Scandroli Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission

Decision Date04 June 1973
Docket NumberNo. 45459,45459
CitationScandroli Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 297 N.E.2d 150, 54 Ill.2d 395 (Ill. 1973)
PartiesSCANDROLI CONSTRUCTION CO., Appellant, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (John A. Lee, Appellee.)
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Gilbert & Powers, Rockford (Don M. Mateer, Rockford, of counsel), for appellant.

Reibman & Hoffman, Ltd., Chicago (Lewis P. Gaines, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

KLUCZYNSKI, Justice:

This is an appeal by Scandroli Construction Co. (employer) from a judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County affirming a decision of the Industrial Commission which awarded John Lee compensation after finding he had suffered a complete loss of use of both feet in one accident which entitled him to an award for total and permanent disability under section 8(e)(18) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 48, par. 138.8(e)(18).) The amount of the award was determined pursuant to section 8(f) of the Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 48, par. 138.8(f).) On appeal the employer contests the finding as to the extent of injury.

The provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act necessary for consideration of this appeal are as follows:

Section 8(e)(18): 'The specific case of loss of both hands, both arms, or both feet, or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, suffered in one accident, or the permanent and complete loss of the use thereof, suffered in one accident, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the compensation fixed by paragraph (f) of this Section. These specific cases of total and permanent disability shall not be construed as excluding other cases.

(f) In case of complete disability, which renders the employee wholly and permanently incapable of work, compensation equal to 65% Of his earnings but not less than $31.50 nor more than $56 per week, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of subparagraphs 2, 3 and 4 of paragraph (b) of this Section, commencing on the day after the accident, and continuing until the amount paid equals the amount which would have been payable as a death benefit under paragraph (a), Section 7, if the employee had died as a result of the accident at the time thereof, leaving heirs surviving as provided in said paragraph (a), Section 7, and thereafter a pension during life annually, In the specific case of total and permanent disability equal to 15% and in other cases of total and permanent disability equal to 12%, of the amount which would have been payable as a death benefit under paragraph (a), Section 7 * * *.

(If) any employee who receives An award under this paragraph and afterwards returns to work or is able to do so, and earns or is able to earn as much as before the accident, payments under such award shall cease. If such employee returns to work, or is able to do so, and earns or is able to earn part but not as much as before the accident, such award shall be modified so as to conform to an award under paragraph (d) of this Section. * * *

Disability as enumerated in subdivision 18, paragraph (e) of this Section shall be considered complete disability.' (Emphasis added.)

Lee, who was 45 years old on the date of the accident (June 28, 1969), testified he was working as a carpenter and millwright that day when he fell through a roof onto a concrete floor thirty feet below. Lee struck the floor while he was in an upright position and then collapsed. He was taken to a hospital where his feet were packed in ice for nine days until the swelling subsided. Surgery was performed and metal pins were inserted through the ball and into the heel of each foot. Both legs were placed in casts for two months. The pins were removed and his feet remained in casts for an additional two months. Thereafter, surgery was again performed on the left foot. He received electronic and heat therapy and his feet were taped for additional support. Throughout this entire period he was taking medication to ease the pain and reduce the swelling. During the first eight months of his convalescence Lee was confined to a wheelchair. He then progressed to the use of a walker and crutches.

At the time of the hearing before the arbitrator (April, 1971), Lee testified that he had to use a cane when he walked on an uneven or slippery surface. He stated that he experienced difficulty in standing up and would lose his balance unless he could steady himself with his cane, or grasp some other object. He claimed that he would experience irritation and pain in his feet if he walked a great distance or was driving an automobile for a prolonged period. To ease the irritation and pain he would take medication. He said that he now walked with a limp.

Lee further testified that he had been told by his physician that additional surgery involving a bone fusion (arthrodesis) might be necessary. He chose to think about it for the time being because he was told that he would be incapacitated for one year and in a cast for six months with the results in no way guaranteed.

At the time of this hearing Lee had been employed for seven months as a construction superintendent. This job necessitated a considerable amount of driving and some walking about construction sites. He said he experienced great difficulty in climbing stairs and ladders or walking on soft dirt while performing his duties.

A medical report was introduced into evidence which indicated that Lee had suffered fractures of the heels and bones in both feet, as well as swelling, impaired mobility, and loss of sensory response of the toes in his right foot. An additional report was submitted which stated that Lee had complained that he was unable to work as a carpenter. This report established that Lee's feet were deformed and that he suffered from degenerative arthritic changes at the subtaler joints. It further noted the continued presence of pain, Lee's inability to stand prolonged weight-bearing and his reluctance to undergo additional surgery to relieve the pain which this physician believed 'would progress.'

The employer now argues that the Workmen's Compensation Act provides that an injury cannot be compensable for 100% Loss unless it 'renders the employee wholly and permanently incapable of work.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 48, par. 138.8(f).) Since Lee was gainfully employed subsequent to the accident, it contends the finding as to the extent of disability of both feet is not supported by the evidence. The thrust of the employer's argument is not persuasive.

In pertinent part ...

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11 cases
  • Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Com'n
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 1, 1984
    ...employee's return to work. (National Lock Co. v. Industrial Com. (1975), 62 Ill.2d 51, 338 N.E.2d 405; Scandroli Construction Co. v. Industrial Com. (1973), 54 Ill.2d 395, 297 N.E.2d 150.) Although the benefit rates for disability under section 8(e)(18) are calculated in the same manner as ......
  • E. R. Moore Co. v. Industrial Commission
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • April 3, 1978
    ...with respect to awards pursuant to section 8(e)(18) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 48, par. 138.8(e)(18)) (Scandroli Construction Co. v. Industrial Com. (1973), 54 Ill.2d 395, 399, 297 N.E.2d 150)), the award of compensation is not for the disability as such, but for the impaired earning capacity ......
  • A R A Services, Inc. v. Industrial Com'n
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • February 21, 1992
    ...the findings on this issue have clearly been determined by the Commission. The cases relied on by ARA, Scandroli Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm'n (1973), 54 Ill.2d 395, 297 N.E.2d 150 and Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Comm'n (1969), 42 Ill.2d 273, 246 N.E.2d 228, are not pers......
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    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
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    ...Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Ill.2d 487, 492-93, 77 Ill.Dec. 119, 459 N.E.2d 1368, 1371 (1984); Scandroli Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 54 Ill.2d 395, 399, 297 N.E.2d 150, 153 (1973). A section 8(e)(18) award does not consider a measure of the employability and does not require tha......
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