Sayles v. Foley

• Decision Date: 26 January 1916
• Docket Number: Nos. 456, 457.,s. 456, 457.
• Citation: 96 A. 340,38 R.I. 484
• Parties: SAYLES v. FOLEY. SAME v. BLOMQUIST.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

96 A. 340

38 R.I. 484

SAYLES

v. FOLEY.

SAME

v. BLOMQUIST.

Nos. 456, 457.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 26, 1916.

Case Certified from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties.

Petitions by Frank A. Sayles against John J. Foley, and John T. Blomquist, respectively, for relief against them as employés under the Workmen's Compensation Act. On certification under Gen. Laws 1909, c. 298, § 1, to the Supreme Court of the question of the constitutionality of the act. Remanded, with opinion, and certified for further proceedings.

Gardner, Pirce & Thornley, of Providence, Claude R. Branch and Edwards & Angell, all of Providence (Charles R. Haslam, of Providence, of counsel), for petitioner. Philip S. Knauer and Walter J. Ladd, both of Providence, for respondents.

BAKER, J. These two cases are petitions by Prank A. Sayles, as lessee and operator of the Glenlyon Dye Works, in the town of Lincoln in this state, filed in the superior court for Providence county October 16, 1913. The petitioner as employer asks for relief against the two respondents as employés in accordance with the provisions of chapter 831 of the Public Laws, entitled "An act relative to payments to employés for personal injuries received in the course of their employment, and to the prevention of such injuries," commonly known as the "Workmen's Compensation Act." The petitions allege, inter alia, that the respondents on the 14th day of January, 1913, were in the employ of the petitioner, but not in domestic service or agriculture; that on said 14th day of January they both received personal injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of said employment; that the petitioner had elected to become subject to the provisions of said act, and had not withdrawn such election; that the respondents had waived their right of action at common law to recover damages for personal injuries received as aforesaid; that the petitioner had paid for reasonable medical aid and hospital services furnished to said respondents for the first two weeks after said injuries, in accordance with said act, and has been and is now willing to pay to them such weekly compensation as they are entitled to under the provisions of said act; but that they have at all times refused to receive any compensation under the terms of said act, and have begun actions at common law in said superior court for damages for said injuries by writs dated August 25, 1913. To these petitions the respondents severally, on November 1, 1913, filed motions to dismiss, on the ground that chapter 831 of the Public Laws is unconstitutional and void for reasons stated in the motions. Without waiving his motion each respondent answered said petition against him, either expressly or in effect admitting the above-named allegations of the petition, excepting the statement that they "had waived their right of action at common law to recover damages for said personal injuries," although as to this they admit that they gave no notice to the petitioner in conformity with the provision of said act that they claimed such right of action. They further answer and say that they are not bound by chapter 831, because it is unconstitutional and void for 10 stated reasons, as follows: (1) In that it violates article 1, § 2, of the Constitution of Rhode Island; (2) in that it violates article 14, § 1 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States; (3), (4), (5), and (6) in that it is discriminatory as to employés in the denial of the equal protection of the law; (7) in that it is coercive in effect and destroys the right of freedom of contract between employers and employés; (8) in that it unjustly discriminates between employers; (9) in that it deprives a minor of his property without due process of law and without just and adequate compensation; and (10) in that it delegates legislative power to (a) the superior court, and (b) to the employer in violation of article 3 and article 4, §§ 1 and 2, of the Constitution of Rhode Island, as well as article 14, § 1, of the amendments of the Constitution of the United States. The motions set up the same grounds of unconstitutionality, except No. (10). Thereupon the superior court certified to this court the question of the constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Act, chapter 831 aforesaid.

In considering this question it is to be borne in mind that, so far as any presumption exists on the point, it is one in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative act. "The rule generally laid down is that statutes should be sustained unless their unconstitutionality is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is to be resolved in favor of the legislative action and the act sustained." State v. District of Narragansett, 16 R. I. 424, 440, 16 Atl. 901, 3 L. R. A. 295. See, also, State v. Kofines, 33 R. I. 211, 218, 80 Atl. 432, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1120, and 6 R. C. L. 97. The act under consideration is similar in its essential features to acts which during the last six years have been passed by the legislatures of many of the states of our country. According to a bulletin recently issued by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics 31 states and the territories of Alaska and Hawaii now have workmen's compensation laws and a similar federal statute covers about one-fourth of the civilian employés of the United States. Ten of these laws were enacted in 1915. They have apparently been passed in response to a widespread public opinion that a common-law action to recover damages for injuries suffered by employés from accidents while in the performance of their work under present industrial conditions is, in most cases, an imperfect and inadequate remedial instrumentality.

Referring to this situation, certain things may be mentioned as matters of common knowledge. The conditions under which great numbers of persons, men, women and youth of both sexes, largely entirely unacquainted with each other, and speaking perhaps different languages, are assembled for the performance of their work, often produce a situation which renders some of the recognized defenses of the employer to a common-law action unreasonable and unfair to the worker. These same conditions which bring together, working in the presence of and about machinery often of a complicated and dangerous character, not infrequently in an overheated atmosphere and amidst the noise and din of operating machines, large groups of people of differing intelligence, experience, skill, and personal characteristics, especially in respect of habits of attention and carefulness, result in large numbers of industrial accidents, notwithstanding the attempt by legislation and the effort of humane, employers to eliminate them as far as is possible by the use of safety appliances and devices. On account of the characteristic imperfections of human beings, accidents in no small number seem to be inevitable under the conditions existing in many forms of present industrial employment. The remedial relief afforded by the ordinary forms of litigation is uncertain and long delayed. If damages are recovered, they are received, not when the disability is suffered and the relief is most needed, but long afterwards, and then materially diminished in amount as a necessary result of the effort to recover them. Undoubtedly for one reason or another employés with meritorious cases sometimes fail to recover damages while, on the other hand, those with undeserving cases sometimes succeed in doing so. In the common-law action there is no set standard as to the amount of damages recoverable, and sometimes great inequality results in cases very similar in their facts. Under this system of litigation it seems clear that the great incidence of hardship and loss falls upon the employé, although at the same time it is often the source of injustice to the employer. Under it the court calendars have, of late years, been increasingly crowded with cases for the recovery of damages for injuries suffered in industrial accidents with, as a consequence, an increased burden upon the state in the matter of court expenses, and resulting additional delay in disposing of other pending cases. Legislation, therefore, which is in amelioration of such a condition is a matter affecting the public welfare. Considering the subject in its general aspects, if such legislation needs justification, it can be amply supported and upheld as a proper exercise of the police power. Citation of authorities on this point seems needless. Courts have almost uniformly declared legislation of this kind as to its general purposes and characteristics to be constitutional. Of course particular acts may contain provisions in conflict with the state or federal Constitutions. We will consider chapter 831 to see whether it be thus objectionable.

If we first examine the question of the constitutionality of the act in its relation to section 2, art. 1, of the state Constitution we are of the opinion that the act is not in contravention of our fundamental law. The respondents in their brief fail to point out wherein the unconstitutionality of the act lies as to section 2. In the matter of Dorrance Street, 4 R. I. 230, on page 249, the court in referring to this section says it sets—

"forth principles of legislation rather than rules of constitutional law—addressed rather to the General Assembly by way of advice and direction than to the courts by way of enforcing' restraint upon the lawmaking power."

The last clause of the section, namely, "the burdens of the state ought to be fairly distributed amongst its citizens" in Brown University v. Granger, 19 R. I. 704, on page 710, 36 Atl. 720, 722 (36 L. R. A. 847), is said to be "intended to control * * * the framing of laws relating to taxation." Practically all of the somewhat numerous cases under this clause relate to the constitutionality of laws respecting taxation.

It will not be necessary to consider the eighth...