Scales v. Hinthorne

Decision Date10 February 2023
Docket Number20-cv-78-DWD
PartiesSHAMAR SCALES, Petitioner, v. CHERRYLE HINTHORNE, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAVID W. DUGAN, DISTRICT JUDGE

Petitioner Shamar Scales was convicted of one count of criminal sexual assault in Jackson County, Illinois (Doc. 12-1). He is serving a 13-year sentence in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Petitioner's sentence was affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Scales, 2018 IL App (5th) 140329-U at ¶ 40. On January 31, 2019, his petition for leave to appeal was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Scales, 116 N.E.3d 926 (Ill. 2019) (Table).

Now before the Court is Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner asserts that his right to a fair trial was violated by: (1) The State's reliance on testimony that was internally inconsistent and which violated the “laws of nature and logic”; (2) The State's failure to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including failing to prove any elements of force or criminal intent and (3) The trial judge's bias against him as shown in the judge's statements at sentencing (Doc. 1). Respondent opposes issuance of a writ (Doc. 11; Doc. 12).

Procedural History and Relevant Facts

This summary of the facts is derived from the detailed descriptions by the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District in its Rule 23 Order affirming Petitioner's conviction on direct appeal (Doc. 12-6); People v. Scales, 2018 IL App (5th) 140329-U. These facts are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, which Petitioner has not shown. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Coleman v. Hardy, 690 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2012); Simental v. Matrisciano, 363 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2004) (The Court may rely on the factual summary of the state appellate court without reviewing the transcripts of petitioner's trial, which is not required, and “is in fact, quite rare.”); Mendiola v. Schomig 224 F.3d 589, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2000).

In November 2013, a jury convicted Petitioner of one count of criminal sexual assault in violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat Ann. 5/11-1.20, which provides in relevant part, that (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: . . . (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent.” (See Doc. 12-1; Doc. 12-2). At Petitioner's trial, both he and the victim, S.M., testified about the events at issue and the nature of their relationship prior to the assault. It was uncontested at trial that Petitioner committed an act of sexual penetration, thus the only issue in dispute concerned whether Petitioner knew that S.M. was asleep and unable to give consent. Scales, 2018 IL App (5th) 140329-U at ¶ 3.

According to the victim, she, her brother, Petitioner, and Petitioner's sister were all close friends, having grown up together in Chicago. The four of them later moved to Carbondale to attend college. When S.M. moved to Carbondale for college she shared an apartment with Petitioner's sister. When Petitioner later moved to Carbondale, S.M. and Petitioner's sister often allowed Petitioner to stay with them at their apartment, although Petitioner did not live with them. Scales, 2018 IL App (5th) 140329-U, at ¶ 4. According to S.M., Petitioner typically slept on the sofa, but on rare occasions would fall asleep in either her or his sister's bed while watching a movie. Id.

The events at issue occurred in April 2013. At that time, S.M. shared an apartment with her brother and a male friend. Petitioner lived with other friends. S.M. testified that on April 11, her childhood friend came to Carbondale to spend the weekend celebrating his birthday. The friend arrived at approximately 2:00 in the afternoon, when S.M. had just finished classes for the day and was getting ready to go to work. S.M.'s job involved cleaning the engineering building. S.M. testified that she drank five or six shots of tequila with her friend before going to work. S.M. testified that she did not feel tipsy. She then worked from approximately 4 or 5 p.m. until 8:30 or 9 p.m. During her work break, at approximately 6 p.m., S.M. drank half a glass of champagne with her coworker.

After work, S.M. went to an apartment in University Village. There she drank a bottle of wine. Sometime after 10 p.m., S.M. and a group of friends went to a bar called Callahan's. S.M. testified that she did not have anything more to drink at Callahan's. S.M. stated that she was “tipsy” at first, but “sobered up as the evening went on because she had to ‘take care of some people who were just really belligerent and drunk.' Id. at ¶ 6. These people included her friend who was visiting for his birthday, Petitioner, S.M.'s brother, and S.M.'s roommate.

S.M. estimated that she left Callahan's at approximately 1:45 in the morning. She stopped at the apartment where her friend was staying before walking back to her apartment. When she arrived at her apartment, S.M. saw her roommate, Petitioner, and another individual sitting inside a parked car. S.M. did not consider this to be unusual or alarming. S.M. went inside her apartment and found her brother home alone, passed out on the floor of his bedroom. S.M. attempted to get her brother into bed but was unable to do so. After that, S.M. ate some food, changed into her pajamas, turned on the television, and went to sleep. S.M. testified that she always closed the door to her bedroom when she slept and was certain that she did so that night. She estimated that she went to bed between 2:30 and 2:45 a.m.

S.M. testified that she was awakened by the sensation of a penis penetrating her vagina. She noted that her pajama bottoms were down around her knees, which is not where they were when she went to bed. S.M. testified initially that she thought she was dreaming. The person having intercourse with her was behind her, under the covers. S.M. testified that she pretended to be asleep, but turned over to face the individual, opened her eyes, and saw that it was Petitioner. S.M. then moved away from him, got out of bed, and angrily told Petitioner to get out. Petitioner left as she told him to do. According to S.M., before leaving, Petitioner said “Man, you tweakin'. You know what you did.” He also told her, “I don't know what you talking about.” Id. at ¶ 9. S.M. emphasized that Petitioner did not wake her up to ask if she wanted to have sex, and she never told him that it was okay. Id. at ¶ 8.

On cross-examination, S.M. was asked about how long the intercourse lasted. She replied, “I would say about one to two minutes.” Asked how she knew this, she replied, “Cause it was not long. I remember reacting fast.” She acknowledged, however, that she did not know exactly how long it went on before she woke up and realized she was not dreaming. S.M. was also asked whether she was sober when she left Callahan's. She explained that she did not feel impaired in any way. She further stated, “I wouldn't say I was sober ‘cause many people feel sober when they take a sobriety test and they are over.” She went on to note, however, that she thought she was sober by the time she went to bed.

Petitioner also testified at trial. “Much of [his] testimony about the sequence of events leading up to the intercourse was similar to S.M.'s account.” Id. at ¶ 12. He testified that he moved to Carbondale in 2009 to attend college. At the time of trial, in November 2013, he was still a freshman at a community college. He testified that he lived with his sister and S.M. during his first two years in Carbondale, but in April 2013 he was living with friends.

Petitioner testified that before going to Callahan's on the night of April 11, 2013, he drank shots with S.M., S.M.'s friend visiting for his birthday, and some other people. He testified that neither he nor S.M. had a lot to drink. Petitioner noted that he had one or two shots and thought S.M. did not have “that many.” Petitioner testified that their group arrived at Callahan's around 11:30 p.m., and they left when the bar closed at 2 a.m. He testified that when the bar closed, they could not find S.M.'s brother, so he got into a car with S.M.'s roommate and another individual to look for him. S.M. left Callahan's with other friends. After looking for S.M.'s brother in a few places, they decided to go to the apartment S.M. and her brother shared. Petitioner estimated they arrived at the apartment at 2:45 a.m. and found S.M.'s brother passed out on the bathroom floor. Petitioner and S.M.'s roommate carried S.M.'s brother to his bed. Petitioner then went into S.M.'s bedroom to sleep in her bed with her. Petitioner explained that he shared a bed with S.M. frequently and “it wasn't a problem.” Id. at ¶ 14. Petitioner testified that he and S.M. had never previously had a sexual relationship. Id.

Here, Petitioner's account of events diverges from S.M.'s version. According to Petitioner, when he got into bed with S.M., S.M. turned around and looked at him. Petitioner said he could see that S.M.'s eyes were open, and she was awake. Petitioner acknowledged that there was no conversation about sex. He testified, however, that S.M. “allowed” him to pull down her pajama bottoms, digitally stimulate her, and have sex with her. Petitioner explained that he was unable to pull her pajama bottoms all the way down until she rolled over because her hip was in the way. He further testified that during sex, S.M. moved with him and moaned. Petitioner testified that the intercourse lasted 10 to 15 minutes, during which time S.M. gave no indication that she did not want to have sex with him.

Petitioner testified that when he...

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