Scaggs v. Gpch-Gp, Inc., No. 2005-CA-00917-SCT.
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
| Writing for the Court | Smith |
| Citation | 931 So.2d 1274 |
| Decision Date | 15 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2005-CA-00917-SCT. |
| Parties | Mary SCAGGS v. GPCH-GP, INC. d/b/a Garden Park Medical Center. |
Page 1274
v.
GPCH-GP, INC. d/b/a Garden Park Medical Center.
Woodrow W. Pringle, III, Gulfport, attorney for appellant.
William E. Whitfield, III, Gulfport, Kimberly S. Rosetti, attorneys for appellee.
Before SMITH, C.J., CARLSON and DICKINSON, JJ.
SMITH, Chief Justice, for the Court.
¶ 1. Mary Scaggs (Scaggs) filed a medical malpractice action against Garden Park Medical Center (Garden Park) on April 12, 2004, arising out of injuries she sustained during a preoperative procedure on March
Page 1275
14, 2002. Subsequently, Garden Park filed a motion to dismiss the suit on the basis that the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The trial court determined the suit was time barred and granted Garden Park's motion. Scaggs then perfected the present appeal with this Court.
¶ 2. On March 14, 2002, Scaggs was admitted to Garden Park and scheduled to undergo surgery. During the preoperative process Scaggs fell and sustained injuries to her knee, back and neck while attempting to climb onto a table. Scaggs alleges her injuries are attributable to the directions given to her by an employee of Garden Park.
¶ 3. On December 10, 2002, Scaggs sent Garden Park written notice of her intent to pursue a claim. On January 28, 2004, Scaggs, through other counsel, sent Garden Park a second notice of her intention to file suit. Scaggs filed suit on April 12, 2004, against Garden Park in the Circuit Court of Harrison County.
¶ 4. Subsequently, Garden Park filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. Garden Park's motion averred that because suit was filed after March 14, 2004, Scaggs did not comply with the two-year period of limitations under Miss.Code Ann. Section 15-1-36. Hence, Garden Park maintained the suit was time barred. After considering the pertinent provisions of Miss.Code Ann. Section 15-1-36, the trial court determined that Scaggs did not file her claim in a timely fashion and should be dismissed. Thus, the trial court granted Garden Park's motion.
¶ 5. We conclude that the circuit court erred in granting Garden Park's motion to dismiss. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. MOTION TO DISMISS
Standard of Review
¶ 6. When considering a motion to dismiss, this Court's standard of review is de novo. "When considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of his claim." Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland Sch. Dist., 764 So.2d 1234 (Miss.1999)(citing T.M. v. Noblitt, 650 So.2d 1340, 1342 (Miss.1995)). This Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court unless they are manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Bell v. City of Bay St. Louis, 467 So.2d 657, 661 (Miss.1985).
Section 15-1-36
¶ 7. Scaggs argues the trial court erred in dismissing her case on the basis that the suit was filed outside the applicable period of limitations in accordance with Miss.Code Ann. Section 15-1-36. Conversely, Garden Park maintains the trial court was correct in determining that under Miss.Code Ann. Section 15-1-36 Scaggs was not within the allowable period to file suit.
¶ 8. The relevant provisions of Miss Code Ann. 15-1-36 are as follows:
(2) For any claim occurring on or after July 1, 1998, and except as otherwise provided in this section, no claim in tort may be brought against a . . . hospital. . . for injuries or wrongful death arising out of the course of medical, surgical or other professional services unless it is filed within two (2) years from the date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered, and, except
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as described in paragraph (a) and (b) of this sub section, in no event more than seven years after the alleged act, omission or neglect occurred.
...
(15) No action based upon the health care provider's professional negligence may be begun unless the defendant has been given at least sixty (60) days' prior written notice of the intention to begin the action. No particular form of notice is required but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered. If the notice is served within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the time for commencement of the action shall be extended sixty (60) days from the service of the notice for said health care providers and others....
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Jones v. City of Ridgeland, No. 2009-CT-00984-SCT.
...dismiss, this Court's standard of review is de novo." Meadows v. Blake, 36 So.3d 1225, 1229 (Miss.2010) (citing Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So.2d 1274, 1275 (Miss.2006)). ¶ 25. "An automobile stop is ... subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be 'unreasonable' under the circu......
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Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, No. 2008-CA-00416-SCT.
..."`[w]hen considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations taken in the complaint must be taken as true. ...'" Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So.2d 1274, 1275 (Miss.2006) (quoting Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland Sch. Dist., 764 So.2d 1234 II. Whether the chancellor erred in failing to strike Bi......
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Tunica Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors v. HWCC-Tunica, LLC, NO. 2015–CA–01645–SCT
...Of course, our goal when interpreting statutes is to divine the "true meaning of the Legislature." Scaggs v. GPCH–GP, Inc. , 931 So.2d 1274, 1276 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2006) (quoting Stockstill v. State , 854 So.2d 1017, 1022–23 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2003) ). "Our role is to determine the legislative inten......
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City of Jackson v. Allen, NO. 2016–CA–00678–SCT
...Of course, our goal when interpreting statutes is to divine the "true meaning of the Legislature." Scaggs v. GPCH–GP, Inc. , 931 So.2d 1274, 1276 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2006) (quoting Stockstill v. State , 854 So.2d 1017, 1022–23 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2003) ). "Our role is to determine the legislative inten......
-
Jones v. City of Ridgeland, 2009-CT-00984-SCT.
...dismiss, this Court's standard of review is de novo." Meadows v. Blake, 36 So.3d 1225, 1229 (Miss.2010) (citing Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So.2d 1274, 1275 (Miss.2006)). ¶ 25. "An automobile stop is ... subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be 'unreasonable' under the circu......
-
Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, 2008-CA-00416-SCT.
..."`[w]hen considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations taken in the complaint must be taken as true. ...'" Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So.2d 1274, 1275 (Miss.2006) (quoting Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland Sch. Dist., 764 So.2d 1234 II. Whether the chancellor erred in failing to strike Bi......
-
Tunica Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors v. HWCC-Tunica, LLC, 2015–CA–01645–SCT
...Of course, our goal when interpreting statutes is to divine the "true meaning of the Legislature." Scaggs v. GPCH–GP, Inc. , 931 So.2d 1274, 1276 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2006) (quoting Stockstill v. State , 854 So.2d 1017, 1022–23 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2003) ). "Our role is to determine the legislative inten......
-
City of Jackson v. Allen, 2016–CA–00678–SCT
...Of course, our goal when interpreting statutes is to divine the "true meaning of the Legislature." Scaggs v. GPCH–GP, Inc. , 931 So.2d 1274, 1276 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2006) (quoting Stockstill v. State , 854 So.2d 1017, 1022–23 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2003) ). "Our role is to determine the legislative inten......