Sausaman v. Leininger, 29616

• Decision Date: 12 December 1957
• Docket Number: No. 29616,29616
• Parties: Jack E. SAUSAMAN, Appellant, v. Byron LEININGER, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 414

146 N.E.2d 414

237 Ind. 508

Jack E. SAUSAMAN, Appellant, v. Byron LEININGER, Appellee.

No. 29616.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Dec. 12, 1957.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 22, 1958.

Cole, Wildman & Cole, Peru, R. J. Wildman, Peru, Alfred H. Plummer, Wabash, for appellant.

Charles C. Campbell, Arthur Metzler, Rochester, for appellee.

ACHOR, Judge.

This action was instituted by appellee for recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained while riding as a guest in a 1938 Ford operated by appellant. ¹ Trial by the court resulted in a finding and judgment favoring appellee for $7,000.

Motion for new trial contained five specifications. The only grounds relied upon on appeal are that the decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law.

The alleged acts of wanton or wilful misconduct of appellant which proximately caused the injuries to appellee are as follows: The appellant, who lacked two months of being 18 years of age, was driving an automobile owned by his uncle, which was used by appellant for pleasure. The car was so constructed that when the key was removed a pin would be inserted by a spring in a hole in the steering column and lock the wheel when the wheel was turned. On this occasion appellant left the Akron high school with some of his friends, one of whom was the appellee, for a drive through the country. In returning to Akron appellant drove in a southerly direction on State Road 19. When he was five to seven hundred feet north of the city limits and traveling from 50 to 65 miles per hour, appellant pulled out the ignition key and caused the car to coast into town with the key removed. At the city limits there was a 35 to 40 degree curve in the road. Appellant turned the car into this curve which caused the steering wheel to lock. Thereafter the car traveled about 125 feet when it hit a tree. At that time the car was traveling 35 to 40 miles per hour. Appellee was injured as a result of this collision.

Appellant urges that the decision is contrary to law for lack of evidence, in that there is no evidence showing wanton or wilful misconduct in the operation of the car. Appellant contends that his action was neither wanton nor wilful within the meaning of the statute for the reason that he alone knew his state of mind and that his testimony is uncontradicted that he had 'tried the ignition key many times and had found the lock (mechanism) did not work,' and that when he drove the car with the key out the probability of causing injury to his guests 'was the least of my thoughts.' Consequently, appellant contends, under the circumstances the operation of the car with the key removed, constituted no more than a 'mistake of judgment,' for which there was no liability under the guest statute (§ 47-1021, Burns' 1952 Repl.).

However, we are confronted by the fact that (1) the jury had a right to disbelieve appellant's testimony regarding his knowledge of the operation of the car ² and (2) that appellant was chargeable with the knowledge of reasonable men regarding the probability of injury resulting from his conduct. Appellant testified that he understood that the steering mechanism was supposed to lock the front wheels when in three positions, namely, center, left or right, and that from his observation he believed the mechanism was not working. However, this was inconsistent with the testimony of another occupant of the car, who had frequently ridden in the car and understood that the mechanism locked when the wheels were turned.

Furthermore, appellant's own testimony was that he never really made a careful check of the car to determine whether the steering apparatus would lock when the key was removed and the wheels turned to a substantial degree, as it was made to do. By his own testimony, he had driven the car once when he had 'made a slight curve,' and had tried it in his driveway two or three times. Significantly he did not state that he ever tried it when the wheels were turned more than slightly. In fact, his own statement was, 'I never went into detail with it.'

Yet, on this occasion, knowing that the car was constructed in such a manner that the steering wheel would lock when the key was removed, and also knowing of the sharp curve in the road, appellant consciously and intentionally removed the key while driving at a high rate of speed and turned the car sharply into the curve causing the wheels to lock and the collision to occur.

Can we say as a matter of law that this action did not constitute 'wanton or wilful misconduct'? The rule with regard to such conduct has been generally stated as follows:

'In order to constitute willfulness or wantonness within the meaning of this rule, the acts or conduct of the operator of the motor vehicle causing the injury must be done under circumstances which show that the operator is aware, from his knowledge of existing conditions, that it is probable that injury will result from his acts or omissions, and nevertheless proceeds with reckless indifference as to the consequences, or acts without consideration for others on the highway or without care for their safety; but it is not necessary that the driver should have any ill will toward the person injured or that he intend to cause or deliberately cause, the accident or injury in question. More precisely, it has been held that there is a distinction between the terms 'willful' and 'wanton,' as used in such cases, in that 'willful' implies intent or purpose, while 'wanton' expresses a reckless disregard of consequences.' 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 258, p. 631. See: Lafayette and Indianapolis Railroad Company v. Huffman, 1867, 28 Ind. 287; Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad Company v. Graham, 1883, 95 Ind. 286.

The rule has been stated by our courts as follows:

'Willful or wanton misconduct consists of the conscious and intentional doing of a wrongful act or omission of a duty, with reckless indifference to consequences, under circumstances which show that the doer has knowledge of existing conditions and that injury will probably result.' Becker v. Strater, 1947, 117 Ind.App. 504, 506, 72 N.E.2d 580, 581. See also: Bedwell v. DeBolt, 1943, 221 Ind. 600, 50 N.E.2d 875.

Appellant asserts that, inherent to the rule as above stated, there must be some 'perverse motive' on the part of the driver, such as malice or wilfulness, as related to the probability of injury to his gutests, and that no such motive existed on the...