Saylor v. Frakes

• Decision Date: 27 June 2022
• Docket Number: 8:20CV264
• Parties: JAMES M. SAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT R. FRAKES, in his official capacity, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

JAMES M. SAYLOR, Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT R. FRAKES, in his official capacity, Defendant.

No. 8:20CV264

United States District Court, D. Nebraska

June 27, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Richard G. Kopf, Senior United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, James Saylor, an inmate in the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (“NDCS”), brings this action pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act” or “RA”). In general, Saylor alleges in his Second Amended Complaint (Filing 51) that he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of having been brutally attacked by other prisoners in May 2002, and since then has been held in solitary confinement, with the exception of a 36-month period between October 2007 and September 2010, when he was placed in a single cell in a protective custody unit, and an 18-month period between July 2016 and January 2018, when he was assigned to a mental health unit. Upon the court's initial review of the Second Amended Complaint, conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, it was determined that Saylor stated plausible claims for relief under the ADA and RA for (1) disparate treatment and (2) failure to make reasonable accommodations insofar as Saylor “alleges that because of his PTSD he has been placed in solitary confinement and has been excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of certain prison services, programs, and activities, . .” (Filing 54 at 45.) The court also determined, however, that to the extent Saylor “complains he has not received proper treatment for his PTSD, he cannot obtain relief under the ADA or RA.” (Filing 54 at 4.)

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The case proceeded to service of process and the sole defendant, Scott R. Frakes, in his official capacity as Director of NDCS, responded by filing a motion to dismiss Saylor's claims under Rule 12(6)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See Filing 61.) Frakes contends Saylor's claims “are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because [he] has previously litigated the same claims in two previous suits before the Court.” (Ibid.)

For the reasons discussed below, the court concludes that Frakes' motion to dismiss should be granted, and that the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but it does require more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (1955). Furthermore, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim is plausible on its face when the factual content pled “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard requires the possibility, not probability, of the alleged acts. Id.

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6), a complaint must raise a claim of entitlement to relief. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must assume all well-plead factual allegations are true and construe the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences arising from it, in the light most favorable to the non-moving pleader. Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). However, the court will not, “blindly accept the legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts.” Id. “When the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Peterson Contractors, Inc., 970 F.Supp.2d 945, 949 (D. Neb. 2013).

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“When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may consider some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint, as well as materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” Ashford v. Douglas Cnty., 880 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 395 (8th Cir. 2014)); see Stahl v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 327 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The district court may take judicial notice of public records and may thus consider them on a motion to dismiss.”). The court can take judicial notice of its own records and files, and facts which are part of its public records. United States v. Jackson, 640 F.2d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 1981). Judicial notice is particularly applicable to the court's own records of prior litigation closely related to the case before it. Id. The court can also take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if they relate directly to the matters at issue. Conforti v. United States, 74 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 1996).

As per Frakes request, the court will take judicial notice of its own records in Saylor v. Kohl, No. 4:12-CV-3115 (“Saylor I”), including:

• Filing 178, order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment, 2014 WL 73335741 (D. Neb. Dec. 22, 2014) (Bataillon, J.)

• Filing 190, order on appeal reversing and remanding with directions, 812 F.3d 637 (8th Cir.), as amended (Jan. 29, 2016)

• Filing 222, order dismissing on remand, 2016 WL 8201925 (D. Neb. Nov. 28, 2016) (Bataillon, J.)

• Filing 225, motion to reconsider with attached proposed third amended complaint (filed Dec. 27, 2016)

• Filing 230, order denying motion to reconsider, 2017 WL 486921 (Feb. 6, 2017) (Bataillon, J.)

and in Saylor v. Nebraska, No. 8:17-CV-472 (“Saylor II”), including:

• Filing 1, notice of removal with attached state-court complaint (filed Dec. 8, 2017)

• Filing 28, order remanding to state court, 2018 WL 1732178 (D. Neb. Apr. 10, 2018) (Bataillon, J.)

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III. BACKGROUND OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

In 2002, while a prisoner at the Nebraska State Penitentiary (NSP), Saylor was allegedly attacked, beaten, and raped by other inmates. In 2005 Saylor was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of the 2002 attack, and he began seeing Dr. Glen Christensen, a psychiatrist who contracted with NDCS. Saylor saw Dr Christensen monthly for treatment. In April 2005, Saylor filed a complaint in state court alleging that the State of Nebraska and NDCS failed to protect him from the assault and failed to properly treat him after the assault. The trial was held in 2009, and in 2010 the state court entered an order in favor of Saylor, finding that the staff was negligent in failing to provide him with reasonably adequate protection from the 2002 assault. The court also found that Saylor received inadequate medical treatment from Dr. [Mohammad] Kamal from 2002 to 2005. Saylor was awarded $250,000 in damages.

Saylor I, Filing 190 (812 F.3d at 641).

In the state court action, the court also found, however, that the Nebraska Department of Corrections had provided medically appropriate care from and after March 31, 2010. Saylor v. State of Nebraska, No. CI 05-1597 (March 31, 2010); see Saylor v. Kohl, No. 4:12cv3115 (D. Neb.), Filing No. 143-18, Index of Evid., Ex. 16, State Court Decision at 35-36.

Saylor II, Filing 28 (2018 WL 1732178, at *1).

In April 2010, Saylor had his last meeting with Dr. Christensen because his contract with the prison was ending in May 2010. In addition, Saylor had monthly Mental Status Reviews with Cathy Moss, a Licensed Mental Health Practitioner. She informed Saylor that Dr. Kamal was the only psychiatrist available to work with him at NSP. In May 2010, Saylor stated that he would not work with Dr. Kamal because Dr. Kohl had removed Dr. Kamal as Saylor's psychiatrist five years ago. Thus, Saylor agreed to forgo psychiatric care but wanted to continue taking his medications. A multidisciplinary hearing was held in 2010 to discuss the next step for Saylor because Dr. Christensen's contract ended and Saylor refused to work with Dr. Kamal. Defendants Dr. Weilage, Dr. Perez, and Dr. Kamal participated in the meeting, along

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with others not named in the lawsuit. The group suggested that Saylor could be transferred to Tecumseh State Correctional Institution (TSCI) because Dr. Baker, a psychiatrist providing care at TSCI, could work with Saylor. It is normal procedure for a correctional facility to transfer inmates who need mental health care beyond the resources available in their facility to a facility where such care is available. Warden Bakewell made the final decision, and Saylor was transferred to TSCI in September 2010. Saylor claims that the transfer was unnecessary, retaliatory, and caused his PTSD to worsen.

Saylor was initially classified as an inmate in Protective Custody but was placed in the TSCI hospital upon arrival because he attempted to hang himself before he was transferred. While in the hospital he met with Dr. Baker. Dr. Baker wanted to gradually take Saylor off Seroquel, one of his medicines. He agreed and decided to continue taking Xanax. Throughout his time at TSCI, Saylor saw Dr. Baker every couple of months and was subjected to monthly Mental Status Reviews, but he often refused to participate. After a week in the hospital, Saylor was placed in the Special Management Unit (SMU) for refusing to move to Protective Custody. SMU is the only facility with single cells, and Saylor specifically asked for his own cell because of his PTSD and fear of roommates. In early October 2010, he was moved to Protective Custody, which

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