Save the Valley, Inc. v. Indiana-Kentucky Elec. Corp.
| Decision Date | 11 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A04-0312-CV-610.,49A04-0312-CV-610. |
| Citation | 820 N.E.2d 677 |
| Parties | SAVE THE VALLEY, INC., Hoosier Environmental Council, Inc., and Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc., Appellants-Respondents-Defendants, v. INDIANA-KENTUCKY ELECTRIC CORPORATION, Appellee-Petitioner-Plaintiff, Indiana Department of Environmental Management, Appellee-Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Michael A. Mullett, Mullett Polk & Associates, LLC Indianapolis, IN, for Appellants.
Howard A. Learner, Shannon Fisk, Environmental Law and Policy Center, Chicago, IL, William R. Groth, Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth & Towe, Indianapolis, IN, for Amicus Curiae.
Anthony C. Sullivan, Bryan G. Tabler, Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Appellee, Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corporation.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Joby Jerrells, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Appellee, Indiana Department of Environmental Management.
Save the Valley, Inc., Hoosier Environmental Counsel, Inc., and Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc., (collectively "Appellants") appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss and the granting of a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corporation ("IKEC"). We reverse.
The Appellants raise three issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court properly granted IKEC's partial motion for summary judgment.
IKEC owns Clifty Creek Station, a coal-fired electric generating station in Jefferson County. On December 11, 2002, the Indiana Department of Environmental Management ("IDEM") (collectively with IKEC referred to as "Appellees") issued an order renewing IKEC's permit to operate a coal ash landfill near the Clifty Creek site.
On December 26, 2002, the Appellants petitioned for review of the granting of the permit with the Office of Environmental Management ("OEA"). The Appellants' petition alleged that unnamed members of their groups reside, work, and recreate in the area affected by the permit and that they would be adversely affected by the granting of the permit. On February 7, 2003, IKEC moved to dismiss the petition alleging that the Appellants did not state facts demonstrating that they were aggrieved or adversely affected by the granting of the permit. IKEC later alleged that the OEA was without jurisdiction over the case because the Appellants' petition did not demonstrate that they were persons aggrieved or adversely affected by the granting of the permit.
On March 31, 2003, the Appellants filed an amended petition alleging that named members of the groups reside, work, and recreate in the area affected by the granting of the permit. The amended petition also specified that the individual members would be adversely affected by the impact on the groundwater and by fugitive dust from the landfill. On June 23, 2003, the OEA denied IKEC's motion to dismiss on the ground that the Appellants had "associational standing," which gave the OEA jurisdiction over the case.
On July 3, 2003, IKEC filed a verified petition for judicial review and a complaint for declaratory judgment with the trial court. On July 23, 2003, IDEM also filed a petition for judicial review. On July 24, 2003, IKEC filed a motion for summary judgment on its complaint for declaratory judgment. On July 28, 2003, the cases were consolidated. The Appellants then filed motions to dismiss the Appellees' petitions for judicial review alleging that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the petitions. The Appellants did not file a timely response to IKEC's motion for summary judgment.
On October 27, 2003, the trial court granted IKEC's motion for summary judgment and denied the Appellants' motions to dismiss. The trial court concluded that the OEA never had jurisdiction over the case or the authority to award any administrative remedy except the dismissal of the Appellants' petition because the Appellants' petition did not demonstrate that they were aggrieved or adversely affected by the granting of the permit. The Appellants now appeal.2
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. C.F., 812 N.E.2d 181, 183 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). "When there are no disputed facts with regard to a motion for summary judgment and the question presented is a pure question of law, as is the case here, we review the matter de novo." Hopper v. Carey, 810 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. Further, we are not bound by the findings and conclusions entered by the trial court in its summary judgment order. Metropolitan Development Comm'n of Marion County v. Pinnacle Media, LLC, 811 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).
The Appellants argue that they had standing to petition for administrative review of the granting of IKEC's petition under the doctrine of associational standing. The Appellees respond that the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act ("AOPA") does not give the Appellants standing to petition for administrative review. This issue has not been addressed in Indiana.4
Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-3-7(a)(1), which describes how a party may seek administrative review, provides that a person must petition for review in a writing that states facts demonstrating: "(A) the petitioner is a person to whom the order is specifically directed; (B) the petitioner is aggrieved or adversely affected by the order; or (C) the petitioner is entitled to review under any law." In Huffman v. Office of Environmental Adjudication, 811 N.E.2d 806 (Ind.2004), our supreme court recently addressed the issue of standing to seek administrative review. In that case, the court addressed whether the judicial doctrine of standing applied to administrative proceedings. The court concluded that there was no clear evidence of a legislative intent to make the class of persons who may seek administrative review and the class of persons who have standing one and the same. Id. at 812. The court held, "the statute, and only the statute, defines the class of person who can seek administrative review of agency action." Id. at 813. The statute and Huffman are silent regarding an association's standing to sue on behalf of its members.
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that an association has standing to sue on behalf of its members when: "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 344, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2442, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977).
[W]hether an association has standing to invoke the court's remedial powers on behalf of its members depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought. If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2213, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
Several states have adopted the Hunt test and allow associations to proceed on behalf of their members. See, e.g., Bama Budweiser of Montgomery, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 783 So.2d 792, 795 (Ala.2000)
; Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Comm. Servs., 148 Ariz. 1, 712 P.2d 914, 919 (1985); Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70 v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 190 Cal.App.3d 1515, 236 Cal.Rptr. 78, 82-84 (Ca.App.1987); Connecticut Ass'n of Health Care Facilities, Inc., v. Worrell, 199 Conn. 609, 508 A.2d 743, 747-48 (1986); Oceanport Indus. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 902 (Del.1994); Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Dept. of Labor & Emp. Sec., 412 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla.1982); Aldridge v. Georgia Hospitality & Travel Ass'n, 251 Ga. 234, 304 S.E.2d 708, 710 (1983); Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 78 Hawai'i 192, 891 P.2d 279, 292 (1995); Glengary-Gamlin Protective Ass'n v. Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 675 P.2d 344, 347-48 (1983); NEA-Coffeyville v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 445, 268 Kan. 384, 996 P.2d 821, 824 (2000); Louisiana Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc., v. State, 669 So.2d 1185, 1190 (La.1996); Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc., v. Fisheries Wildlife Bd., 416 Mass. 635, 624 N.E.2d 556, 559 (1993); State v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 497-98 (Minn.1996); Mississippi Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. Bd. of Aldermen, 870 So.2d 1189, 1193 (Miss.2004); Missouri Outdoor Adver. Ass'n v. Missouri State Highways & Transp. Comm'n, 826 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Mo.1992); Dental Soc'y v. Carey, 61 N.Y.2d 330, 474 N.Y.S.2d 262, 462 N.E.2d 362, 363 (1984); Ohio Acad. of Nursing Homes, Inc., v. Barry, 37 Ohio App.3d 46, 523 N.E.2d 523, 524 (1987); Oklahoma Pub. Employee's Ass'n v. Oklahoma Dep't of Cent. Servs., 55 P.3d 1072, 1077 (Okla.2002); Beaufort Realty Co. v. Beaufort County, 346 S.C. 298, 551 S.E.2d 588, 589 (2001); Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 447 (Tex.1993); Utah Rest. Ass'n v. Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985); Parker v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998); Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1789 v. Spokane Airports, 146 Wash.2d 207, 45 P.3d 186, 189 (2002); Snyder v. Callaghan, 168 W.Va. 265, 284 S.E.2d 241, 250-52 (1981).
As recognized by the Connecticut Supreme Court, associational standing advances two important objectives. First, allowing an association to represent its members' interests promotes judicial economy and efficiency. Worrell, 199 Conn. at 617,508 A.2d 743. The Hunt requirements allow a single plaintiff, in a single lawsuit, to adequately...
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