SC Uninsured Employer's Fund v. House, 3850.
Citation | 602 S.E.2d 81,360 S.C. 468 |
Decision Date | 02 August 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 3850.,3850. |
Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
Parties | SOUTH CAROLINA UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S FUND, Respondent, v. Roy R. HOUSE, Claimant, and Jack Clark and Vaughn Homes, Inc. and/or Jack Clark Constructions and Travelers/Zurich, Defendants, of whom Roy R. House is Respondent. and Vaughn Homes, Inc. is Appellant. |
Kirsten Leslie Barr, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellant.
Edgar W. Dickson, of Orangeburg, for Respondent.
In this workers' compensation case, Vaughn Homes, Inc. appeals the circuit court's order reversing the full commission and concluding Vaughn was liable for injuries sustained by an employee of its subcontractor. We reverse.
Vaughn Homes, a housing contractor, subcontracted with Jack Clark Constructions for framing work. Roy House, an employee of Clark, filed a workers' compensation claim after he was injured in the course and scope of his employment with Clark. At the time of House's accident, Clark did not have workers' compensation coverage.
When he was initially engaged to perform the work, Clark presented Vaughn with a certificate indicating he had workers' compensation coverage from June 5, 1997, to June 5, 1998. Upon the expiration of the original term, Clark provided a certificate indicating continued coverage until June 7, 1999. The history of the policy indicates several instances of cancellation and reinstatement, all based on nonpayment of premiums, until, in March 1999, Clark received notification from his agent that the policy was due to expire in June. A notice of cancellation was served on Clark prior to the date of expiration, but Clark failed to pay the renewal premium.
Clark applied for a new policy with another insurance agency on July 1, 1999, but coverage was declined. Clark continued to perform work for Vaughn, but admitted he neither notified Vaughn that his coverage had lapsed for nonpayment nor advised Vaughn that his application for other coverage was declined. Clark, however, continued to verbally advise Vaughn that he did have coverage.
Following hearings on House's workers' compensation claim, the single commissioner transferred Vaughn's liability to the South Carolina Uninsured Employer's Fund, concluding Clark committed fraud by failing to notify its higher-tier contractor of a lapse in coverage pursuant to South Carolina Code section 42-1-415(C) (Supp.2003). The full commission affirmed but the circuit court reversed, finding Vaughn had notice of the expiration of Clark's policy and failed to require proof of coverage after the policy expired.
When reviewing an appeal from the workers' compensation commission, the circuit and appellate courts are proscribed from weighing the evidence or substituting their judgment for that of the full commission on questions of fact. However, the reviewing court may reverse when a decision is predicated on an error of law. Pratt v. Morris Roofing, Inc., 353 S.C. 339, 344-45, 577 S.E.2d 475, 477-78 (Ct.App.2003), aff'd as modified, 357 S.C. 619, 594 S.E.2d 272 (2004). Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Stewart v. Richland Mem'l Hosp., 350 S.C. 589, 593, 567 S.E.2d 510, 512 (Ct.App.2002).
Vaughn argues it may transfer liability for House's injuries to the fund pursuant to South Carolina Code Ann. section 42-1-415 (Supp. 2003). Vaughn contends the circuit court erred by interpreting section 42-1-415 to require a higher-tier contractor to continue to collect proof of insurance coverage from its subcontractor after originally collecting documentation at the time of hire. We agree.
The full commission affirmed the single commissioner's decision to relieve Vaughn of liability based on the finding Clark committed fraud pursuant to section 42-1-415(C) (Supp.2003). In reversing, the circuit court concluded Vaughn had notice that Clark's policy would expire, and reasoned the burden fell upon Vaughn to require appropriate evidence of continued coverage. The court further determined the commission erred as a matter of law in finding Clark committed fraud, based essentially on two premises. The first premise was that Clark never represented to Vaughn that he had insurance coverage for any period of time subsequent to June 7, 1999, and therefore could not be guilty of fraudulently representing that he did. As a second premise, the circuit court concluded the expiration of a policy at the end of its term was not the type of "lapse" contemplated by the provisions of section 42-1-415.
However, neither the commission's finding of fraud nor the circuit court's focus on notice is determinative of whether liability may be transferred under section 42-1-415. Under subsection 42-1-415(A), a statutory employer, such as Vaughn, may transfer liability to the fund when a subcontractor's employee is injured if the statutory employer submits documentation to the fund that the subcontractor has represented himself as having workers' compensation coverage "at the time the... subcontractor was engaged to perform work." S.C.Code Ann. § 42-1-415(A) (Supp.2003); see also Harrell v. Pineland Plantation, Ltd., 337 S.C. 313, 330, 523 S.E.2d 766, 774-75 (1999)
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