Scalf v. Berkel, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 2-282-A-45,2-282-A-45
• Citation: 448 N.E.2d 1201
• Parties: Charles E. SCALF, Jr., Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. BERKEL, INCORPORATED, Appellee (Defendant Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1201

448 N.E.2d 1201

Charles E. SCALF, Jr., Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. BERKEL, INCORPORATED, Appellee (Defendant Below).

No. 2-282-A-45.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Second District.

May 17, 1983.

Rehearing Denied July 19, 1983.

Vernon J. Petri, Thomas C. Doehrman, Petri, Fuhs & Doehrman, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Evan E. Steger, Ice, Miller, Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, for appellee.

BUCHANAN, Chief Judge.

CASE SUMMARY

Plaintiff-appellant Charles E. Scalf, Jr. (Scalf) appeals from a summary judgment barring his product liability action against defendant-appellee Berkel, Incorporated, (Berkel), asserting federal due process and equal protection attacks on the constitutionality of the ten-year limitation on filing actions under the Indiana Product Liability Statute of Limitation (hereinafter cited as Statute).

We affirm.

FACTS

The undisputed facts are that Scalf was employed by a meat market in Noblesville, Indiana. A meat grinding machine used at the market had been manufactured by a subsidiary of a predecessor in interest to Berkel. While using the machine, on June 21, 1978, Scalf suffered injuries which resulted in the amputation of his right arm below the elbow.

On March 2, 1981, Scalf instituted suit against Berkel for damages arising from his injury. Berkel responded to the complaint and simultaneously filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Scalf's cause was barred by the ten-year provision of the Statute.

After a hearing, in which Scalf challenged the Statute on constitutional grounds, the trial court found that the meat grinder was delivered by the manufacturer on October 29, 1957 (more than ten years before the date of Scalf's injury), that Scalf's cause of action was subject to the Statute, and that summary judgment should be granted in favor of Berkel. Record at 103-105. In so ruling, the trial court implicitly rejected Scalf's argument that the Statute violated the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (hereinafter cited as Fourteenth Amendment).

Scalf appeals.

ISSUES

Two issues are presented for review:

1. Does the Statute violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

2. Does the Statute violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

DECISION

ISSUE ONE--Does the Statute violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS--Scalf emphasizes differing language between the Indiana Constitution and the federal constitution which he says results in "due process" protection. He seeks to avoid the effect of Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., (1981) Ind., 418 N.E.2d 207 (holding the Statute compatible with the "due course of law" clause of the Indiana Constitution) by asserting there is a violation of federal due process because the ten-year claim provision of the Statute constitutes an infringement of his fundamental right to bring suit, and he relies on Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, (1982) Ala., 416 S.2d 996, ¹ as a model of reasoning. Scalf further asserts that the Statute creates an irrebuttable presumption affecting persons in his circumstances.

Berkel responds that we should adhere to the decision in Dague, reject any claim of a fundamental right on Scalf's part, and find that the Statute operates in a manner rationally related to its purpose.

CONCLUSION--The Statute complies with the dictates of Fourteenth Amendment due process.

Scalf and Berkel agree that the meat grinder was delivered to the initial user or consumer more than ten years prior to the occasion of Scalf's injury and do not dispute that the Statute is applicable. The Statute which is sometimes referred to as a statute of repose, does set a time limit on the filing of a product liability action:

"This section applies to all persons regardless of minority or legal disability. Notwithstanding IC 34-1-2-5, any product liability action must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues or within ten (10) years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer; except that, if the cause of action accrues more than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years after that initial delivery, the action may be commenced at any time within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues." ²

As no factual controversy exists, our task is to determine if the trial court's application of the Statute was appropriate in light of the constitutional challenge raised by Scalf. Rowland v. Amoco Oil Co., (1982) Ind.App., 432 N.E.2d 414, trans. denied.

In confronting the constitutional challenge to the Statute, we do not question the wisdom or desirability of the actions taken by the legislature. See Short v. Texaco, Inc., (1980) Ind., 406 N.E.2d 625, aff'd 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738. "Otherwise, under the guise of limiting the Legislature to its constitutional bounds, we are likely to exceed our own." Sidle v . Majors, (1976) 264 Ind. 206, 208, 341 N.E.2d 763, 766. Therefore, we accord a strong presumption of constitutionality to all duly enacted statutes. Any reasonable doubts which occur are resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the legislation at issue, so it is manifest that the challenger bears a heavy burden. Dague, supra; Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., (1980) Ind., 404 N.E.2d 585; Sidle, supra.

Though confronted with an issue of first impression in Indiana--a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the Statute--we are not without authority to guide us in our resolution of the issue. The Statute has been found in compliance with the Indiana "due course of law" requirement, a constitutional provision analogous to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dague, supra. Furthermore, our courts have previously confronted Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, establishing in the process both the scope and course of the applicable analysis. So, we turn to Scalf's due process challenge.

Proper inquiry into Scalf's due process challenge requires us to determine whether the Statute "is a rational means to achieve the goal which the legislature through its enactment sought to reach ." Johnson, supra at 598 (citations omitted). ³ We reject Scalf's assertion that he possesses a fundamental right to bring suit which would entitle his cause to a more demanding standard of review. It is well settled in Indiana that the ability to bring a cause of action does not rise to the level of a fundamental right for constitutional purposes.

" 'Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have upheld the right of states to abolish or modify the common law.' [O]ne of the acknowledged functions of legislation is to change the common law to reflect change of time and circumstances. Moreover, there is no vested or property right in any rule of the common law, and the right to bring a common law action is not a fundamental right."

Dague, supra at 213 (quoting Sidle, supra ). Moreover, Scalf lost no vested right. His circumstance is like that of the unsuccessful plaintiff in Dague (a state "due course of law" challenge rejected) in which plaintiff filed suit in 1978 for a death resulting from an allegedly defective aircraft manufactured in 1965. In both instances, no cause of action had accrued at the time the no cause provision of the Statute became effective, so that at the time of loss there was no cause of action existing.

Our inquiry is also directed towards discovering the goal of the Indiana Legislature in enacting the Statute.

"The general purpose of a statute of limitation is to encourage prompt presentation of claims. United States v. Kubrick, (1979) 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259. When any alleged tortfeasor is required to defend a claim long after the alleged wrong has occurred, the ability to successfully do so is diminished by reason of dimmed memories, the death of witnesses, and lost documents. As the years between injury and suit increase, so does the probability that the search for truth at trial will be impeded and contorted to the benefit of the plaintiff."

Johnson, supra at 604. The general goal of the legislature is to limit the period of time within which to bring a product liability action. Dague, supra at 210. The General Assembly was confronted by evidence of skyrocketing product liability insurance costs fueled by huge increases in the number of product liability claims, large increases in the amounts of settlements and awards, and indications that the victim of an allegedly defective product was favored over the maker of that product in the tort process. J. Vargo, Survey of Recent Developments--Products Liability, 15 Ind.Law.Rev. 289 (1982). ⁴ (hereinafter cited as Survey ) The Statute reflects a legislative appraisal that a causal relationship existed between the time period for prosecuting a product liability action and the ever-accelerating insurance costs for product liability protection.

Our legislature responded in a similar manner to evidence of a medical malpractice insurance crisis in enacting the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. The legislature enacted limitations on the time to file and the amount of recovery in an effort to reduce the difficulties in obtaining medical malpractice insurance. Our supreme court, in Johnson, found that a rational relationship existed between the enactment of the Medical Malpractice Act and the limitations imposed in both time and amount. A similar relationship exists in the enactment of the Statute. ⁵

Thus the law has rejected Scalf's assertion that the Statute creates a constitutionally impermissible presumption that persons injured using machines or products of ten years of age or more are undeserving of compensation for their injuries. A similar argument was presented in Johnson, wherein some appellants argued that the Medical Malpractice Statute created an irrebuttable presumption that an injured patient's loss could...