Savage v. Utah Youth Village

• Decision Date: 03 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 20030087.,20030087.
• Citation: 2004 UT 102,104 P.3d 1242
• Parties: Jake Savage, Jana Savage, and Jake Savage as guardian for and on behalf of John Doe, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Utah Youth Village, a Utah Corporation, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

2004 UT 102

104 P.3d 1242

Jake Savage, Jana Savage, and Jake Savage as guardian for and on behalf of John Doe, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Utah Youth Village, a Utah Corporation, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20030087.

Supreme Court of Utah.

FILED December 3, 2004.

This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter.

Fred R. Silvester, Spencer Siebers, Salt Lake, for plaintiffs.

Dale J. Lambert, Karra J. Porter, Salt Lake, for defendant.

Von G. Keetch, Alexander Dushku, Salt Lake, Amicus Curiae.

DURHAM, Chief Justice:

¶1 Plaintiffs Jake and Jana Savage, on behalf of their minor son John Doe, appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant Utah Youth Village (the Village). The Savages sued the Village for various claims arising from the Village's placement of a juvenile in their home who subsequently molested their three-year-old child. The district court held that the Savages' claims are barred by Utah Code section 78-12-25.1. The Savages raise four issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the Village's motion to amend its answer to include the statute as a defense; (2) whether negligent placement is a cognizable claim under Utah law; (3) whether Utah Code section 78-12-25.1 is a delayed discovery statute of limitation designed to give victims of child sexual abuse with repressed memories the opportunity to sue certain individuals upon recollection of the sexual abuse, and not, as the district court held, a statute that "created and defined" a new cause of action; and (4) whether the statute, as interpreted by the district court, violates Utah's constitutional guarantees of open courts and uniform operation of laws.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The Village is a private, non-profit Utah corporation that provides treatment and help for youth with "mild emotional or behavioral problems, a minimal delinquent record and/or difficulty with interpersonal relationships," and also places youth in foster homes. The Village contracts with foster, or "treatment," parents and places treatment youth in these parents' homes. For each child, the Village is required to maintain a confidential file containing the child's psychosocial, psychiatric, and therapy information, as well as other confidential documents. The file is secured at the Village offices, and foster parents can have access when they visit. In addition, the Village is required to maintain an "Out-of-Home Placement Information Record," or "Traveling File," that accompanies the child to every foster home and contains a record of the child's mental health and medical and delinquency history.

¶3 In 1996, the Savages approached the Village about their desire to work as foster parents. In preparation for this responsibility, they attended training meetings where they learned that foster children have often been abused, are frequently at risk to abuse other children, and should not at any time be left alone with other children in the foster home. After completing their training, the Savages took in five different foster children between 1996 and 1997. After a break from working as foster parents, they again decided to become foster parents in May 1999, this time for sex offender youth. The Savages understood these children to have fewer behavioral problems and to require less paperwork to monitor their progress. The Savages also desired the extra income that fostering sex offender youth provided. Before assuming this responsibility, the Savages met with the Village treatment director, Jeff Simpson, who emphasized the precautions they must take to protect their own children, including never leaving their children alone with a treatment youth.

¶4 From August to November 1999, the Savages took in three different youth sex offenders. The Village provided the Savages with the Traveling Files for each youth, at least two of whom had histories of sexual offenses arguably more serious than the fourth youth, J.B., whom the Village placed with the Savages in December 1999. Shannon Morris, the Village's consultant to foster parents, had been unable to obtain J.B.'s Traveling File, which detailed his sexual history and criminal record, from his caseworker, who had been fired by the Village at the time Morris placed J.B. in the Savages' home. Instead, Morris orally described J.B. to the Savages, allegedly downplaying his history of sexual offenses and promising that he would be a "good kid." The Savages claim that despite their many requests and Morris's persistent promises to find and bring the Traveling File to them, neither she nor anyone else at the Village provided them with J.B.'s Traveling File, which contained his criminal record.

¶5 Jake Savage learned something more of J.B.'s criminal history of sexual abuse when he accompanied J.B. to a court hearing on January 4, 2000, where the mother of one of J.B.'s young victims addressed the court. During the drive home from the hearing, in response to Jake's inquiry, J.B. revealed that he had committed sexual offenses against eighteen victims. The following night, January 5, 2000, after Jake Savage had gone to work a night shift, Jana Savage and her three-year-old son, John Doe, were watching television or reading a book in the Savages' living room while J.B. lay on the floor doing his homework. At one point, Jana left the room for an estimated ten minutes to check on her ten-month-old son who had started crying in his crib. While Jana was absent from the living room, J.B. sexually abused John Doe.

¶6 Within one year of the abuse, the Savages sued the Village for negligent placement, fraud, breach of contract, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In September 2002, the parties completed discovery, certified the case for trial, and prepared for the trial date of January 14, 2003. On November 8, 2002, the Village filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Utah Code section 78-12-25.1 barred the Savages' claims. The Village argued that the statute limited all civil actions for sexual abuse of a child in Utah to abuse by a "living person," not a corporate entity such as the Village.

¶7 The Savages argued that the statute did not apply as a bar to their claims, would be unconstitutional if applied as the Village urged, and was an affirmative defense that the Village had never pled and had therefore waived. The district court granted the Village's motion to amend its answer and its motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

I. THE DECISION TO ALLOW THE VILLAGE TO AMEND ITS ANSWER

¶8 The Savages argue that the district court abused its discretion in granting the Village's motion to amend its answer because the Village requested the amendment late in the litigation, it should have been aware of the statute when the complaint was filed, and it offered no adequate justification for the untimely nature of its request.

¶9 The district court's decision to allow amendment of the pleadings is reviewed for "abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the complaining party." Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, ¶ 38, 57 P.3d 997. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given" by the court "when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). The court's ultimate goal is to have the "real controversy between the parties presented, their rights determined, and the cause decided," Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 57 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Utah 1936), so the court should "allow amendments freely where justice requires, and especially is this true before trial." Gillman V. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045-46 (Utah 1971) (internal quotations omitted). Another "prime consideration" is whether the nonmoving party had adequate "opportunity to meet the newly raised matter." Id. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981). Further, in deciding whether to grant a motion to amend, Utah courts should consider the following factors: "(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification for delay; and (3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party." Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight, 845 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

¶10 Here, the Village filed its motion four weeks before the trial date, giving the Savages a month to research and address the newly raised statute. The Savages did in fact respond to the arguments based on section 78-12-25.1, raising numerous points in opposition to its application. Although the Village moved to amend eleven months after the deadline to amend had passed, three months after the case was certified for trial, and four weeks before trial, thus pressing the outer limits of timeliness, we conclude that no prejudice to appellants is apparent, and the district court acted within its broad discretion when it granted the Village's motion to amend its answer to include the Village's argument regarding section 78-12-25.1(5).

II. EXISTENCE OF A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT PLACEMENT

¶11 In their original complaint, the Savages brought a cause of action against the Village for, among other things, negligence in failing to warn the Savages of J.B.'s criminal record which included "serious sexual deviancy" and "habitual molestation of young children." The Savages allege that the Village's negligence resulted in the sexual abuse of their child by J.B. In their briefs and at oral argument, the Savages characterized this claim as one for negligent placement and argued that such a cause of action is cognizable under Utah law. The Village disputes the Savages' characterization of the law and claims that Utah courts have "never recognized a common law cause of action of the nature alleged by the Savages."

¶12 This court has never explicitly recognized a claim for negligent placement. In Little v. Division of Family Services, however, parents whose autistic child died while in a foster home providing "specialized assistance" for autistic needs filed suit against...