Scandroli v. City of Rockford

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: VAN DEUSEN
• Citation: Scandroli v. City of Rockford, 408 N.E.2d 436, 86 Ill.App.3d 999, 42 Ill.Dec. 58 (Ill. App. 1980)
• Decision Date: 25 July 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-284,79-284
• Parties: , 42 Ill.Dec. 58 Joseph C. SCANDROLI, as Executor of the Estate of Raymond J. Scandroli, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF ROCKFORD, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, and Michael K. Meyers, Judy K. Meyers, Richard W. Stromquist, Barbara J. Stromquist, Eugene A. Horvath, Phyllis D. Horvath, David A. Francis, Valerie M. Francis, Meryle A. Stockus, Carl Stanley Dahlgren, David E. Mussellman, Phyllis J. Mussellman, Howard Waller and Leola Waller, Intervening Defendants- Appellees.

Page 436

408 N.E.2d 436

86 Ill.App.3d 999, 42 Ill.Dec. 58

Joseph C. SCANDROLI, as Executor of the Estate of Raymond J Scandroli, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF ROCKFORD, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee and Michael K. Meyers, Judy K. Meyers, Richard W. Stromquist Barbara J. Stromquist, Eugene A. Horvath, Phyllis D Horvath, David A. Francis, Valerie M. Francis, Meryle A. Stockus, Carl Stanley Dahlgren, David E. Mussellman, Phyllis J. Mussellman, Howard Waller and Leola Waller, Intervening Defendants- Appellees.

No. 79-284.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

July 25, 1980.

Thomas, Thomas & Keeling, Charles F. Thomas, Rockford, for plaintiff-appellant.

A. Curtis Washburn, Director, Dennis L. Leahy, City Atty., John M. Boreen, Rockford, for defendant-appellee.

VAN DEUSEN, Justice:

The estate of Raymond J. Scandroli, deceased, is the owner of vacant real estate located at 1018 North Ridgewood Road in Rockford, and it is this realty which is the subject matter of this cause. The real estate in question, which consists of two corner lots located at the intersection of Cosper Avenue and Ridgewood Road, is zoned single-family residential (R-1). It is bounded on the north, west and east by streets (Cosper Avenue, Cosper Court and Ridgewood Road, respectively) and on the south by residential property, zoned R-1, which is owned by the plaintiff and includes his home. The neighborhood to the east and across the street from Ridgewood Road is zoned R-1 and consists of a large area of single-family residences. To the north and east across Cosper Avenue exists an area which is zoned and developed as multi-family residential (R-3). Situated to the west of and immediately adjacent to this multi-family zoning is an area which is classified and improved as commercial property (CC). Across Cosper Court and to the west of the subject lots lies property, also owned by the Scandroli estate, which is zoned R-3; to the west and south of the corner lots is situated property zoned for use as two-family residential (R-2).

On November 28, 1977, the plaintiff filed an application with the Rockford zoning office requesting both a zoning map amendment from R-1 to R-3 and a rear setback variance from 25 feet to 21 feet for construction of a six-unit townhouse apartment building at 1018 North Ridgewood Road. The zoning board of appeals voted to deny the plaintiff's combined application. On May 1, 1978, the Rockford city council twice voted in favor of granting the dual zoning relief sought, by simple majority votes of 12 to 9 and 11 to 9. Section 1508.2 of the Rockford zoning ordinance, as amended, requires a two-thirds affirmative vote by the aldermen before any combined application, each item of which has not received a recommendation for approval from the zoning board of appeals, can be granted or approved by the city council. Since the requisite two-thirds majority was not attained, the plaintiff's application was denied.

Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a five-count complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the city of Rockford. Certain property owners in the Ridgewood Road area were granted leave to intervene as defendants. The city of Rockford and the intervening defendants filed separate motions to dismiss counts II thru V of the complaint. These motions requested that the counts be stricken because they (1) were substantially insufficient in law; (2) failed to allege any facts but rather pleaded legal conclusions; and (3) failed to state a cause of action. The court granted the motions of the defendant city and the intervenors and dismissed counts II, III and IV. Upon the plaintiff's motion, count V of the complaint was withdrawn and also dismissed. After a trial without a jury, the trial court denied the plaintiff's prayer for a declaratory judgment on count I of the complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff raises as error the trial court's dismissal of counts III and IV of the complaint and the court's decision in favor of defendants with respect to count I.

Count III of the plaintiff's complaint alleged that section 1508 of the city's zoning ordinance, which requires a two-thirds affirmative vote on combined applications for zoning relief, is unconstitutional on its face because it is arbitrary and capricious and without reasonable relationship to the public health, safety or welfare and is violative of the Federal and State constitutional due process guarantees. In count IV the plaintiff raised the same per se constitutional objections to section 301 of the zoning ordinance. This section of the ordinance, as amended, states that, in those cases involving corner lots, "the front of the lot shall be that dimension measured along the street which is the least."

Once a legislative body determines there is a need for legislation to protect and promote the general welfare of its citizens, there is a presumption that the legislative enactment is a valid exercise of the police power. (Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill.2d 443, 453, 27 Ill.Dec. 465, 389 N.E.2d 529; Union Cemetery Association v. Cooper (1953), 414 Ill. 23, 32, 110 N.E.2d 239.) When the validity of a zoning ordinance is questioned, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived which would sustain it, there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts, and the party challenging the classification must shoulder the burden of demonstrating by a resort to common knowledge or other matters which a court may judicially notice that the challenged classification is arbitrary. (City of Springfield v. Kable (1940), 306 Ill.App. 616, 620, 29 N.E.2d 675; cf. Union Cemetery Association v. Cooper.) Furthermore, the due process clauses of the Federal and State constitutions, insofar as they operate to limit the exercise of the police power of the State, proscribe only its unreasonable or arbitrary use. (Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block, 75 Ill.2d 443, 453, 27 Ill.Dec. 465, 389 N.E.2d 529.) To constitute a legitimate exercise of the police power, the legislative act in question must bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest sought to be protected and the means adopted must constitute a reasonable method of accomplishing the intended objective. Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block ; Finish Line Express, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1978), 72 Ill.2d 131, 138, 19 Ill.Dec. 626, 379 N.E.2d 290.

As the plaintiff points out, a single application to amend the zoning map from R-1 to R-3 would require the approval of only a simple majority of the city's aldermen regardless of the outcome of the advisory vote of the zoning board of appeals, while a single application for a setback variance would necessitate a two-thirds affirmative vote by the city council to override a recommendation of denial by the zoning board of appeals. The plaintiff asserts that there is no rational basis for requiring a two-thirds affirmative vote regarding both items of a combined application when separate applications for a zoning map amendment and a variance would require a two-thirds affirmative vote only in the case of the variance.

We note that Illinois courts have upheld the constitutionality of zoning law provisions requiring greater than majority votes by a legislative body in order to amend or change a zoning classification. (Chapman v. County of Will (1973), 55 Ill.2d 524, 304 N.E.2d 287, and Herrington v. County of Peoria (1973), 11 Ill.App.3d 7, 11, 295 N.E.2d 729, both of which upheld a provision of the County Zoning Act requiring a three-fourths affirmative vote of all the county board members before a zoning amendment could be granted; Bredberg v. City of Wheaton (1962), 24 Ill.2d 612, 620, 182 N.E.2d 742, which upheld a provision of the Illinois Municipal Code requiring a favorable vote of two-thirds of the aldermen for approval of a zoning amendment or reclassification.) Our supreme court has also sustained the validity of a provision of the County Zoning Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1977, ch. 34, par. 3154) authorizing the granting of a variance by a three-fourths affirmative vote of the county board where the proposed variation fails to receive the approval of the zoning board of appeals. (Heft v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Peoria County (1964), 31 Ill.2d 266, 270, 201 N.E.2d 364.) The above cases indicate that a legislative body has the discretion to predetermine the precise degree of extra diligence which is required when a municipality is effecting important changes in the property rights of its citizens.

In addition, a home rule unit, such as the defendant city, has the power to enact whatever zoning ordinance it chooses as long as the legislative enactment...