Scannell v. Bel Air Police Dept., Civil No. AMD 96-1632.

• Decision Date: 16 June 1997
• Docket Number: Civil No. AMD 96-1632.
• Citation: 968 F.Supp. 1059
• Parties: Phyllis L. SCANNELL, Plaintiff, v. BEL AIR POLICE DEPARTMENT, Town of Bel Air, William N. McFaul, Leo F. Matrangola, John W. Harkins, Norman E. Ross and Wallace A. Harward, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

968 F.Supp. 1059

Phyllis L. SCANNELL, Plaintiff, v. BEL AIR POLICE DEPARTMENT, Town of Bel Air, William N. McFaul, Leo F. Matrangola, John W. Harkins, Norman E. Ross and Wallace A. Harward, Defendants.

Civil No. AMD 96-1632.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

June 16, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Douglas W. Desmarais, Smith & Downey, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff.

Richard T. Colaresi, Bowie, MD, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

DAVIS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Phyllis L. Scannell has filed a three-count complaint against the Bel Air Police Department ("the Department"), the Town of Bel Air, the Town Administrator, the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Town Police, and a lieutenant and a sergeant at the Department, alleging the following: a hostile work environment claim based on her gender and a retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and/or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.¹ Plaintiff consents to the dismissal of her constitutional claims. I have given careful attention to the parties' memoranda respecting the other claims, and a hearing is not needed. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons explained below, I shall grant in part, and deny in part, the Defendants' motion as to the discrimination claims, and grant the motion as to the constitutional claims.

(i)

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are "granted sparingly and with caution in order to make certain that plaintiff is not improperly denied a right to have his claim adjudicated on the merits." 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, CIVIL 2D § 1349 at 192-93 (1990). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only that a complaint include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A claimant is not required to "set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim" so long as the claim "will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. at 103.² Moreover, all well-pleaded factual allegations are assumed to be true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S 411, 421-22, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1849, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969). Only when the factual allegations in support of a claim are not well-pleaded (e.g., when they are "functionally illegible" or "baldly conclusory," Shuster v. Oppelman, 962 F.Supp. 394, 395 (S.D.N.Y.1997)) should they not be accepted as true and the claim dismissed.

(ii)

Plaintiff has been employed at the police department of the Town of Bel Air, Harford County, Maryland, since 1982, most recently as a detective. On or about April 25, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation. (The allegation of retaliation apparently related to an earlier charge which had been filed with the Harford County Human Rights Commission.) Plaintiff named the "Bel Air Police Department" as the "employer" in the appropriate space on the form and mentioned Sergeant Harward in the text of the charge. Less than one month later, on May 20, 1994, Plaintiff filed a second EEOC charge, i.e., a charge of retaliation. She again identified the Department as her employer. In the factual narrative, she referred to certain incidents involving "the Chief" (i.e., Matrangola) and her "first and second line supervisors."³

After receiving a right-to-sue letter, Plaintiff timely filed a complaint with this Court, alleging that throughout her tenure with the Department she has been "subjected to different terms, conditions, and privileges of her employment on the basis of her sex." Comp. ¶ 17. She also alleges that, as a result of Defendants' conduct, she "has been forced to work in a hostile or abusive working environment, on the basis of her gender." Id. ¶ 18. This "abusive working environment has been so pervasive and severe that it has interfered with Plaintiff's ability to perform her job and has significantly interfered with Plaintiff's psychological well-being." Id. Plaintiff specifically alleges that, "among other things," she was

"a. Excluded by Harward from receiving important and vital information regarding the status of cases and assignments within the Department ... [whereas t]his information is routinely passed on to a male detective within the same Department;

"b. Ignored and ostracized by Harkins, Harward, Ross, and Matrangola;

"c. ... verbally assaulted and physically threatened by Harward;

"d. ... restricted in her activities on behalf of a charitable organization, when males in the Department routinely are allowed to spend time at work on behalf of charitable organizations;

"e. ... subjected to constant harassment and criticism to a degree far more severe than her male counterpart[s]; and

"f. ... deprived of her rights to voice complaints within the normal departmental channels."

Id. Plaintiff further alleges that "[w]hen she complained to Harkins about her gender-related mistreatment, Harkins informed her that if she voiced any further complaints about the matter, he would be `forced' to reassign her to another position." Harkins then tore up Scannell's written complaint "inches in front of her face." Id. ¶ 19.

Plaintiff also alleges that on May 17, 1994, less than one month after filing the April charge, she was called into Matrangola's office for a meeting with Matrangola, Harward, and Harkins. There, Matrangola "insinuated" that Plaintiff could lose her job if she persisted in pursuing her complaints of discrimination and retaliation. Id. ¶ 22. Two days later, on May 19, 1994, "Plaintiff arrived at work to find that all of the reports that she had turned in to Harward had been returned [to her] with notes attached indicating that things were missing or that something additional should have been done, even though the reports had, in fact, been satisfactorily completed." Id. ¶ 23. After protesting Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff was allegedly subjected to "heightened ridicule, isolation, and discrimination." Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff further alleges that despite actual knowledge of Defendants' discriminatory conduct, Defendants "elected not to take appropriate disciplinary and remedial action" in light of these incidents. Id. ¶ 25.

(iii)

The Defendants present four issues for resolution, as follows:

(1) Whether Plaintiff has alleged conduct sufficient to constitute an "abusive and hostile" work environment satisfying the elements of a gender discrimination claim under Title VII.

(2) Whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show that she suffered "adverse employment action" as necessary to comprise a retaliation claim under Title VII.

(3) Whether Plaintiff has complied sufficiently with the naming requirement under Title VII to permit those claims to go forward.

(4) Whether Plaintiff has alleged a cognizable claim under Title VII for individual liability. I shall address each issue in turn.

(iv)

Defendants challenge the legal sufficiency of the claim asserted in Count I. They contend that Plaintiff has alleged no more than "isolated incidents of offensive or insulting behavior." Defs.Mem. at 3. Defendants further maintain that Plaintiff's allegations are only "conclusory" and "generalized statements." Id. at 4-5. Defendants posit that the alleged conduct, even considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, does not constitute an actionable claim of hostile work environment.

Title VII prohibits "an employer" from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized Title VII's expansive scope when it held that the prohibition against "discrimination" protects employees from hostile environment sex discrimination. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2408, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). Noting that "the language of Title VII is not limited to `economic' or `tangible' discrimination" but "evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment," id. at 64, 106 S.Ct. at 2404 (internal quotations omitted), the Meritor Court endorsed the substantial body of lower federal court case law which had established that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is actionable under Title VII. Id. at 65-67, 106 S.Ct. at 2404-06.

To sustain a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII, Plaintiff must allege and prove that (1) the subject conduct was unwelcome; (2) it was based on her sex; (3) it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter plaintiff's conditions of employment and to create an abusive or hostile work environment; and (4) it was imputable on some factual basis to the employer. Spicer v. Commonwealth of Va., 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc). Defendants' motion focuses on the second and third elements.

"Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment — an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive — is beyond Title VII's purview." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370...