Sawyer Spindle Co. v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 07 October 1895
• Citation: 69 F. 837
• Parties: SAWYER SPINDLE CO. et al. v. TAYLOR et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

69 F. 837

SAWYER SPINDLE CO. et al. v. TAYLOR et al.

United States Circuit Court, D. New Jersey.

October 7, 1895

Fish Richardson & Storrow, for complainants.

A. Q Keasbey & Sons, for defendants.

DALLAS Circuit Judge.

This suit is upon patent to John E. Atwood, No. 253,572, dated February 14, 1882, for 'support for spindles for spinning machines. ' The claims involved are as follows:

'(3) The combination, substantially as hereinbefore described of a spindle rail of a spinning machine, a spindle, and a supporting tube flexibly mounted with relation to the spindle rail, and containing step and bolster bearings. (4) The combination, substantially as hereinbefore described, of a spindle rail, a spindle, a supporting tube containing step and bolster bearings, flexible connections between said tube and the spindle rail, and adjusting devices for varying the degree of flexibility of the supporting tube and spindle therein. (5) The combination of the spindle rail, the spindle, the supporting tube, loosely mounted with relation to the rail, and containing the step and bolster bearings for the spindle, the spring, and the nut for compressing it, substantially as described.'

The defendants insist that the complainants are chargeable with laches, and that, therefore, 'an injunction ought not to be granted, even on final hearing,-- at least, until the coming in of the master's report. ' When the case was before the court on motion for preliminary injunction (56 F 110), the same point was made, but I then, upon full consideration, reached a conclusion adverse to the defendants. The decision upon that motion was made on June 6, 1893, and thus, without further application or appeal, the matter has rested, until now, upon hearing on pleadings and proofs, the court is asked to refrain from granting a perpetual injunction pending any reference that may be ordered. But if the opinion which I formed on the motion for an interlocutory injunction was then rightly controlling, it certainly should be no less potential now that the proofs have been taken, and the plaintiffs insist that by them the main questions in the cause have been settled and resolved in their favor. In fact, however, the defendants' present position is not as strong in this regard as it was on the interlocutory hearing. I do not feel called upon to vindicate the action of the court in granting the preliminary injunction, but may abridge discussion by saying that, if the delay then set up to defeat the motion had not been satisfactorily explained, that motion might have been, upon that ground, refused; but, upon final hearing, laches, in the sense of mere delay in bringing suit against the defendants, cannot deprive the plaintiffs of their right to protection against a continuance of the unlawful use of their patented invention, and consequent injury to their business. It is only by words, acts, or omissions which give rise to estoppel that this right, if and when established by the proofs, can be forfeited. This distinction is clear and well recognized, and cannot be obliterated by a vague use of the word 'laches.' As I have said, mere delay in bringing suit may, under some circumstances, impel the court to withhold its hand during the course of litigation; and as was remarked in New York Grape-Sugar Co. v. Buffalo Grape-Sugar Co., infra, even on final hearing, 'cases may arise where a court of equity would refuse an injunction against an innocent infringer, by reason of the protracted course of conduct of a previous owner of the patent, who knew of the infringement, and silently and knowingly permitted the expenditure of substantial sums of money by the infringer. ' To such cases the doctrine of estoppel may be pertinent, but the present case is not such an one. I have attentively read the very thorough brief of the learned counsel of the defendants, but without finding any fact referred to other than that, as claimed, the plaintiffs long knew of the violation of their rights before proceeding to maintain them; and I am constrained to the conclusion that his contention is met by the rule, as I have already indicated it, that mere delay in seeking relief will not, where there is no estoppel, prevent the granting of a final injunction. New York Grape-Sugar Co. v. Buffalo Grape-Sugar Co., 18 F. 638; Brush Electric Co. v. Electric Imp. Co., 45 F. 241; Price v. Steel Co., 46 F. 107; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245-253. In Waite v. Chair Co., 45 F. 258, it would seem, if the syllabus in the report could be relied on, that the question was...