Savage v. United States
| Decision Date | 12 February 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-70-Civ-177.,3-70-Civ-177. |
| Parties | Francis J. SAVAGE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Miles W. Lord, Hartley Nordin, State of Minnesota, Earl Cudd, Cyrus Magnusson, Alfred Anderson, Silas C. Haugen, and Herbert Ramberg, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Francis J. Savage, pro se.
Stephen G. Palmer, Asst. U. S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., for defendants United States of America, Miles W. Lord and Hartley Nordin.
John R. Kenefick, Asst. Sol. Gen., St. Paul, Minn., for defendants State of Minnesota, Earl Cudd, Alfred O. Anderson and Silas C. Haugen.
Joseph Perry, St. Paul, Minn., for defendant Herbert Ramberg.
This matter is before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by defendants United States of America, Miles W. Lord, and Hartley Nordin, and by defendants State of Minnesota, Earl Cudd, Alfred Anderson, Silas C. Haugen, and Herbert Ramberg. These motions are made pursuant to the provisions of Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The complaint attempts to state two claims for relief, one based upon the common law tort of malicious prosecution, the other based upon the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Numerous grounds are relied on by defendants in support of their motions for dismissal. For reasons stated below, the motions to dismiss are granted.
From the pleadings, files and records it appears that American Allied Insurance Company (American Allied) was a stock insurance company incorporated under the laws of the State of Minnesota. On August 31, 1964, a routine financial examination of American Allied was conducted by the Insurance Division of the State of Minnesota pursuant to state law. That examination was directed by defendant Anderson, Chief Examiner for the Insurance Division, and the examiners were defendants Haugen and Ramberg. Defendant Magnusson was the Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Minnesota.
The examination report indicated a need for improvement and more adequate maintenance of records on the part of American Allied. Because of this unsatisfactory report and because of additional complaints and an exceptional increase in the volume of business done by American Allied, a second and more extensive examination of American Allied was conducted under the direction and supervision of the above-referenced Chief Examiner and examiners.
These two examinations precipitated action by the State of Minnesota to declare American Allied insolvent and obtain an order for liquidation. Defendant Cudd, Special Assistant Attorney General for the State of Minnesota, participated in the preparation and trial of the insolvency proceeding against American Allied. After a hearing in state district court, an order for liquidation of American Allied was issued on August 4, 1965.
During this time, the affairs of American Allied were also inquired into by United States authorities regarding possible violations of federal law. As a result of the information discovered, facts were presented to a federal grand jury and indictments for mail fraud were returned against various individuals. Plaintiff was one of those against whom an indictment issued. Defendant Lord, then United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota, and defendant Nordin, then Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota, were responsible for the preparation and presentation of evidence to the grand jury. The indictment against plaintiff was subsequently dismissed on July 21, 1967 without his having to stand trial.
The complaint,1 of considerable length and apparently drafted by plaintiff without professional legal aid, alleges, in essence, that plaintiff joined American Allied as an employee on or about January 1, 1965 for the purpose of securing protective reinsurance for the company, following assurances by defendants State of Minnesota, Magnusson, Anderson, Haugen, and Ramberg that American Allied was in a state-approved financial condition. Plaintiff alleges that these defendants fraudulently concealed the true financial condition of American Allied. Plaintiff further alleges that each of the defendants, acting individually and in conspiracy, and under the color of law, did wilfully, fraudulently, and maliciously contrive to secure a grand jury indictment against plaintiff without reasonable or probable cause in order to advance their own personal interests, such acts being beyond the discretion of their respective duties and offices. This conduct is alleged to have deprived plaintiff of his civil rights in contravention of the Constitution of the United States and related statutes. It is also alleged that this conduct injured plaintiff's reputation among his friends and business associates so as to prevent plaintiff from pursuing his usual occupation in the insurance industry as a reinsurance specialist. Plaintiff seeks recovery of damages.
Plaintiff's complaint as against the United States of America must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States is subject to civil liability for torts committed by its officers and employees only to the extent provided for by the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2674. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint against defendants Lord and Nordin is for malicious prosecution. The Federal Tort Claims Act specifically excepts this type of claim from those for which recovery can be had from the United States.
Thus, the government has expressly reserved its traditional immunity from tort claims of the nature of the one alleged by plaintiff. See Tinkoff v. United States, 211 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1954).
To the extent plaintiff's complaint is founded on the Civil Rights Act, it fails to state a claim against the United States since the statute applies only to deprivations of constitutional rights caused by other "persons." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The United States is not such a "person."
Plaintiff's complaint as against the State of Minnesota must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The State of Minnesota is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the Constitution or acts of Congress and hence there is no diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 24 S.Ct. 598, 48 L.Ed. 870 (1904); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Long, 181 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1950). Nor is the State of Minnesota a "person" within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act. There is no federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); United States ex rel. Lee v. People, 343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965). In addition, plaintiff's claims for relief as against the State of Minnesota are barred by the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity. U.S.Const. Amend XI; Spanel v. Mounds View School District No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W. 2d 795 (1962); Berman v. Minnesota State Agriculture Society, 93 Minn. 125, 100 N.W. 732 (1904).
It is undisputed from the pleadings and files that each of the named individual defendants was engaged in the performance of his official duties under Federal or State law at all times material, and in connection with the improper conduct alleged against each of them.
The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity requires the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as against defendants Lord, Nordin, Cudd, Anderson, Haugen and Ramberg.
Quasi-judicial immunity from suits for civil liability derives from the common law doctrine of judicial immunity, concerning which the Supreme Court stated in 1871:
"It is a principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1871).
An identical concern for the preservation of personal freedom for other public officials charged with discretionary authority from harassment and vindictive or ill-founded damage suits has led the federal courts to apply the doctrine of immunity in suits against lesser governmental officials. By the great weight of authority such officials are immune from civil suits based on allegedly malicious or erroneous acts in the performance of their duties. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959) (); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 79 S.Ct. 1331, 3 L.Ed.2d 1454 (1959) (Commander of Boston Naval Shipyard—defamation); Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1950) (Immigration Officials—false imprisonment); Swanson v. Willis, 114 F.Supp. 434 (D.Alaska 1953) (Deputy United States Marshal—battery, false arrest); Hartline v. Clary, 141 F.Supp. 151 (E.D.S.C.1956) ().
The Supreme Court expressly discussed the theory underlying the extension of the immunity doctrine to lesser government officials in Barr v. Matteo, supra.
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