Sayles v. Allstate Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 10 May 2016 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16–CV–01534 |
Citation | 260 F.Supp.3d 427 |
Parties | Samantha SAYLES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Charles Kannebecker, Weinstein Schneider Kannebecker & Lokuta, Milford, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Marc E. Wolin, Saiber LLC, Florham Park, NJ, for Defendant.
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"). (Doc. 10.) For the reasons that follow, Allstate's Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
The well-pleaded facts as set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1–1) are as follows:
Plaintiff Samantha Sayles ("Sayles") was insured under an auto insurance policy issued by Defendant Allstate (the "Policy"). (Compl. ¶ 13.) The Policy provided for, inter alia , first-party medical expense benefits up to $5000 per person. (Ex. A, Doc. 11–1.) Relevant to the instant dispute, the Policy states under a subheading labeled "Proof of Claim; Medical Reports":
(Ex. A, Doc. 11–1) (the "examination requirement"). On December 11, 2015, Sayles was involved in a motor vehicle accident within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in which she sustained numerous physical injuries. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Sayles was treated by medical providers for these injuries. (Id. ¶ 15.) On May 20, 2016, Allstate sent a letter to Sayles's counsel, Charles Kannebecker, concerning Sayles's medical benefits under the Policy. (Id. ¶ 17.) The letter states in pertinent part:
(Doc. 11–1 Ex. B.) In accordance with the letter, Allstate refused to pay Sayles's medical benefits until the physical examination was completed. (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 18, 26.) At no point did Allstate petition a court to compel the physical examination of Sayles that it sought. (Id. ¶ 21.) Sayles alleges that Allstate's examination requirement is a company-wide policy. (Id. ¶ 27.)
Sayles claims that the Policy's examination requirement violates the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law ("MVFRL"), 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1701, et seq. (Compl. ¶ 41.) Section 1796 of the MVFRL entitled "Mental or Physical Examination of Person" states in relevant part:
(a) General rule. Whenever the mental or physical condition of a person is material to any claim for medical, income loss or catastrophic loss benefits, a court of competent jurisdiction ... may order the person to submit to a mental or physical examination by a physician. The order may only be made upon motion for good cause shown. The order shall give the person to be examined adequate notice of the time and date of the examination and shall state the manner, conditions and scope of the examination and the physician by whom it is to be performed. If a person fails to comply with an order to be examined, the court or the administrator may order that the person be denied benefits until compliance.
Because Allstate did not petition a court to compel Sayles to submit to a physical examination, and consequently because there was no court order based upon a showing of "good cause" directing Sayles to submit to such an examination in accordance with the statutory specifications, Sayles claims that Allstate's refusal to pay her medical benefits until she completed the physical examination that it requested violated the statute.1 (Compl. ¶¶ 41–42; see Count II.)
This putative class action was originally filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County on June 20, 2016. (See Doc. 1.) On July 25, 2016, Allstate removed the action to federal court. (See Doc. 16.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court's role is limited to determining if a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of her claims. See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp. , 223 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States , 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must " ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ " Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Detailed factual allegations are not required. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. However, mere conclusory statements will not do; "a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Instead, a complaint must "show" this entitlement by alleging sufficient facts. Id. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 664, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). As such, "[t]he touchstone of the pleading standard is plausibility." Bistrian v. Levi , 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).
The inquiry at the motion to dismiss stage is "normally broken into three parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged." Malleus v. George , 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting as true all the facts alleged in the complaint, a plaintiff has not pleaded "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, meaning enough factual allegations " ‘to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ " each necessary element.
Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court should consider the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. Mayer v. Belichick , 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc. , 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) ). The Court may also consider "undisputedly authentic" documents when the plaintiff's claims are based on the documents and the defendant has attached copies of the documents to the motion to dismiss. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. , 998 F.2d at 1196. The Court need not assume that the plaintiff can prove facts that were not alleged in the complaint, see City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co. , 147 F.3d 256, 263 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1998), or credit a complaint's " ‘bald assertions’ " or " ‘legal conclusions,’ " Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. , 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig. , 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30 (3d Cir. 1997) ).
The Complaint seeks to bring claims on behalf of a class, which Sayles generally defines as:
All persons injured in motor vehicle accidents and insured under Pennsylvania auto insurance polices issued by [D]efendant which provided for medical benefits coverage whom [D]efendant required or directed to submit to insurance physical exams without Court order directing insured to submit to physical exams.2
(Compl. ¶ 43.) The Complaint raises eight (8) counts seeking relief: (1) a request for a declaratory judgment declaring Allstate in violation of § 1796 of the MVFRL and that it must hereafter comply with the statute (id. ¶¶ 59, 128(B)); (2) claims for a violation of § 1796 of the MVFRL (id. ¶ 62); (3) claims for violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201–1, et seq. (id. ¶ 71); (4) claims for violations of Pennsylvania's Insurance Bad Faith Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8371 (id. ¶ 83); (5) claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing (id. ¶ 99); (6) claims for unjust enrichment (id. ¶ 108); (7) claims of...
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