Savas v. Cal. State Law Enforcement Agency

Decision Date08 September 2020
Docket NumberCase No.: 20-cv-00032-DMS-DEB
Citation485 F.Supp.3d 1233
Parties Jonathan SAVAS, et al., individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CALIFORNIA STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, a labor organization; Betty Yee, in her official capacity as State Controller of California; and Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity as Attorney General of California, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of California

Rebekah Christine Millard, Freedom Foundation, Olympia, WA, Mariah Gondeiro, Freedom Foundation, Redwood City, CA, for Plaintiffs Jonathan Savas, Lauren Ashby, Ethan Balter, Bella Bardeen, Paul Carey, Christian Espinoza, Carter Fenley, Alec Fletes, Moses Haase, Frank Harwood, Jon Hernandez, Cole Heydorff, Jess Hiller, Mackenzie Koepsell, Jennifer Marshall, Andres Mendoza, Kent Mertins, Yuruan Quinones, Joshua Raymond, Brad Rollins, Tristan Traub, Adam Wright.

Mariah Gondeiro, Freedom Foundation, Redwood City, CA, for Plaintiff Andrew Cox.

Cassandra M. Ferrannini, Downey Brand LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant California State Law Enforcement Agency.

Maureen C. Onyeagbako, California Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants Betty Yee, Xavier Becerra.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTSMOTION TO DISMISS

Dana M. Sabraw, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court are two separate motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims: one filed by Defendant California Statewide Law Enforcement Association1 ("CSLEA" or "the union"), and one filed by Defendants Betty Yee and Xavier Becerra (the "State Defendants"). Plaintiffs filed an opposition to each motion, and CSLEA and the State Defendants each filed a reply brief. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendantsmotions to dismiss.

I.BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are lifeguards employed by the California Department of Parks and Recreation.

(First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶ 35). CSLEA represents Plaintiffs exclusively in collective bargaining. (Id. ¶ 36). Plaintiffs joined CSLEA by signing a membership application. (Id. ¶ 41). CSLEA's membership application, in relevant part, authorized dues deductions from employees’ wages and stated there are limitations on the time period in which an employee can withdraw as a member of the union. Specifically, it read: "I elect to become a member of CSLEA and the applicable affiliate organization for my classification and department. I hereby authorize deduction from my salary of CSLEA/Affiliate dues. [...] Per the Unit 7 contract and State law, there are limitations on the time period for withdrawal from membership." (Ex. 2 to FAC). Plaintiffs allege they were not provided with a copy of the "Unit 7" contract, nor were they directed to where they could find that contract. (FAC ¶ 43). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs signed membership applications and became members of the union. (Id. ¶ 41).

Plaintiffs allege that if a lifeguard did not sign the membership application, they were required to pay "an automatic fee greater than or equal to the amount of full union dues." (Id. ¶ 49). In 2018, this type of agency fee scheme was struck down in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018), in which the Supreme Court held that the deduction of union dues or "fair-share" agency fees from nonmembers of a union violated the nonmember employees’ First Amendment rights, absent affirmative consent. 138 S. Ct. at 2486. Following the decision in Janus , California's Public Employment Relations Board, the agency which administers collective bargaining agreements for public employees, determined that it would no longer enforce any statutory or regulatory provision requiring nonmembers to pay agency fees. (Ex. A to State Defs.’ Mot. at 2).

In the summer of 2019, Plaintiffs decided to leave the union. (FAC ¶ 53). They inquired about dropping membership in July 2019 and later submitted membership resignations via certified mail in or around September 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 54–56). In October 2019, Plaintiffs received a reply from CSLEA Membership Coordinator Kara Gapke stating she would not approve Plaintiffs’ resignations because "the window [had] closed." (Id. ¶ 57).

The "window" referred to the time period during which union members could resign their membership, as detailed in a memorandum of understanding ("MOU") between CSLEA and the State. (Id. ¶ 58). The current MOU was finalized in July 2019 and expires July 1, 2023. (Id. ). The MOU contains an organizational security provision, Article 3.1(A)(1), which requires union members to pay dues for the duration of the bargaining agreement:

A written authorization for CSLEA dues deductions in effect on the effective date of this Contract or thereafter submitted shall continue in full force and effect during the life of this Contract; provided, however, that any employee may withdraw from CSLEA by sending a signed withdrawal letter to CSLEA within thirty (30) calendar days prior to the expiration of this Contract. (FAC ¶¶ 59–60).

Cal. Gov. Code § 3515.7(a) provides that unions may enter into an organizational security arrangement with the State in the form of "maintenance of membership." Under Cal. Gov. Code § 3513(i), "maintenance of membership" means that all state employees who voluntarily become members of a union shall remain members for a period agreed to in the MOU. The provision does not apply to any employee who withdraws from the union by submitting a signed letter within thirty days prior to the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.

State law further sets out the process by which union dues are deducted from members’ wages. Cal. Gov. Code § 3515.7(b) authorizes the State to remit funds deducted from employee wages to the unions. Under § 1152, employee organizations may request that the State deduct membership dues and other fees from union members’ wages, and the State Controller processes such deduction requests pursuant to the procedures set forth in § 1153. Plaintiffs allege that they have revoked the authority to deduct dues from their wages and object to union membership, but that union dues continue to be deducted from their wages. (FAC ¶ 63).

On January 6, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the present case against CSLEA, Betty Yee in her official capacity as State Controller, and Xavier Becerra in his official capacity as Attorney General. Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on May 15, 2020. Plaintiffs allege, individually and on behalf of all putative class members, that Defendants violated PlaintiffsFirst Amendment rights by: (1) refusing to accept Plaintiffs’ resignation from union membership, (2) continuing to deduct union dues from Plaintiffs’ paychecks, and (3) compelling Plaintiffs to join the union by threat of a fee. Plaintiffs also assert two state law claims against CSLEA, alleging that CSLEA committed the tort of fraudulent concealment and that CSLEA's membership applications are void for unconscionability. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, restitution, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The present motions followed.

II.LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ; Navarro v. Block , 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). In deciding a motion to dismiss, all material factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996). A court, however, need not accept all conclusory allegations as true. Rather, it must "examine whether conclusory allegations follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff." Holden v. Hagopian , 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff's complaint fails to contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

III.DISCUSSION
A. PlaintiffsFirst Amendment Claims

Plaintiffs’ first three causes of action are premised on violations of their First Amendment rights. They assert that the statutes relating to union membership and dues deductions are unconstitutional and that Defendants violated their First Amendment rights as secured by the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. CSLEA argues that Janus is inapplicable to union members like Plaintiffs, and that the First Amendment does not invalidate Plaintiffs’ contractual commitments. The State Defendants argue that State Controller Yee enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity; that Plaintiffs lack standing; that Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges fail because Plaintiffs consented to union membership and dues deductions; and that Plaintiffs’ third cause of action fails to plead sufficient facts.

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). "Dismissal of a § 1983 claim following a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is proper if the complaint is devoid of factual allegations that give rise to a plausible inference of either element." Naffe v. Frey , 789 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2015).

1. Claims Against CSLEA

Plaintiffs§ 1983 claims against CSLEA are based on the assertion that CSLEA violated PlaintiffsFirst...

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