Savings Bank v. Ward

Citation25 L.Ed. 621,100 U.S. 195
PartiesSAVINGS BANK v. WARD
Decision Date01 October 1879
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. R. Ross Perry for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. Joseph H. Bradley and Mr. John J. Johnson for the defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

Attorneys employed by the purchasers of real property to investigate the title of the grantor prior to the purchase impliedly contract to exercise reasonable care and skill in the performance of the undertaking, and if they are negligent, or fail to exercise such reasonable care and skill in the discharge of the stipulated service, they are responsible to their employers for the loss occasioned by such neglect or want of care and skill. Addison, Contr. (6th ed.) 400.

Like care and skill are also required of attorneys when employed to investigate titles to real estate to ascertain whether it is a safe or sufficient security for a loan of money, the rule being that if the attorney is negligent or fails to exercise reasonable care and skill in the performance of the service, and a loss results to his employers from such neglect or want of care and skill, he shall be responsible to them for the consequences of such loss. Addison, Torts (Wood's ed.), 615.

Pursuant to that rule of law the plaintiffs sued the defendant, and alleged as the cause of action that they retained and employed him to examine and ascertain the title of the possessor of certian premises situate in the city of Washington and described in the declaration, and to report to them the nature and extent of his title to the same; and they allege that he, the defendant, accepted the employment, and reported to them that the title of the possessor of the premises was good and unincumbered.

Their theory as alleged in the declaration is that they procured that report with a view to the making of a loan, and they allege that upon the faith and credit of it they loaned the sum of $3,500 to the pretended owner of the premises, and accepted as security for the same a trust-deed of the property, whereas the borrower of the money was insolvent and had no title whatever to the premises, as fully and explicitly appears by a prior deed of conveyance duly recorded.

Process was duly served, and the defendant appeared and pleaded the general issue, which was duly joined by the plaintiffs. Continuance followed, and at the opening of the next term the parties went to trial, and the verdict and judgment were in favor of the defendant. Exceptions were filed by the plaintiffs, and they sued out the present writ of error.

Six errors are assigned in this court, of which three will be separately examined. They are as follows: 1. That the court erred in ruling that some privity of contract, arising from an actual employment of the defendant by the plaintiffs, is necessary to enable the latter to maintain the action. 2. That the court erred in holding that the evidence introduced did not establish such a privity of contract between the parties as entitled the plaintiffs to recover. 3. That the court erred in instructing the jury that upon the whole evidence the verdict should be for the defendant.

Evidence was introduced by the plaintiffs tending to prove that the defendant is an attorney-at-law doing business in the city, and that he held himself out to the public as a person skilled in the examination of titles to real estate situated in the District of Columbia. That the claimant of the lot described in the transcript employed the defendant, in his professional character, to examine his title to that lot, and to report to him the condition of the same, and that the defendant, pursuant to that employment, reported to his employer that his title to the lot is good and that the property is unincumbered, the report being signed by the defendant and his son.

It is not pretended by the plaintiffs that they ever employed the defendant to examine the title to the lot, and it appears that the report was made at the sole request of the claimant of the lot, without any knowledge on the part of the defendant as to the purpose for which it was obtained. All that is conceded by the plaintiffs; but they gave evidence to show that the claimant of the lot presented the certificate to certain brokers, and employed them to negotiate a loan upon the property in his favor for $3,500, on the faith of that certificate. Detailed statement is given in the transcript of the steps taken by the brokers to obtain the required loan, the substance of which is that they required the party to give a negotiable note for the amount, payable in one year, with ten per cent interest, and that he and his wife should execute a trust-deed of the lot to them as trustees to secure the payment of the note when due.

Preliminaries being arranged, the brokers applied to the plaintiffs for the loan and obtained the same, giving the note and deed of trust with the certificate as security for the payment. Before accepting the papers, the plaintiffs, through their agent, required the brokers to sign the name of the borrower to the formal application for the loan, as exhibited in the transcript, and that the certificate as to the title should be continued to the date of the transaction.

Throughout, the negotiation for the loan was conducted entirely by the brokers with the plaintiffs, and it was the borrower who procured the second certificate from the defendant, the evidence showing that the defendant never came in contact either with the plaintiffs or the brokers.

Payment of the note was not made at maturity, and when it was attempted to sell the premises under the trust-deed, it was discovered that the certificates were untrue, and that the grantors, on the 13th of March previous, had conveyed the premises in fee-simple, by deed duly executed and recorded.

Attorneys-at-law are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order; but it is a mistake to suppose that they are officers of the United States, as they are neither elected nor appointed in the manner prescribed by the Constitution for the election or appointment of such officers. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378.

When a person adopts the legal profession, and assumes to exercise its duties in behalf of another for hire, he must be understood as promising to employ a reasonable degree of care and skill in the performance of such duties; and if injury results to the client from a want of such a degree of reasonable care and skill, the attorney may be held to respond in damages to the extent of the injury sustained. Proof of employment and the want of reasonable care and skill are prerequisites to the maintenance of the action; but it must not be understood that an attorney is liable for every mistake that may occur in practice, or that he may be held responsible to his client for every error of judgment in the conduct of his client's cause. Instead of that, the rule is that if he acts with a proper degree of skill, and with reasonable care and to the best of his knowledge, he will not be held responsible. Bowman v. Tallman, 27 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 212, 274.

If he fails in any of these respects he may, and sometimes does, not only forfeit all claim for compensation, but may also render himself liable to his client for any damage he may sustain from such neglect. Such liabilities frequently arise, and an attorney may also be liable to his client for the consequences of his want of reasonable care or skill in matters not in litigation. Business men not infrequently seek legal advice in making or receiving conveyances of real property, and it is well settled that an attorney may be liable to his client for negligence or want of reasonable care and skill in examining titles in such cases, whether the error occurs in respect to the title of property purchased or in the covenants in the instrument of conveyance, where the property is sold.

Where the relation of attorney and client exists there is seldom any serious difficulty in determining whether the client has or has not a cause of action, or its nature and extent if one exists. Criterions of standard character are established in legal decisions by which every such controversy may be determined; but in the case before the court the defendant was never retained or employed by the plaintiffs, nor did they ever pay him any thing for making the certificates, nor did he ever perform any service at their request or in their behalf.

Neither fraud nor collusion is alleged or proved; and it is conceded that the certificates were made by the defendant at the request of the applicant for the loan, without any knowledge on the part of the defendant what use was to be made of the same or to whom they were to be presented. None of those matters are controverted; but the plaintiffs contend that an attorney in such a case is liable to the immediate sufferer for negligence in the examination of such a title, although he, the sufferer, did not employ the defendant, and the case shows that the service was performed for a third person without any knowledge that the certificate was to be used to procure a loan from the injured party.

Persons acting professionally in legal formalities, negotiations, or proceedings by the warrant or authority of their clients may be regarded as attorneys-at-law within the meaning of that designation as used in this country; and all such, when they undertake to conduct legal controversies or transactions, profess themselves to be reasonably well acquainted with the law and the rules and practice of the courts, and they are bound to exercise in such proceedings a reasonable degree of care, prudence, diligence, and skill. Authorities everywhere support that proposition; but attorneys do not profess to know all the law or to be incapable of error or mistake in applying it to the facts of every case, as even the most skilful of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
346 cases
  • Tingler v. Graystone Homes, Inc., Record No. 180791
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Virginia
    • 31 Octubre 2019
    ...of others, the wrong-doer is liable to the injured party, whether there be any contract between them or not." Savings Bank v. Ward , 100 U.S. 195, 204, 25 L.Ed. 621 (1879) (citation omitted). But "[w]here the wrongful act is not immediately dangerous to the lives of others, the negligent pa......
  • Blair v. Ing, No. 22401.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Hawai'i
    • 27 Febrero 2001
    ...may not maintain a legal malpractice action against an attorney for negligence absent fraud or collusion. See National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 205-206, 25 L.Ed. 621 (1879). Although the strict privity requirement remains prevalent in many factual circumstances of legal malpractice,......
  • Booth v. Fletcher
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • 19 Diciembre 1938
    ...administration of the laws, and that fidelity to the court is paramount even to the duty owed to the client." 8 National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198, 25 L.Ed. 621; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 9 Harlan F. Stone, Law and its Administrat......
  • Cammer v. United States, 12353.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • 5 Mayo 1955
    ...a member of the bar is an officer of the court. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378, 71 U.S. 333, 378, 18 L.Ed. 366; Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198, 25 L.Ed. 621; Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158; Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510, 67 S.Ct. 3......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
7 books & journal articles
  • Chapter 21 UNANTICIPATED LIABILITY OF THE LANDMAN
    • United States
    • FNREL - Annual Institute Vol. 31 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute (FNREL)
    • Invalid date
    ...357 (Wyo. 1975). [6] State ex rel. Freeman v. Abstracters Board of Examiners, 99 Mont. 564, 45 P.2d 668 (1935). [7] Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880). [8] Alaska Stat. § 08.88.421(8) (1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-61-101(4)(f) (1978); Mont. Code Ann. § 37-51-103(7) (1985); Neb. Rev. ......
  • Chapter 8 OPINION LETTERS IN WATER RIGHT AND MINING TRANSACTIONS: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
    • United States
    • FNREL - Annual Institute Vol. 33 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute (FNREL)
    • Invalid date
    ...Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969). [27] Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). [28] 100 U.S. 195 (1879). [29] See, e.g., Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N.W. 1 (1895) (duty owed to addressee); DuBois v. Decker, 130 N.......
  • Chapter 7 LIABILITY OF LAWYERS TO NON-CLIENTS FOR NEGLIGENT OR QUESTIONABLE ADVICE OR OPINIONS: EXPOSURE, DEFENSES, CURRENT JUDICIAL VIEWS, AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
    • United States
    • FNREL - Annual Institute Vol. 43 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute (FNREL)
    • Invalid date
    ...§ 73, Comment e and accompanying Reporter's Note. [35] See Mallen & Smith, supra note 18, § 7.1. [36] National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) (suit by lender against property purchaser's attorney for erroneous certificate of title); see Mallen & Smith, supra note 18, § 7.5; see a......
  • Chapter 27 USE OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TITLE OPINION
    • United States
    • FNREL - Annual Institute Vol. 49 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute (FNREL)
    • Invalid date
    ...Advice or Opinions: Exposure, Defenses, Current Judicial Views, and Ethical Considerations," 43 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 7-1 (1997). [16] 100 U.S. 195(1879). [17] Id. at 203. [18] Jennifer R. Rossi, "An Attorney May Owe a Nonclient a Duty of Care When the Attorney Either Knows or Should Have......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT