Scadden v. State
| Decision Date | 05 February 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-39,86-39 |
| Citation | 732 P.2d 1036 |
| Parties | Bryan SCADDEN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Leonard D. Munker, Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Senior Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.
Appellant, a high school teacher and girl's volleyball coach, was convicted on one count of second degree sexual assault. The victim was a student and team member. Appellant was charged with using his position of authority to cause submission to sexual intercourse, in violation of § 6-2-303(a)(vi), W.S.1977. On appeal, appellant raises one statutory construction constitutional question, and six procedural or sufficiency issues, as claimed error:
I. Unconstitutionality of the statute: Section 6-2-303(a)(vi) violates Art. 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
II. Course-of-activities evidence: Introduction of testimony concerning appellant's teaching and coaching methods and his influence over students other than the two alleged victims violated the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, and deprived appellant of a fundamentally fair trial.
III. Sex-offense expert testimony: Admission of Detective Reikens' testimony about the range of responses she encountered as a police officer investigating sexual abuse and sexual-assault cases constituted error.
IV. Motion for a mistrial: Denial of appellant's motion for a mistrial was unjustified in light of Ms. Hoxey's improper testimony as the State Crime Laboratory specialist, regarding the 38 undesignated pubic hairs found in the school closet where admitted sexual activity occurred.
V. Cumulative evidence: Rejection for introduction of the transcript of MBS' preliminary hearing denied appellant his constitutional right to defend.
VI. Sufficiency of the evidence: There was insufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction.
VII. Instructions: Refusal to give the jury Instruction 14 and appellant's proposed Instructions A and B was error.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Bryan Scadden, then age 29, was a continuing-contract teacher and girl's volleyball coach at Cheyenne's East High School. The sexual-assault allegations involve his relationship with MBS, a high school student and volleyball athlete who graduated in 1984, and with KR, another East High School student and volleyball player who graduated in 1985.
Commencing on or about November 1, 1983, when MBS was 17 years old, appellant and MBS began a course of sexual relations that continued through September 12, 1984. The sexual affair between the coach and KR began in October of 1984, and lasted a shorter time, terminating when police investigatory activities intervened.
Appellant was charged with five counts of sexual assault: one of first-degree sexual assault, and four of second-degree. The four second-degree sexual assault charges were brought under § 6-2-303(a)(vi), W.S.1977, hereafter referred to as the "position of authority" statute. Appellant was convicted on one charge of second-degree sexual assault under that statute, and acquitted of the other four charged offenses. The conviction, which resulted in a sentence of confinement for two to five years, involved an incident with MBS that occurred about December 26, 1983.
Throughout the trial, the prosecution sought to portray appellant as a highly influential authority figure who encouraged the victims to become dependent on him in an atmosphere of trust, and who then used this influence to impose his sexual will on those students. Conversely, appellant sought to convince the jury that with MBS he developed a relationship of consensual sex founded on love, and that KR seduced him. In both cases he maintained that the young women freely consented. Appellant's argument apparently won favor with the jury on four charges but not the fifth--or it decided that a conviction on one offense would suffice. Logically, in result, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not met on the four counts for which he was acquitted.
The ten-day trial was explicit in scope and detail, and encompassed graphic descriptions of various sexual acts. The details will only be included in this opinion as justified in the discussion and disposition of the issues raised on appeal.
Unconstitutionality of the statute: Section 6-2-303(a)(vi) violates Art. 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The relevant portion of the challenged statute, § 6-2-303(a)(vi), W.S.1977 states:
It is well settled that " ' "every law must be presumed to be constitutional, with all reasonable doubt resolved in its favor." ' " Keser v. State, Wyo., 706 P.2d 263, 266 (1985), quoting from Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 567 P.2d 270, 274 (1977). In this context, we examine appellant's two constitutional challenges.
Appellant asserts that under Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, reh. denied 410 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1409, 35 L.Ed.2d 694 (1973), due process limits the state's ability to invade certain zones of privacy, and that a zone of privacy extends to individuals' decisions whether or not to engage in consensual sexual relations. He concedes that the State of Wyoming does have the power to regulate sexual relations, but that that power is limited by due-process protections of this fundamental and protected liberty. This court agrees.
However, appellant's argument fails to recognize that this case does not involve sexual relations between consenting adults. Appellant tried his case under the consent theory, but the jury found him guilty under a statute and instructions which required it to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent. May it suffice to say that where the constitutional rights to privacy confront the state's police power, the privacy rights do not extend to sexual relations between high school coach-instructors and underage students. Within the purview of this case, we determine that instructors do not have a constitutional right to have sexual relations with minor students in the state's educational system. We distinguish any authority which pertains to adults or concerns the privacy-of-the-home relationship. E.g., Griswold v. State of Connecticut, supra. Cf. majority and dissenting opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140, reh. denied, 478 U.S. 1039, 107 S.Ct. 29, 92 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986).
The jury was instructed both that lack of consent is an element of the crime which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and that consent is a defense to the crime for which appellant was convicted. Instruction No. 9 states, in relevant part:
Instruction No. 10 states:
" 'Submit' as used in this case means that the person subjected to sexual intrusion by an actor, who is in a position of authority over that person, does not give free, full and reasoned consent."
Instruction No. 11 states:
The State contended, and the jury found, that the victim did not give free, full and reasoned consent to the sexual act for which appellant was convicted. See an excellent discussion of the course-of-conduct consent question in State v. Kennedy, Utah, 616 P.2d 594 (1980).
The law in Wyoming, and indeed the law in general, has always limited some sexual contacts. The primary purpose for these proscriptions against sexual relations is the absence of acceptable consensual participation in the act. The State of Wyoming has a compelling interest in regulating sexual contacts between persons when one of those persons does not consent or lacks the capacity to consent. Incest or statutory rape are readily apparent examples. State v. Ross, 16 Wyo. 285, 301, 93 P. 299, reh. denied 16 Wyo. 285, 94 P. 217 (1908).
In the exercise of its governmental police power, the legislature has thrown out the protecting arm of the law to guard those persons who are...
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