Sawyer v. Bradshaw

Decision Date16 June 1888
Citation17 N.E. 812,125 Ill. 440
PartiesSAWYER et al. v. BRADSHAW et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to appellate court, Fourth district.

R. S. Sawyer and Wise & Davis, for plaintiff in error.

SHELDON, C. J.

On November 29, 1879, Seth T. Sawyer and Robinson S. Sawyer purchased at sheriff's sale, under an execution upon a judgment in their favor against George T. Brown, for $160, and costs of suit recovered at the February term, 1879, of court, lot 39, in Penitentiary Plat addition to Alton, as the property of said Brown, and subsequently received a sheriff's deed therefor. On April 6, 1878, said Brown executed to Metealfe and Bradshaw a deed of trust upon said lot 39 to secure the payment of a note from Brown to Metcalfe and Bradshaw, of even date with the deed of trust, for $3,000, payable one year after date, with 10 per cent. interest. On July 26, 1879, Metcalfe and Bradshaw caused said lot 39 to be sold at public sale under the deed of trust for the satisfaction of said note, and at the sale the lot was struck off and sold to Bradshaw for the sum of one dollar, and he received a trustee's deed for the lot. It had previously been sold under an execution against Brown, and on June 21, 1879, Metcalfe and Bradshaw paid $381 in redemption of the lot from the execution sale. On January 21, 1880, Bradshaw sold and conveyed the lot to one Anna S. Clark. On March 6, 1885, the Sawyers filed their bill in chancery in this case in the circuit court of Madison county to have set aside the aforesaid deed of trust, trustee's sale, and deed, and the deed to Anna S. Clark, as fraudulent and void as against creditors, or, if the said Clark was found to be an innocent purchaser of the lot, that then Metcalfe and Bradshaw, or Bradshaw, account to the complainants for the value of the lot. The circuit court found the deed of trust to have been made in fraud of creditors, that Clark was an innocent purchaser, and decreed that Bradshaw should pay to the complainants $650 as the value of the lot at the time of complainants' sheriff's deed for the same, March 8, 1881. The complainants bring this writ of error for the review of the judgment of the appellate court,

The chief reliance, as showing the deed of trust in question to be fraudulent as against creditors, is upon the fact that the note secured by the deed of trust was given for a larger amount than was due from Brown to Metcalfe and Bradshaw at the date of the note; citing Wooley v. Fry, 30 Ill. 163;Upton v. Craig, 57 Ill. 259;Mitchell v. Sawyer, 115 Ill. 650, 5 N. E. Rep. 109; Bump, Fraud. Conv. 470,-as in support of the position. The testimony of Metcalfe and Bradshaw is that Brown only owed them about $1,500 or $1,600 at the time the note and deed of trust for $3,000 were given, on April 6, 1878, and on July 26, 1879, the day of the trustee's sale, and that the balance of the note was to secure future advances and services. The mere discrepancy between the amount of the indebtedness and that of the note and deed of trust should not, of itself, avoid the deed of trust as to creditors. The consequence, in that respect, depends upon the intent of the transaction, and upon its being calculated to mislead, to their injury, or to hinder and delay, creditors. There was a wide difference in the estimate of value by witnesses of the lot here concerned, as is usual upon questions of value; one witness placing his estimate of value as high as $1,500. But the complainants in their bill state the value of the lot as only being from $500 to $800; and we think the circuit court's finding of its value as $650 to be quite as high as there was warrant for, from all the evidence in the case. There was no question as to the actual indebtedness to Metcalfe and Bradshaw being as much as $1,500. Under such circumstances of the value of the lot and the amount of the real indebtedness, there was nothing in the...

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