Scaplen v. United Services, Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | WWMCV186014673S |
| Court | Superior Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | Kelly Scaplen v. United Services, Inc. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Cole-Chu, Leeland J., J.T.R.
By her amended complaint dated March 21, 2018, following the granting of the defendant’s motion to strike her original complaint, the plaintiff, Kelly Scaplen, maintains and amends her three counts against her former employer United Services Inc. Count one alleges pregnancy discrimination in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(b)(7); count two alleges interference with the plaintiff’s rights under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2612 et seq. (2006); and count three alleges retaliation for the plaintiff’s exercise of her rights under the FMLA. On April 5, 2019, the defendant moved (# 107) to strike all three counts of the amended complaint. The plaintiff filed an opposition, with brief, on June 6, 2019 (#109), to which the defendant replied on June 14, 2019 (#112). The motion was argued on November 18, 2019, and submitted on November 26 2019, when the plaintiff complied with the court’s order to file and serve on the defendant a "blacklined" document showing the differences between the original and amended complaints.
In ruling on a motion to strike, the court takes the facts to be those alleged, disregarding legal conclusions and opinions. New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 747, 36 A.3d 224 (2012); see also Faulkner v United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997) (). In this light, the pleaded essential facts- material facts added by the amended complaint in bold font- are as follows.
The defendant hired the plaintiff on about June 7, 2004. In March of 2012, the defendant promoted the plaintiff to Program Manager. Sometime around 2014, in a meeting with the defendant’s chief executive officer, vice president of services, the director of the plaintiff’s division, and the plaintiff, the defendant’s chief financial officer made a negative comment about women having babies and using leave from employment.[1] The comment insinuated that the officer saw leave taken for having babies "as a burden and a nuisance."[2]
Around January 4, 2017, the plaintiff learned she was pregnant with her first child. Prior to her pregnancy, the plaintiff had no issues at work, had generally received positive performance reviews, and was considered by the defendant to be a good and valuable employee .[3] Around March of 2017, the plaintiff notified the defendant of her pregnancy. In particular, she informed her direct supervisor of her pregnancy and discussed her intention to take three months off after the baby was born and then to return to work on a part-time basis for some period of time. The defendant then had a policy allowing employees the option of returning to work part time (twenty-four hours per week) for up to four months after giving birth. In May of 2017, the plaintiff learned that there was something wrong with her unborn child- a condition later determined to be duodenal atresia, which required surgery shortly after the baby was born. The plaintiff informed her supervisor of the baby’s diagnosis and the need for post-birth surgery.
The plaintiff gave birth to her baby girl ten weeks early, on June 28, 2017. The plaintiff’s daughter was immediately placed on a feeding tube/catheter, had the needed surgery on July 13, 2017, and remained in the hospital on a feeding tube through September 16, 2017. In early September 2017, the plaintiff contacted the defendant’s Human Resources (HR) office and spoke with the defendant’s HR director about her options for returning to work. The HR director encouraged the plaintiff to return to work at the end of the three months of leave and then to use the federal Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as needed for the plaintiff’s daughter’s care. The plaintiff submitted FMLA paperwork from her doctor to the defendant and was approved by the defendant for leave under the FMLA. The plaintiff returned to work on September 22, 2017.
Before the plaintiff returned from maternity leave, the defendant scrutinized her work and work performance in order to generate a pretextual basis for terminating her employment.[4] Defendant’s true motive in doing so was to terminate the plaintiff because of her pregnancy, childbirth, and use of leave in connection with pregnancy or childbirth.
Upon her return to work, the plaintiff was called into a meeting with the defendant’s chief operating officer, the defendant’s HR director, and the plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, where she was told unspecified "things came to light" while she was on maternity leave[5] and that she was being suspended pending an investigation. Among the issues said officers of the defendant claimed had come to light was that the plaintiff had violated the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) by leaving client files out on her desk or on shelves, in her office .[6] All the issues the defendant claimed to have uncovered, including the alleged HIPAA violation, were false and pretextual. The plaintiff had openly stored files on her desk or on shelves in her office, in full view of all of her supervisors, for the entire duration of her tenure as program manager and had never been told there was anything wrong with doing so .[7]
On October 11, 2017, in a meeting with the defendant’s chief operating officer and chief financial officer, the plaintiff’s employment was terminated. The defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment because of her pregnancy.[8]
Count one of the amended complaint alleges pregnancy discrimination in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60. "It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section [for an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent: (A) To terminate a woman’s employment because of her pregnancy ..." General Statutes § 46a-60(b)(7).[9] Section 46a-60(a)(1), P.A. 17-118, provides, "[a]s used in this section: (1) ‘[p]regnancy’ means pregnancy, childbirth or a related condition, including, but not limited to, lactation ..." Section 46a-60 is construed liberally to accomplish its purpose of reducing employment discrimination. Cimino v. Pratt & Whitney, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-07-5011977 (November 29, 2007, Bellis, J.) (44 Conn.L.Rptr. 621).
"[W]e review federal precedent concerning employment discrimination for guidance in enforcing our own antidiscrimination statutes." Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 415, 944 A.2d 925 (2008). "These claims of ... discrimination are subject to the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard." Green v. Cellco Partnership, 218 F.Supp.3d 157, 162 (D.Conn. 2016); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas the employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Phadnis v. Great Expression Dental Centers of Connecticut, P.C., 170 Conn.App. 79, 87, 153 A.3d 687 (2017). (Citation omitted.) Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport, 304 Conn. 483, 513, 43 A.3d 69 (2012). "In order to establish a prima facie case, the [plaintiff] must prove that: (1) [she] is in the protected class; (2) [she] was qualified for the position; (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Phadnis v. Great Expression Dental Centers of Connecticut, P.C., supra, 170 Conn.App. 87-88.
As to count one, the present motion asserts that the plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts from which an inference of pregnancy discrimination can properly, that is, legally be drawn.[10] The court disagrees.
The burden on a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination is not onerous. Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free School Dist., 691 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2012). Of course, involuntary termination of employment by one’s employer is an adverse employment action. Amato v. Hearst Corp., 149 Conn.App. 774, 781, 89 A.3d 977 (2014). (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stinnett v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 278 F.Supp.3d 599, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
The defendant challenges the amended complaint for its failure to allege that similarly situated employees who were not pregnant were treated more favorably than the plaintiff was treated. Although this court did make that point in striking the plaintiff’s original complaint, that ruling cannot...
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