Sawyer v. Parish of Concordia

• Decision Date: 01 June 1882
• Citation: 12 F. 754
• Parties: SAWYER v. PARISH OF CONCORDIA. [1]
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

12 F. 754

SAWYER v. PARISH OF CONCORDIA. ^[1]

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Louisiana.

June, 1882

W. W Farmer, for plaintiff.

Boatner & Liddell, for defendant.

BOARMAN D.J.

The plaintiff, a lawyer and citizen of Louisiana, sues the parish of Concordia for $27,000, claimed to be due to him because of certain professional services rendered the defendant, in pursuance of a conditional contract of date December, 1872. He alleges that he completed his part of the agreement before October, A.D. 1879, and that on the happening of the suspensive condition his contract became absolute and indefeasible; that by operation of law his contract has a retroactive effect, and takes date with the agreement--December, 1872. At that time he alleges the existence of two statutes of the state which gave him remedies for the legal and effectual enforcement of his contract, to-wit, the act, No. 69, A.D. 1869, and section 2743, Rev. St. 1870.

The act, No. 69, provides substantially as follows: That the judge rendering a judgment against any parish shall order the tax-assessing officers of the defendant parish to assess a special tax in amount sufficient to pay the judgment creditor; that said tax shall be forthwith collected and held as a special fund for the benefit of such creditor, and shall not be otherwise diverted; provided there are no other funds subject to such judgment in the parish treasury. The act, or section 2743, authorized the parishes in the state to levy and collect such taxes as may be deemed necessary by parish authorities to defray the expenses of the local government.

Having cited these two acts, he alleges that act. No. 96, A.D. 1877 repealed them. This act limits the power of the parish so that not more than 10 mills can be collected for any purpose and repeals all general laws authorizing the levy of any special or judgment taxes. In addition to the repealing statutes, he alleges that article 209 of the state constitution of 1879 limits the parish tax to 1 per centum of the assessment, and that the sum annually collected in the parish is used and needed for the alimentary purposes of the parochial government, and will furnish nothing with which to pay his claims; that said parish has no funds on hand, and no property subject to seizure.

He alleges that the powers and remedies the courts of the state had and would have exercised, under act No. 69 and section 2743, for the enforcement of the obligation of this contract, have been destroyed and taken away by the enactment of the subsequent acts and article of the state constitution; that these acts, No. 69 and section 2743, now repealed, entered into and were vital elements in his contract; that the state has by these subsequent repealing laws impaired the obligations of his contract, contrary to article 1, Sec. 10, of the constitution of the United States . He avers that his suit arises under the constitution of the United States. Defendant denies the jurisdiction of this court. His motion is now under consideration.

He urges that 'plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the same state, and that plaintiff's demand and alleged contract, if any exists, can be enforced in the courts of the state of Louisiana under act No. 69, A.D. 1869; that said act, and remedy therein provided, was not repealed by act No. 96, 1877, nor by the provisions of the constitution of 1879.

After stating so much by way of denying jurisdiction, he adds in his motion that 'it is the well-settled jurisprudence of the state that these repealing acts and article of the constitution do not affect the remedy or rights of parties under contracts entered into, as plaintiff's was, before the passage of act No. 96, 1877, or before the constitution of 1879. ' To sustain the suggestions in his motion he cites a number of cases reported in the Louisiana Reports. They will be noticed later. Defendant's objection to this court's jurisdiction, if confined to the suggestions in his motion, is very limited, and if the question was tried on an admission of all he says, it is doubtful if any circuit court would refuse jurisdiction to try plaintiff's suit since the passage of the act of congress of March 3, A.D. 1875.

He denies that act No. 69, so far as it affects the legal rights of the plaintiff claiming, as he does, under a contract, has been repealed; that the state courts, while allowing the repealing act of 1877 to fatally affect all persons not claiming under an anterior contract, will protect plaintiff from any loss of right or remedy in consequence of the repeal.

The fact of the repeal cannot be denied. The act, No. 69, certainly did exist as an operative law in A.D. 1872, and it is equally clear that act No. 96, of 1877, destroyed the remedies and powers under act No. 69, 1869, and section 2743 of Revised Statutes. The act, No. 96, 1877, limits and greatly reduces the per centum of taxation that the parish of Concordia could collect when plaintiff entered into his contract with defendant. The municipal law of the state which binds the parties to perform their agreement constitutes the obligation of a contract. These laws, existing at the time of the contract, must govern and control the contract in every shape in which it is intended they should bear on it, whether they affect the validity or construction of the contract.

The jurisdiction of this court cannot be tested, as it applies to this case, by the jurisprudence of the state courts, however much in the cases cited they may have sought to restrain the effect of the state statutes enacted subsequently to the date of plaintiff's contract. The state courts, of course, have ample power to try this case, or any other suits involving an interpretation of their statutes of constitution, and before the act of March 3, 1875, had original jurisdiction over such cases as this, to the exclusion of the federal courts. It is now conceded that that act is constitutional, and that congress intended under its operation to extend to the circuit courts of the United States all the judicial power which congress could, under the constitution, confer on such courts. The act enables this court to try, concurrently with the state courts, all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, involving over $500, 'arising under the constitution or laws of the United States. ' Before the passage of the act of 1875 the supreme court only could, under its appellate power, examine and revise the decisions of the highest state courts when they, in a final judgment, passed on a 'title, right, privilege, or immunity, specially set up or claimed by either party under the constitution of the United States.'

In such cases, when the judgment was against the title, right, or privilege, the cause could go up on writ of error to the supreme court. Now it is no longer necessary, in order to reach the federal court, that a suitor, setting up any such right or privilege, should begin his action in the state courts. Such a right, privilege, or immunity makes up a federal question, and if his suit involves such a question he may begin it in this court.

The act of March 3, 1875, made some radical changes in the practice and jurisdictional powers of the circuit courts. The effect and extent of the change has not been fully realized, nor has the act, as yet, been comprehensively interpreted by the supreme court. One of the objects of the act, obviously, was to open the circuit courts to suitors claiming rights under the federal constitution and laws, and to enable such litigants to reach the courts of the United States without the tedious and oftentimes difficult process of an appeal on writ of error to the supreme court. May it not be a fact that all suits involving a federal question, which, prior to the act of 1875, could have been taken up on writ of error from the state courts of last resort to the supreme court, may now be filed and tried originally in the circuit courts? Certainly the counsel favoring this motion has fallen far short in his estimate of the changes made by this act of 1875.

It must be admitted as true that plaintiff entered into the contract as alleged; that act No. 69, giving him certain remedies, and section 2743, Rev. St., existed at the date of his agreement; that the act, No. 96, 1877, and article 209 of state constitution, repealed the two statutes, No. 69 and section 2743. The motion to the jurisdiction cannot put at issue these facts as plaintiff alleges them. The constitution of the United States prohibits the impairment of the obligation of a contract. It does not, in such a way, protect the obligation of an ordinary debt.

If his cause of action was to enforce the collection of an account or an ordinary debt, then the allegation that certain laws affecting his remedy had been repealed would not present a federal question. His right to sue in this court attaches at once if he has presented such a question. It must depend on the subject-matter of his suit.

In Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 824, the court says the right to sue 'is anterior to the defense, and must depend on the state of things when the action is brought. ' Can his right to sue depend on anything else? If the jurisdiction depends on or could be ousted by the character of the defense, or was limited by the denials in defendant's answer, should he file one, or by the matter of facts he should choose to put at issue, then it is apparent that the ingenuity of counsel would have much to do with confirming or denying jurisdiction. If it depended on the jurisprudence of the state courts, on similar issues to those involved in the case at bar, the power in this court to try such cases as this one would often rest on the opinions of the state judges. In this connection, it was suggested...