Savignac v. Jones Day

• Decision Date: 04 September 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 19-2443 (RDM)
• Citation: 486 F.Supp.3d 14
• Parties: Mark C. SAVIGNAC et al., Plaintiffs, v. JONES DAY et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

486 F.Supp.3d 14

Mark C. SAVIGNAC et al., Plaintiffs,

v.JONES DAY et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-2443 (RDM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 4, 2020

Mark C. Savignac, Urbana, IL, pro se.

Julia Sheketoff, Urbana, IL, pro se.

MaryEllen Powers, Christopher DiPompeo, Jones Day, Washington, DC, Anderson T. Bailey, Pro Hac Vice, Jones Day, Pittsburgh, PA, Terri L. Chase, Pro Hac Vice, Traci L. Lovitt, Pro Hac Vice, Jones Day, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge Defendants Jones Day, Stephen Brogan, and Beth Heifetz move to dismiss Plaintiffs Mark Savignac and Julia Sheketoff's complaint alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) ; the D.C. Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"), D.C. Code § 2-1401 et seq. ; and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 215, as well as interference with the right to take protected leave in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. , and the D.C. Family and Medical Leave Act ("DCFMLA"), D.C. Code § 32-501 et seq.

For the reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendants’ motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

For purposes of resolving the pending motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the following factual allegations as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

1. The Parties

Jones Day is a large, international law firm. Dkt. 1 at 1 (Compl. ¶ 2). Stephen Brogan is the firm's managing partner, and Beth Heifetz heads the firm's "Issues & Appeals" practice group. Id. at 1–2 (Compl. ¶ 2). Mark Savignac and Julia Sheketoff are attorneys who formerly worked as associates in the Issues & Appeals group in Jones Day's Washington, D.C. office. Id. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–3). Both Savignac and Sheketoff joined Jones Day after serving as law clerks for a federal district court, a federal appellate court, and the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. at 6, 8 (Compl. ¶¶ 36, 56). Sheketoff joined the firm in 2014, and Savignac joined in 2017. Id. (Compl. ¶¶ 37, 57). They married in 2017 and have one child, who was born in January 2019, id. at 1 (Compl. ¶ 1), several months after Sheketoff had left the firm, id. at 29 (Compl. ¶ 210).

2. Jones Day's Employee Evaluation and Salary-Setting Practices

Jones Day determines the size of annual salary adjustments for each associate based in part on reviews submitted by the partners who worked with the associate during the relevant period. Dkt. 1 at 5 (Compl. ¶ 25–29). These reviews are compiled by the partnership into a "consensus statement" for the associate, and Jones Day's managing partner, Stephen Brogan, approves each associate's salary change based on his or her consensus statement. Id. (Compl. ¶ 28–29). Associates are not provided copies of their consensus statements or evaluations, and they are not permitted to discuss their salaries with others at the firm. Id. (Compl. ¶ 30–31). Plaintiffs allege that this "black-box compensation system ... enables and conceals sex discrimination" because salary raises are made at the discretion of the predominantly male partnership and because associates are not permitted to share their salaries with others. Id. at 28, 30 (Compl. ¶¶ 204, 219).

3. Sheketoff's Evaluation and Salary Determination

During her third year at Jones Day, Sheketoff was assigned to work on a memorandum with a partner in another practice group, Partner A.¹ Dkt. 1 at 10 (Compl. ¶ 70). Before Sheketoff began this project, Heifetz warned Sheketoff that Partner A was a "terrible writer." Id. (Compl. ¶ 71). Partner A edited Sheketoff's initial draft of the memorandum, and she believed that some of his edits were misguided. Id. (Compl. ¶¶ 73–74). She asked a male associate in her practice group who had worked with Partner A in the past for advice on how she should handle this situation. Id. (Compl. ¶ 75). The male associate advised her to "speak up about the problems introduced by Partner A's edits and try to improve the memorandum." Id. (Compl. ¶ 76). Sheketoff followed this advice and suggested "further edits and explain[ed] to Partner A why she believed that he should not implement all of his edits." Id. (Compl. ¶ 77). The partner responded with an email, which Plaintiffs characterize as "scolding her for second-guessing his edits." Id. at 11 (Compl. ¶ 78). He provided "specific comments" on Sheketoff's draft "in bold " and conveyed the following "general comments" in his email, which is attached to the complaint:

1. you should avoid making style edits to the writing of the person whose name goes first on the memo (e.g., the first sentence on p. 2 under exec summary ... where you changed "as well as" to "and")

2. when the person whose name goes first on the memos makes an edit, you should not change it back to the way you had it (e.g., on p. 4 when describing the district court case ... the citation alerts the reader to the specific court).

Dkt. 15-2 at 3 (emphasis in original). Sheketoff alleges that she had not received this type of reaction in the past when she had suggested edits to male supervisors, and the male associate who had recommended that she raise her concerns about the edits with Partner A was surprised that he reacted this way. Dkt. 1 at 11 (Compl. ¶ 79–80). Plaintiffs further allege that Partner A is "deferential" to similarly situated male associates and has stopped by the "male" Issues & Appeals associates’ table in the cafeteria to make "self-deprecating remarks" that those associates are smarter than he is. Id. (Compl. ¶¶ 82–83).

Plaintiffs allege that, after this interaction with Sheketoff, Partner A wrote a "disingenuous, severely negative" review of Sheketoff's work that was then factored into her 2016 consensus statement. Id. at 11–12 (Compl. ¶¶ 85, 88). They further claim that he made this negative review "because Julia is a woman" and that the review "unfairly" criticized her work. Id. at 11 (Compl. ¶¶ 85–86). Sheketoff's 2017 raise was based on her 2016 consensus statement, and, according to Plaintiffs, "[b]ut for Partner A's negative evaluation," her 2017 raise would have been higher. Id. at 12 (Compl. ¶¶ 88–90). Sheketoff's 2017 raise was one fifth as large as the raise she had received the previous year. Id. (Compl. ¶ 89). Plaintiffs assert "on information and belief" that the raise Sheketoff received "was smaller than the raises received by male associates in the Issues & Appeals group the same year." Id. (Compl. ¶ 91).

4. Jones Day's Parental Leave Policies

In 2018, Plaintiffs learned that they were expecting their first child, and their son was born in early January 2019. Dkt. 1 at 17, 19 (Compl. ¶¶ 136, 146). Savignac and Sheketoff desired to care for their son equally, while equally maintaining focus on their careers. Id. at 2 (Compl. ¶ 5). To this end, Plaintiffs sought to maximize the length of paid leave that Savignac could take after the birth of their son. Jones Day's leave policy for new parents consists of three parts, as follows:

First , "the [f]irm ... provide[s] mothers [with] eight weeks of paid leave under the [f]irm's Short Term Disability policy," and, "if the mother is the primary caregiver, the [f]irm ... provide[s] an additional ten weeks of paid family leave after the eight weeks of paid disability leave." Dkt. 1-1 at 3. "[W]ith approval," the firm also provides "up to an additional six weeks of unpaid leave" to new mothers. Id. The firm's Short Term Disability policy, in turn, provides that, "[u]nless the [f]irm is notified otherwise, it will assume that a lawyer's medical provider has certified an eight-week, post-partum disability period for routine childbirth (including Cesarean-section births)." Id. at 5. "Except for leave for routine childbirth," however, "the specific period of approved [short term disability] leave is subject to certification from professional medical personnel that specifies the appropriate length in a manner satisfactory to the [f]irm or its [t]hird [p]arty [a]dministrator." Id.

Second , the policy for biological fathers provides that, "if the father is the primary caregiver, the [f]irm will provide ten weeks of paid family leave and, with approval, up to an additional six weeks of unpaid leave." Id. at 3. "Fathers must commence this family leave within eight weeks after the birth of the child." Id.

Finally , although not directly applicable here, the policy for parents of newly adopted children "provide[s] 18 weeks of paid adoption leave to the primary caregiver and, with approval, up to an additional six weeks of unpaid leave." Id. "Primary caregivers must commence this family leave within eight weeks after the adoption of the child." Id.

Under these policies, biological mothers (and adoptive parents) who are primary caregivers may take a total of eighteen weeks of paid leave, while biological fathers who are primary caregivers may take only ten weeks of paid leave. Dkt. 1 at 13–14 (Compl. ¶ 106, 108); Dkt. 1-1 at 3. In Defendants’ view, this makes perfect sense because, unlike biological fathers, biological mothers experience the physical effects of childbirth. Dkt. 15 at 9. Plaintiffs, for their part, allege that Jones Day gives eight-weeks of "disability leave" to all biological mothers, regardless of how long they are actually disabled after giving birth. Dkt. 1 at 14–15 (Compl. ¶¶ 112, 114–16). They also allege that Jones Day "advertises its parental leave policy to prospective employees as allotting 18 weeks of paid leave to mothers and 10 weeks of paid leave to fathers, omitting mention of any requirement that the mother be disabled." Id. at 14 (Compl. ¶ 114). Plaintiffs maintain that, considered in this light, use of the term "disability leave" for the eight-week paid-leave period for biological mothers is...