Scaife v. State

• Decision Date: 29 May 2015
• Docket Number: 111,319.
• Citation: 51 Kan.App.2d 577,350 P.3d 1
• Parties: William L. SCAIFE, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

51 Kan.App.2d 577

350 P.3d 1

William L. SCAIFE, Appellant

v.STATE of Kansas, Appellee.

111,319.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

May 29, 2015.

Gerald E. Wells, of Jerry Wells Attorney–at–Law, of Lawrence, for appellant.

Edmond Brancart, chief deputy district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before POWELL, P.J., McANANY, J., and BUKATY, S.J.

Opinion

POWELL, J.

William L. Scaife appeals the summary denial of his motion filed pursuant to K.S.A. 60–1507. Scaife argues the district court improperly denied his motion because (1) the court erroneously determined it was untimely and (2) it was manifest injustice for the court to summarily deny his timely motion without an evidentiary hearing. Because we agree with the district court that Scaife's motion was untimely, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Scaife was convicted by a jury of (1) murder in the first degree, (2) attempted murder in the first degree, (3) two counts of aggravated robbery, and (4) felony fleeing to elude police. On direct appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed every conviction and sentence except the court vacated and remanded for retrial the conviction of murder in the first degree. State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 623, 186 P.3d 755 (2008). The Kansas Supreme Court announced its opinion on July 3, 2008, and issued its mandate on September 24, 2008. Scaife did not petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.

On December 31, 2008, upon remand to the district court, Scaife entered into a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to a reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter, agreed to accept a sentence under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, and waived his right to appeal. The district court accepted Scaife's plea and sentenced him to a guideline sentence on January 15, 2009. In accordance with his waiver, no direct appeal was filed by Scaife.

On January 6, 2010, Scaife filed his present K.S.A. 60–1507 motion in Wyandotte County District Court, alleging: (1) Scaife's original trial attorney was wrongly disqualified in violation of Scaife's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, (2) Scaife's replacement counsel was ineffective during Scaife's trial and direct appeal in violation of Scaife's Sixth Amendment rights, and (3) a fatal variance existed between the information and the evidence produced at trial in violation of Scaife's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

On December 12, 2011, after an unexplained delay of nearly 2 years, the district court summarily dismissed Scaife's motion solely because the motion had not been filed prior to the 1–year statutory deadline pursuant to K.S.A. 60–1507(f). Scaife appealed the district court's dismissal, and after a series of procedural delays—the reasons are immaterial—our court reinstated Scaife's appeal on March 13, 2014.

Did the District Court Err in Summarily Dismissing Scaife's K.S.A. 60–1507 Motion as Untimely?

Scaife's sole issue on appeal challenges the district court's finding that his motion filed under K.S.A. 60–1507 was untimely. Significantly, Scaife does not argue that the motion, if untimely, should be reviewed to prevent manifest injustice but argues it was manifest injustice for the district court to deny him an evidentiary hearing on a timely motion. Accordingly, he has abandoned any such claim. See State v. Gardner, 10 Kan.App.2d 408, 413, 701 P.2d 703, rev. denied 237 Kan. 888 (1985).

Standard of Review

Because the facts are not in dispute and resolution of this issue involves an interpretation of a statute, which is a question of law, our review is unlimited. State v. Jefferson, 287 Kan. 28, 33, 194 P.3d 557 (2008). The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. Hall v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 286 Kan. 777, 785, 189 P.3d 508 (2008). Our duty is to ascertain that intent through the statutory language used and give ordinary words their ordinary meaning. State v. Gracey, 288 Kan. 252, 257, 200 P.3d 1275 (2009). However, when the meaning of a statute is unclear, “we may consider the provisions of the entire act with a view toward reconciling and bringing them into harmony. [Citation omitted.] [We] always strive[ ] for a reasonable ... construction that avoids an unreasonable or absurd result. [Citation omitted.]” Baker v. State, 297 Kan. 486, 488, 303 P.3d 675 (2013).

Analysis

K.S.A. 60–1507(a) gives prisoners the right to collaterally attack their sentences:

“Motion attacking sentence. A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of general jurisdiction claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws of the state of Kansas, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may, pursuant to the time limitations imposed by subsection (f), move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”

However, there is a 1–year time limit for prisoners to bring such an action:

“Time limitations. (1) Any action under this section must be brought within one year of: (i) The final order of the last appellate court in this state to exercise jurisdiction on a direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction; or (ii) the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States supreme court or issuance of such court's final order following granting such petition.

“(2) The time limitation herein may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice.” K.S.A. 60–1507(f).

Supreme Court Rule 183 (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 286) governs procedures applicable to K.S.A. 60–1507 motions:

“(c) When Remedy May Be Invoked.

(1) The provisions of K.S.A. 60–1507 may be invoked only by a person in custody claiming the right to be released.

(2) A motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence may not be filed while an appeal from the conviction and sentence is pending or during the time within which an appeal may be perfected.

(3) A proceeding under K.S.A. 60–1507 ordinarily may not be used as a substitute for direct appeal involving mere trial errors or as a substitute for a second appeal. Mere trial errors must be corrected by direct appeal, but trial errors affecting constitutional rights may be raised even though the error could have been raised on appeal, provided exceptional circumstances excuse the failure to appeal.

(4) Unless the court extends the time to prevent manifest injustice, a motion under K.S.A. 60–1507 must be filed not later than one year after the later of:

(A) the date the mandate is issued by the last appellate court in this state which exercises jurisdiction on a movant's direct appeal or the termination of the appellate court's jurisdiction; or

(B) the date the United States Supreme Court denies a petition for the writ of certiorari from the movant's direct appeal or issues its final order after granting the petition.”

As is clear from the language quoted above, any prisoner in custody under a sentence of a court of general jurisdiction may challenge his confinement and sentence, provided the challenge is brought either (a) within 1 year from the final order of the last appellate court to exercise jurisdiction on a direct appeal or (b) within 1 year from the termination of appellate jurisdiction. However, no challenge may be brought while a direct appeal is pending or during the time within which an appeal may be perfected.

Scaife contends the 1–year statutory time limit within which to bring his K.S.A. 60–1507 motion commenced 14 days after he was sentenced for voluntary manslaughter by the district court on remand. See K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–3608(c) (14 days to perfect appeal after judgment of the district court). Citing K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(1)(i), Scaife contends that appellate jurisdiction terminated 14 days after the January 15, 2009, sentencing date for his voluntary manslaughter conviction, because he never exercised his right to file a direct appeal of his sentence. Therefore, under Scaife's interpretation of K.S.A. 60–1507(f), he had until January 29, 2010, to file his motion, rendering his K.S.A. 60–1507 motion submitted on January 6, 2010, timely. Unfortunately, Scaife fails to cite caselaw to support his reading of K.S.A. 60–1507(f).

The State counters that the 1–year statutory period commenced 90 days after the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Scaife's convictions and that the vacated first-degree murder conviction is not relevant to the triggering criteria found in K.S.A. 60–1507. The State reasons that once our Supreme Court issued the mandate on September 24, 2008, Scaife's convictions could not be appealed any further after the 90–day period during which Scaife could seek certiorari from the United States Supreme Court had expired.

Thus, the State contends K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(1)(ii) controls, and the 1–year statutory period commenced on December 28, 2008–90 days following the Kansas Supreme Court's mandate in Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 186 P.3d 755. Like Scaife, the State cites no caselaw in making this argument.

Fortunately, our Supreme Court and various panels of this court have considered similar questions which are helpful to our analysis. The most relevant for our purposes is Baker, in which the defendant initially directly appealed his conviction and sentence for first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence and remanded the entire case for resentencing. After receiving a new sentence on remand, Baker did not file a direct appeal. Within 1 year from when he was resentenced on remand—but more than 1 year after the Supreme Court's opinion affirming his conviction had become final—Baker filed a...