Scantling v. State
| Decision Date | 21 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 90968,90968 |
| Citation | 711 So.2d 524 |
| Parties | 23 Fla. L. Weekly S282 Teayoir SCANTLING, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and Paula S. Saunders, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals; and Edward C. Hill, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
We have for review Scantling v. State, 704 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (en banc), which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinion in Lyons v. State, 672 So.2d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We approve the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Scantling and disapprove Lyons.
Scantling was sentenced to seven years in prison for an attempted armed robbery conviction in 1990. After serving part of that term, he was placed on control-release status. In December 1995, Scantling committed another offense, possession of cocaine, while he was on control-release status. In imposing the sentence for cocaine possession, the trial court indicated that the new sentence would be "served consecutively to the sentence he is currently serving." However, the sentencing papers indicate that the present sentence is to be served consecutive to any sentence received for violation of control release. On appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, Scantling argued that the consecutive sentence is precluded by Currelly v. State, 678 So.2d 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), in which the First District affirmed the appellant's conviction and sentence but struck the part of the sentence which referred to any sentence received for violation of control release, interpreting that phrase as purporting to require his sentence to be consecutive to an undetermined future sentence. The First District in Currelly cited Lyons v. State, 672 So.2d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), for the proposition that a sentence cannot be imposed consecutive to an undetermined future sentence.
In this case, the First District affirmed Scantling's sentence and receded from Currelly to the extent that Currelly stands for the proposition that a consecutive sentence is precluded for a control-release violation because the sentence would be consecutive to an undetermined future sentence. Scantling v. State, 704 So.2d at 565. The First District acknowledged conflict with Lyons. Id. Petitioner alleged conflict, and we accepted jurisdiction.
Scantling argues that the First District erred in affirming the trial court's sentencing determination and in receding from Currelly, which he cites in support of his contention that the Parole Commission's as-yet undetermined action regarding his control-release violation is an undetermined sentence and thus the court cannot impose a new sentence to run consecutively to the punishment for the control-release violation. We disagree.
In the First District's en banc opinion, Judge Allen explained:
An inmate on control release has already been sentenced for an earlier offense, and pursuant to section 947.141(4), Florida Statutes, an inmate violating control release may be returned to prison for the continued service of that sentence. Because...
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Childers v. State
...(Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (en banc decision released by criminal division without antecedent publication of panel decision), approved by 711 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1998); Sheley v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 703 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (en banc decision released by criminal division without antecedent p......
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Childers v. State
...(Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (en banc decision released by criminal division without antecedent publication of panel decision), approved by 711 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1998); Sheley v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 703 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (en banc decision released by criminal division without antecedent p......
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Jett v. State, 97-2697.
...court of the penalty imposed on a defendant for the offense of which the defendant has been adjudged guilty.'" Scantling v. State, 711 So.2d 524, 526 n.1 (Fla. May 21, 1998). The trial court's pronouncement did not condition the termination of probation on entry of an order or on any other ......
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Williams v. State
...sentence either concurrently or consecutively to any future punishment for the [control-release] violation.") (citing Scantling v. State, 711 So.2d 524, 524 (Fla.1998) ); see also § 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008) ("Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an ......