Sc Dept. of Social Services v. Seegars, 26119.

Decision Date27 February 2006
Docket NumberNo. 26119.,26119.
Citation627 S.E.2d 718
PartiesSOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent, v. Angelica SEEGARS, John Doe, and L.J. Parker, Defendants, of whom Angelica Seegars is Appellant. In re Brionica Ja'zyra Seegars, 10-06-99; Javarus Kaleel Seegars, 07-11-02; Children under the age of eighteen.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

William P. Davis, of Baker, Ravanel & Bender, L.L.P., of Columbia, for Appellant.

Deborah Murdock, of Greenville, for Respondent.

Marion H. (Mark) Grier, Jr., of Lancaster, for Guardian Ad Litem.

Justice BURNETT:

Angelica Seegars (Appellant) appeals the family court's termination of her parental rights to Brionica Ja'zyra Seegars and Javarus Kaleel Seegars (Children). We affirm as modified.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 22, 2002, the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) took Children into emergency protective custody because Javarus had been hospitalized for severe injuries from a nonaccidental trauma. On October 16, 2003, in a formal order of removal, the family court found injuries to Javarus's brain, toes, neck, and leg occurred while in the care of another but under the direction of approval of Appellant and found injuries to Javarus's arm and ribs occurred while in Appellant's direct care and control. The family court further found Brionica was at a substantial risk of abuse because of the severity of Javarus's physical abuse by Appellant. The family court also ordered Appellant to pay monthly child support for Children in the amount of $248.00 with court costs of five percent.1

On April 9, 2004, DSS commenced this action for termination of parental rights (TPR) against Appellant, John Doe, and L.J. Parker. DSS sought termination of Appellant's parental rights pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(1), (2), (4), (6), and (8) (1976 & Supp.2005) and termination of parental rights of Parker and Doe pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(3), (4), (7), and (8).

At the TPR hearing, Dr. William Lehman, an orthopedic surgeon, testified he treated Javarus on September 25, 2002, for a fracture of the upper arm bone. On October 8, 2002, Lehman treated Javarus for skull and rib fractures. He testified the skull injury led to significant and permanent brain damage, and he concluded Javarus's injuries were not accidental. He further testified Javarus was two years old at the time of hearing, but functioning, intellectually and physically, at a six month level.

Carol Tiedeman, Javarus's physical therapist, testified she began his therapy on January 7, 2003. According to Tiedeman, Javarus had neurological damage and vision and hearing impairments and had been diagnosed with battered child syndrome and shaken baby syndrome. She testified that Javarus's foster mother brought him to the appointments and did home therapy with Javarus. She stated she had never met or talked to Appellant.

Chrys Tuttle, a foster care case worker for DSS, was assigned to Children's case. According to Tuttle's records, Appellant alleged she had five places of employment since Children had been in foster care, but Tuttle was unable to verify Appellant's employment history. She opined Appellant had not demonstrated stable employment for a period of six months because she had not had any one job for a six month period. Tuttle testified her records indicated eight residences for Appellant since Children had been in foster care, including a one bedroom apartment in Charlotte, North Carolina where Appellant had been living since February 28, 2004.

Tuttle testified Appellant attended four of twenty scheduled medical appointments for Javarus, none of Javarus's twenty-three emergency medical appointments, and none of Javarus's one hundred, at least, physical, speech, and occupational appointments. She also testified there were prospective adoptive placements available for Children and in her opinion termination of Appellant's parental rights was in the best interests of Children.

According to family court records, Appellant's child support began on October 17, 2003. Appellant paid $20.00 on October 17, 2003, and $50.00 on October 31, 2003. The deputy clerk of the family court testified Appellant was in arrears $3,054.80 as of the date of the TPR hearing.

Appellant testified to four places of employment and four to five residences since the formal removal order. She testified she would begin working at Mercy Hospital in Charlotte, North Carolina, the week following the hearing and she had been working at Presbyterian Hospital in Charlotte since June 2004. She testified she worked at Burger King Corporation in Charlotte from February to June 2004, and she worked at Goodwill Industries from September 2003 to November 2003.2

Appellant testified she gave Children toys, money, and gifts during visits and for their birthdays and Christmas. She also asserted she had insufficient funds to pay the court-ordered child support because her employment with Goodwill ended in November 2003. She further testified she wrote "a letter to Columbia to let them know what my status was with child support and to be patient with me and I would try to clear it up as soon as I could." Appellant testified the family court records were incorrect because she had made more than two payments.

By agreement, a written evaluation from Dr. Lisa Jackel, a licensed clinical psychologist who conducted a psychological evaluation of Appellant, was admitted in lieu of her live testimony. She diagnosed Appellant with schizotypal personality disorder and alleged physical and sexual abuse. Dr. Jackel concluded that Appellant "is not currently or likely ever capable of appropriately caring for her children, financially, emotionally, or intellectually."

By agreement, a letter from Dr. Russell Hancock, Appellant's current psychologist, was admitted in lieu of his live testimony. He diagnosed Appellant with adjustment disorder and schizotypal personality disorder. He explained the difference between a personality disorder and a psychotic disorder.

The guardian ad litem recommended termination of parental rights and found termination was in Children's best interests.

On November 15, 2005, the family court judge entered a Final Order for Termination of Parental Rights, terminating Appellant's parental rights based on S.C.Code Ann § 20-7-1572(4), (6), and (8). The family court also terminated the alleged fathers' parental rights on the grounds of S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(3), (4), (7), and (8).3 The family court denied Appellant's motion to alter or amend the judgment and for reconsideration, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Appellant appeals and we certified this case for review from the Court of Appeals under Rule 204(b), SCACR.

ISSUES

I. Did the family court err in terminating Appellant's parental rights because she willfully failed to support the children for a period in excess of six months, S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(4), or because she had a diagnosable condition that is unlikely to change within a reasonable time and made it unlikely that she could provide minimally acceptable care for the children, S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(6)?

II. Does the termination of Appellant's parental rights based on S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(8) violate her due process rights?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The family court will terminate parental rights and free a child up for adoption if it finds that one of the nine statutory grounds for termination has been met and that "termination is in the best interest of the child." S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572. The family court judge terminated Appellant's parental rights pursuant to three statutory grounds. Id. § 20-7-1572(4), (6), & (8). DSS must prove these grounds by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Richland County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Earles, 330 S.C. 24, 496 S.E.2d 864 (1998). When reviewing the family court decision, this Court may make its own conclusion as to whether DSS proved by clear and convincing evidence that parental rights should be terminated. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Cochran, 356 S.C. 413, 589 S.E.2d 753 (2003). The reviewing court, however, is not required "to ignore the fact that the family court, who saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony." Hooper v. Rockwell, 334 S.C. 281, 297, 513 S.E.2d 358, 367 (1999).

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Termination of Parental Rights
A. Willful Failure to Support

Appellant argues the family court erred in terminating her parental rights on the ground she failed to support Children or make any material contribution to their care for a period in excess of six months. We disagree.

Under S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(4) the family court may order termination of parental rights if:

The child has lived outside the home of either parent for a period of six months, and during that time the parent has wil[l]fully failed to support the child. Failure to support means that the parent has failed to make a material contribution to the child's care.... The court may consider all relevant circumstances in determining whether or not the parent has wil[l]fully failed to support the child, including requests for support by the custodian and the ability of the parent to provide support.

Whether a parent's failure to support a child is "willful" within the meaning of the statute is a question of intent to be determined in each case from all the facts and circumstances. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Broome, 307 S.C. 48, 52, 413 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1992). Conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego parental duties may fairly be characterized as "willful" because it manifests a conscious indifference to the rights of the child to receive support and consortium from the parent. Id. at 53, 413 S.E.2d at 839.

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