opinion. For the present purposes, it enough to state that the plaintiff is a white male who is on retired status in the United States Army. He is ranked as a lieutenant colonel and, during the years 1996 and 1997, he sought promotion to the rank of colonel. In each instance, he was denied promotion.
On October 25, 1999, the plaintiff filed this action alleging that his failure to be promoted was due to the Army's equal opportunity policy. His complaint clearly alleged that the Army's policy was unconstitutional both facially and as applied. See Amended Complaint, Mar. 19, 2001 ( that the defendant's equal opportunity instructions "both as set forth in writing and as actually interpreted and executed" violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.)
On March 31, 2000, the Army moved to dismiss LTC Saunders' original complaint on several standing and mootness grounds. As such, the Army did not address whether the equal opportunity policy was, on its face, unconstitutional. The Court granted in part and denied in part the Army's motion. Specifically, the Court dismissed Saunders' claims for prospective relief on the ground that he, as a retired officer, had no standing to seek such relief.1 With respect to Saunders' retrospective claims, the Court found that Saunders had properly stated a claim.
Thereafter, the plaintiff amended his complaint. He added an allegation that he was denied "equal protection of the laws [through the use of] racial and sexual classifications in [the] composition of the [promotion] selection boards." Amended Complaint, at 7.
In response to Saunders' amended complaint, the Army moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. Aside from its argument against the selection board composition claim, the Army advances several different arguments:
(1) Saunders' claim with respect to the 1996 selection board should be dismissed because the equal opportunity policy did not discriminate on the basis of race or gender;
(b) he would not have been promoted even in the absence of the equal opportunity policy, and
(c) the Army's behavior is justifiable under a standard of intermediate scrutiny.
If a plaintiff has failed "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," a court may grant a defendant's motion to dismiss. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see also Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1114 (D.C.Cir.2000). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and give the plaintiff "the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C.Cir.1979); see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). "However, legal conclusions, deductions or opinions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness." Wiggins v. Hitchens, 853 F.Supp. 505, 508 n. 1 (D.D.C.1994) ().
As the plaintiff's amended complaint is identical to the plaintiff's original complaint in all respects save one, few words are needed to resolve the defendant's motion. The only issue presented in the instant motion that was not addressed by the Court's March 19, 2001 Opinion is the issue of selection board composition. On this issue, the Court finds that the plaintiff is without standing to facially challenge the selection board composition, but may proceed with an as applied claim. See Ward v. Caldera, 138 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001).
To have jurisdiction over a case, a court must find there to be "a causal relationship between the [plaintiff's] injury and the challenged conduct." Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). In the case at hand, there is no such relationship between the defendant's membership policy and the plaintiff's non-promotion. The Court recently explained its reasoning at length in Ward v. Caldera:
To hold [in favor of the non-promoted plaintiff] would be to hold that every time "one or more females and one or more members of racial groups other than Caucasian" are placed on a selection board, the collective promotion decisions of the selection board are unavoidably altered. Such a conclusion would necessarily include two presumptions. First, that all women and non-whites have an inherent and unavoidable disposition to favor their own race and gender. And second, that all promotion decisions by selection boards are controlled by the voting habits of a few women and non-whites.
The first presumption is not just patently false, it is diametrically opposed to Supreme Court jurisprudence which this Court is bound to follow. The Supreme Court has consistently shunned such racial and gender stereotypes, and, in any event, has never held that a decision-maker's race or sex, by itself, prevents her from making an objective decision.
The second presumption behind the plaintiff's claim is completely devoid of logic. While it is reasonable to assume that women and non-whites, together with the other members of selection boards, inform the decisions of the board, it is patently unreasonable to assume that a few members, constituting a numerical minority of the board, can control the outcome of the board's decisions. Thus, even if women and nonwhites were possessed of the class narcissism which the plaintiff implies, there is no reason to think they would be successful in converting the rest of the board to their views.
Of course, there exists the possibility (though it is a slight one for sure) that a particular woman or minority, possessed of both class narcissism and Machiavellian powers of persuasion, could pull off a coup of racial or gender discrimination against a particular applicant. But the mere possibility of this is a far cry from the necessity that, in a facial challenge, the plaintiff "establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [policy] would be valid."
Ward, 138 F.Supp.2d at 8-9 (citations omitted).
Regarding selection board composition, the instant case presents the same material facts as Ward v. Caldera. Thus, the Court finds that the plaintiff's facial challenge to the policy must fail.2 The plaintiff, however, may continue to pursue an as-applied challenge; that is, an allegation that the 1996 and 1997 selection boards that considered his promotion intended to discriminate against him. As the Court recognized in Ward,
the plaintiff in this case might, in accordance with his duty to demonstrate a discriminatory purpose under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), utilize the selection board membership, together with other evidence such as the promotion rate for certain races and genders, to persuade the Court that he has been discriminated against.
Ward, 138 F.Supp.2d at 9. Thus, although the Court holds that board membership itself is not conclusive (or even probative) as to discrimination, the individual identities of board members may, of course, play a role in discrimination.
Before reaching the merits of a particular claim, a federal court must assure itself that it has jurisdiction over the case. See FW/PBS Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (same); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (same). In order for a court to have jurisdiction over a case, the plaintiff bringing the suit must have standing to raise the claims asserted therein. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of...
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