Scaccia v. Boston Elevated Ry.

• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Citation: 308 Mass. 310,32 N.E.2d 253
• Parties: SCACCIA v. BOSTON ELEVATED RY.
• Decision Date: 24 February 1941

308 Mass. 310

32 N.E.2d 253

SCACCIA

v.BOSTON ELEVATED RY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Feb. 24, 1941.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Williams, Judge.

Action of tort by Constance Scaccia against the Boston Elevated Railway, in which trial by jury was waived, and it was stipulated that if on the statement of agreed facts trial judge would have been warranted in submitting the case to a jury, he should find for the plaintiff in a stated sum, but if, as matter of law, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, he should find for the defendant. On report of superior court justice.

Report dismissed.

Argued before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, DOLAN, COX, and RONAN, JJ.

E. J. Donlan, of Boston, for plaintiff.

S. P. Sears and R. Maguire, both of Boston, for defendant.

COX, Justice.

Trial by jury of this action of tort was waived, and it was stipulated that if on the statement of agreed facts the trial judge would have been warranted in submitting the case to a jury, he should find for the plaintiff in a stated sum, but if, as matter of law, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, he should find for the defendant. He found for the defendant and reported the case to this court in the following terms: ‘I now report the case for the determination of the question whether on the agreed statement of facts and the inferences which may be drawn from them there was any evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. If the court is of opinion that there was any such evidence, then judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff in the amount of the stipulated damages. Otherwise, judgment is to be entered for the defendant. It is agreed and stipulated that the Supreme Judicial Court may draw from the agreed facts any inferences of fact that might have been drawn therefrom at a trial.’ We are of opinion that the report is not properly before us.

The only authority for a report of this case is found in G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 111, which provides, so far as material, as follows: ‘A justice of * * * the superior * * * court * * * after a finding of the facts by the court, may report the case for determination by the full court. * * * A justice of * * * the superior court may, upon request of the parties, in any case where there is agreement as to all the material facts, report the case to the full court for determination without making any decision thereon.’ See Frati v. Jannini, 226 Mass. 430, at page 431, 115 N.E. 746, at page 747, where it was said that the accurate phrase to express the way of reporting a case where there is an agreement as to all the material facts is ‘case stated,’ although not infrequently the words ‘agreed facts' or ‘agreed statement of facts' are used. It was also said in that case, 226 Mass. at page 432, 115 N.E. at page 747: ‘Often a difficulty of construction arises to determine whether, on the one hand, the document stating facts is a ‘case stated’ or whether, on the other hand, it is merely a part of the whole of the evidence in the case or a statement of agreed facts submitted as evidence from which by inference or otherwise the ultimate facts are to be deduced. * * * The determination of that question when it arises must be made on the substance of the thing done and not upon the name or description applied to it. That question assumes importance now by reason of St.1913, c. 716, § 5 [see now G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 126], whereby it is provided that inferences of fact may be drawn on a ‘case stated’ unless parties expressly agree to the contrary. * * * If the agreed facts are submitted to the tribunal merely as evidence and in place of ordinary proof, then that portion of that statute does not apply and the case stands as does any other case at law coming by appeal or report from the decision of the trial judge.'

It does not appear in the report that it was made upon request of the parties, although we assume, without deciding, that this may be inferred from the fact that it was agreed and stipulated that this court might draw from the agreed facts any inferences of fact that might have been drawn therefrom at a trial.

In Atlantic Maritime Co. v. Glorcester, 228 Mass. 519, page 520,117 N.E. 924, at page 925, the case was submitted by stipulation to a judge of the Superior Court on an ‘agreed statement of facts submitted as evidence’, and the judge reported the case without decision ‘in accordance with the provisions of Acts of 1917, chapter 345.’ See now G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 111. It was said in that case, 228 Mass. at pages 521 and 522,117 N.E. at page 925: ‘The statute does not mean that, when a finding of fact must be made in order to present a pure question of law as decisive of the case, the judge of the superior court can omit to make that finding and merely pass the case on to be decided both as to fact as well as law by this court. Abandonment of the judicial function by the trial court was not intended by the statute. If material facts, whether primary or ultimate, express or inferential, are omitted from facts agreed and submitted, it becomes the duty of the superior court judge to find those facts before he can report under the statute. Even though the ultimate facts may rest upon inferences, the duty of determining...