SC Dept. of Transp. v. Faulkenberry, No. 3043.

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: 337 S.C. 140,522 S.E.2d 822
• Docket Number: No. 3043.
• Decision Date: 07 September 1999
• Parties: SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant, v. J. Larry FAULKENBERRY, Landowner, and Palmetto Farm Credit Mortgage, Other Condemnee, of whom J. Larry Faulkenberry is the, Respondent.

337 S.C. 140
522 S.E.2d 822

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant,
v.
J. Larry FAULKENBERRY, Landowner, and Palmetto Farm Credit Mortgage, Other Condemnee, of whom J. Larry Faulkenberry is the, Respondent

No. 3043.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard May 11, 1999.

Decided September 7, 1999.

337 S.C. 143

Glennith C. Johnson, of Columbia, George C. James, Sr., of Richardson & James, of Sumter, for appellant

Robert J. Sheheen, of Savage, Royall & Sheheen, of Camden, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In this condemnation case, the trial court determined the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) should pay landowner J. Larry Faulkenberry interest, pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 28-2-420 (1991), on fifty percent of SCDOT'S pre-judgment payment to Faulkenberry from the date of the filing of the condemnation notice to the date of the jury verdict. In a supplemental order, the trial court ordered

337 S.C. 144

SCDOT to pay post-judgment interest on the interest awarded. SCDOT appeals. We reverse and remand

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

SCDOT filed an action on May 27, 1994, to condemn 1,709.4 acres of Faulkenberry's Clarendon County property. SCDOT deposited with the Clarendon County Clerk of Court $487,200.00, its appraised value for the property. Faulkenberry filed a separate action, asserting SCDOT had no authority or basis to condemn his property. On June 29, 1994, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting SCDOT from proceeding with the condemnation.

The parties negotiated a settlement and signed a consent order on July 27, 1994. Pursuant to this order, SCDOT filed an amended condemnation notice and tender of payment establishing $863,574.00 as the tendered compensation for the property. SCDOT agreed that $863,574.00 would be the minimum compensation for the property, with a final amount to be determined at a later date. SCDOT retrieved its initial deposit from the Clerk of Court and paid the entire amount of the revised tender to Faulkenberry. Faulkenberry consented to the dissolution of the temporary restraining order and dismissal of his injunction litigation, and agreed not to initiate further injunctive action against SCDOT.

The matter proceeded to trial and, on February 7, 1996, the jury awarded Faulkenberry $2,396,100.00. After the verdict, Faulkenberry wrote SCDOT requesting payment for the difference between the verdict and the tender, plus interest at the statutory rate of eight percent, for a total of $1,745,184.62. Afterwards, Faulkenberry sent a second letter to SCDOT with a revised calculation totaling $1,774,852.79. However, SCDOT's calculations differed, and SCDOT in turn offered Faulkenberry $1,753,488.32. Faulkenberry refused the offer, and SCDOT moved to have the appropriate amount determined by the court.

SCDOT asserted that under S.C.Code Ann. § 28-2-420 (1991), Faulkenberry was entitled to interest on the entire verdict for only 64 days: from May 27, 1994, the date of the original condemnation notice, until July 29, 1994, when the one hundred percent drawdown was paid pursuant to the consent

337 S.C. 145

order. It contended that from July 29, 1994, until the jury verdict on February 7, 1996, Faulkenberry was entitled to interest only on the difference between the jury verdict and the payment previously received. Faulkenberry argued he was entitled to the statutory interest on the full jury verdict for the entire period from the date of the condemnation notice through jury verdict

In an order dated December 3, 1997, the trial court noted S.C.Code Ann. § 28-2-480 (1991) allows a landowner to draw down up to fifty percent of the funds deposited with the clerk of court by the condemnor. The court found that "fairness and equity" require that statutory interest be paid only on the difference between the amount of the award by the jury and the amount that could be drawn down by the condemnee pursuant to Section 28-2-480. The court held that the additional drawdown above that allowed by Section 28-2-480, i.e., $431,787.00, was consideration for Faulkenberry's agreement to dismiss his challenge to SCDOT's right to condemn.

The court ordered SCDOT to pay interest on the difference between $2,396,100.00 (the jury verdict) less $431,787.00 (50% of the tendered amount) or $1,964,313.00, from the date of the filing of the condemnation notice through the date of the verdict. The court added:

The Court has not made any calculation of the amount of interest due since it does not know the relevant dates and is thus unable to determine the length of time on which interest would be due and payable. If the parties are unable to arrive at a calculation based upon the Court's order, the Court will again review the matter with a view toward actually calculating the amount of interest due and payable.

The parties were able to agree that, under the court's order, the interest due was $53,744.13. However, the parties were unable to agree on whether interest at the statutory judgment rate (14%, under S.C.Code Ann. § 34-31-20(b)¹) was to begin to run on the date of the verdict or the date of the court's initial order.

337 S.C. 146

In a supplemental order dated January 23, 1998, the trial court concluded the amount of interest due was unliquidated until the December 3, 1997 order, and therefore judgment interest did not begin to accrue until twenty days after that order, pursuant to Section 28-2-420(a).² In addition, the court allowed SCDOT to pay the award into court to terminate the running of statutory interest on the judgment. SCDOT appealed.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Error Preservation

Faulkenberry argues SCDOT has failed to appeal the trial court's December 3rd order and, thus, the December order is the law of the case concerning his entitlement to interest on the additional 50% drawdown. We disagree.

Generally, only final judgments are appealable. Culbertson v. Clemens, 322 S.C. 20, 471 S.E.2d 163 (1996). If a judgment leaves some further act to be done by the court before the rights of the parties are determined, the judgment is not final. Id. "If a judgment determines the applicable law while leaving open questions of fact, it is not a final judgment." Mid-State Distrib., Inc. v. Century Importers, Inc., 310 S.C. 330, 335, 426 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1993). When there is a final judgment, and a party timely files its notice of intent to appeal from that judgment, this court may review any intermediate order necessarily affecting the judgment not earlier appealed. Lancaster v. Fielder, 305 S.C. 418, 409 S.E.2d 375 (1991).

The court's December order ruled Faulkenberry was entitled to interest on the additional fifty percent of the deposit he received. However, the court also noted it did not calculate the actual amount of interest due because it did not have the relevant dates. This was clearly an undetermined

337 S.C. 147

question of fact. The court left the matter to the parties to determine, but also gave them the option to bring the matter back before the court if the parties could not agree. Thus, the rights of the parties were not completely determined until the judge's January 23, 1998 order, which finally decided the applicable date for the commencement of the accrual of statutory interest and set forth the total amount due Faulkenberry. Further, at no time did SCDOT depart from its position,³ and therefore it was not required to appeal from the intermediate order to preserve its right of review on appeal from final judgment. Gunnells v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 261 S.C. 106, 198 S.E.2d 535 (1973).

II. Statutory Interpretation

SCDOT argues the trial court erred in ordering it to pay interest on one-half of the amount tendered to Faulkenberry after he received it. It asserts interest under S.C.Code Ann. § 28-2-420 does not accrue on any amount paid to the condemnee after its receipt. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

In interpreting a statute, this court's primary function is to ascertain the intention of the legislature. In re Vincent J., 333 S.C. 233, 509 S.E.2d 261 (1998). Statutes should be construed with regard to the whole system of law of which they form a part. Roche v. Young Bros., Inc., 332 S.C. 75, 504 S.E.2d 311 (1998) (citing 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 362 (1953)). A statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers. TNS Mills, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 503 S.E.2d 471 (1998). In construing a statute, this court will reject any interpretation that leads to an unreasonable result. Busby v. Moore, 330 S.C. 201, 498 S.E.2d 883 (1998). Further, construction of a statute by an agency charged with its administration will be accorded the most respectful consideration and will not be overruled absent compelling reasons. Glover by

337 S.C. 148

Cauthen v. Suitt Constr. Co., 318 S.C. 465, 458 S.E.2d 535 (1995).

B. Discussion

Until the adoption of the South Carolina Constitution of 1868, the state exercised its right of eminent domain to take private lands without compensation. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Miller, 237 S.C. 386, 117 S.E.2d 561 (1960). Currently, both the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of the South Carolina Constitution prohibit the taking of private property for public use without payment of just compensation to the property owner.

Neither constitution defines "just compensation," nor prescribes how it shall be made when the condemnor is a public entity. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Southern Ry., 239 S.C. 1, 121 S.E.2d 236 (1961). However, the United States Supreme Court has stated, "The compensation to which the owner is entitled is the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken." Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304, 43 S.Ct. 354, 67 L.Ed. 664 (1923). In order for the landowner to be compensated fully, the government must "put the...