Scarborough v. State

• Decision Date: 04 December 1981
• Docket Number: No. 388,388
• Citation: 437 A.2d 672,50 Md.App. 276
• Parties: William SCARBOROUGH v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 276

50 Md.App. 276

437 A.2d 672

William SCARBOROUGH v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 388.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 4, 1981.

Howard L. Cardin, Assigned Public Defender, Baltimore, for appellant.

Alexander L. Cummings, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., William A. Swisher, State's Atty. for Baltimore City and Keith E. Mathews, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City, on brief, for appellee.

Argued before THOMPSON, LOWE and MASON, JJ.

THOMPSON, Judge.

In this case we are primarily concerned with a novel procedure, adopted by the trial judge in a robbery prosecution, in which separate juries were empaneled to try the appellant and a co-defendant simultaneously.

William Scarborough, appellant, was charged along with Maurice King with robbery with a deadly weapon and a handgun violation. The two defendants were tried together as set out above in the Criminal Court of Baltimore. King was acquitted of both charges by one jury while the appellant was found guilty by the other. The appellant was thereupon sentenced to a term of 20 years for the robbery conviction and 5 years for the handgun violation, to be served consecutively.

The appeal presents the following questions:

1. Did the trial court err when it compelled the appellant to be tried along with the co-defendant before two juries?

2. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury that they were the judges of the law?

3. Did the trial court err when it called Laura Batts as a court's witness?

4. Did the trial court err in permitting improper rebuttal testimony?

FACTS

On the morning of January 11, 1980, Robert Shore, manager of Herb's Liquor and Cut Rate, accompanied by Henry Floyd, the "clean up man", went to Carrollton Bank to acquire cash for the business's check cashing service. After obtaining approximately $10,000 in cash and coins they returned to the store and parked across the street. As they were crossing the street, each was robbed by a different individual. Shore shot several times at the person who robbed him and the robber returned two shots. He testified that he did not see the Floyd robbery. Floyd also testified that he did not see the Shore robbery but that after the shots were fired he did see two persons running in the vacant lot across the street. Robert Shore testified that the robber took from him a package containing approximately $9,900. Subsequently Shore identified the appellant by photo, by line-up and by in-court identification. Henry Floyd testified that the second robber took from him a package containing approximately $100.

Laura Batts, the appellant's mother, was called at the request of the state as a court's witness. In the course of her testimony she denied having ever made a statement to an investigating officer that she had seen her son on the morning of the occurrence in question in the company of a man called "Peanut". Her denial of this statement was later rebutted by the testimony of the investigating officer, Detective Parker. The trial judge ruled that inasmuch as Batts had denied making the statement the state would not be permitted to adduce further testimony from Detective Parker that "Peanut" was the co-defendant King.

Gladys Basilio testified that on the morning of January 11, 1980 she was employed by the Department of Social Services located in Mondawmin Mall and that she had spoken with the appellant at her office between 9:00-9:30 a. m., a time within minutes of the robbery of Robert Shore. On cross-examination, testimony was adduced concerning Basilio's attitude toward police officers, her lack of cooperation with the police and the procedures employed in the course of her work. Thereafter, the state called three witnesses in rebuttal of her testimony. The substance and extent of their statements will be more fully discussed hereinafter.

I Dual Jury System

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in its refusal to grant a severance and in its use of the novel multiple jury system to determine the guilt of the respective defendants. More specifically, the appellant contends that the dual trial resulted in confusion and conflict, thus prejudicing his right to obtain a fair trial.

The multiple jury system is a unique concept in the province of jury trials. The procedure is precarious because all the risks inherent in the traditional jury system become two-fold; as a result, courts which have sanctioned its use have done so hesitantly.

In State v. Corsi, 86 N.J. 172, 430 A.2d 210 (1981), the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the conviction of two criminal defendants who were tried jointly before separate juries. In rendering this decision the court expressed its reservations with respect to the frequent use of this procedure, stating:

"The reason for the lack of widespread adoption of this technique would appear to be the belief that application of appropriate safeguards necessary to protect the rights of defendants in such a trial would be more time consuming than if separate trials were ordered. In addition, inherent in such a complicated procedure is the greatly enhanced possibility of error. It seems clear, therefore, that such procedure remains the rare exception rather than the rule.

"We conclude that the multiple jury procedure utilized in the instant case can involve substantial risks of prejudice to a defendant's right to a fair trial. As The Appellate Division noted in Hernandez, (State v. Hernandez, 163 N.J.Super. 283, 394 A.2d 883 (App.Div.1978), certif. den. 81 N.J. 342, 407 A.2d 1216 (1979)) there are too many opportunities for reversible error to take place. We do not recommend it. If it is to be used at all, it should be in relatively uncomplicated situations which will not require the excessive moving of juries in and out of the courtroom and where physical separation of the juries during the entire trial proceedings can be insured. In short, a trial court should carefully weigh the risks involved before attempting to utilize the multiple jury procedure." 430 A.2d at 213.

Other appellate courts, although finding nor reversible error in the trial courts' use of this procedure, generally condemn its use. See, United States v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922, 98 S.Ct. 1484, 55 L.Ed.2d 515 (1978); United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1127, 93 S.Ct. 948, 35 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973); State v. Watson, La., 397 So.2d 1337 (1981); People v. Brooks, 92 Mich.App. 393, 285 N.W.2d 307 (1979); Note, Criminal Law-Multiple Jury Joint Trials-On the Joint Trial of Two Defendants, the Empanelling of Two Juries Simultaneously is Permissible, 2 Fordham Urban L.J. 407 (1974).

In the present case the trial judge empaneled the juries separately and propounded preliminary instructions cautioning them not to speak of the trial among one another until it was concluded. Additionally, separate opening and closing arguments were given and there were separate jury deliberations and verdicts. ¹

The appellant contends that despite the various measures taken by the court, he nevertheless was deprived of a fair trial. He points to various incidents in the record which allegedly demonstrate prejudice. We fail to see the prejudice, particularly when it is considered that if the trial judge had denied the motion for severance and tried the defendants jointly before a single jury we would have found no abuse of discretion. Md.Rule 745 a provides as follows:

"The court may order two or more charging documents to be tried together if the offenses and the defendants could have been joined in a single charging document."

Md.Rule 712 permits the charging of multiple defendants in a single document "if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses." It is apparent to us the appellant and his co-defendant below were obviously engaged in a single transaction despite the state having dropped the charges which alleged each was involved in the robbery of both victims. See, Stevenson v. State, 43 Md.App. 120, 130-31, 403 A.2d 812 (1979), aff'd. on other grounds, 287 Md. 504, 413 A.2d 1340 (1980). Appellant had no vested right in shielding himself from the co-defendant's cross-examination of the victim Floyd. See, Murray v. State, 35 Md.App. 612, 615-16, 371 A.2d 719 (1977). We note particularly that there was no problem of a confession by a non-testifying defendant as arose in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).

Although we have found no reversible error, we join the other courts in strongly condemning the use of dual juries.

II Jury as The Judge of the Law

Relying on Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 423 A.2d 558 (1980), the appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in its instruction to the jury that they were the judges of the law, thereby leaving the jury free to interpret for itself numerous federal constitutional rights, i. e., burden of proof, presumption of innocence. Although appellant failed to raise an objection to the instructions at the time they were propounded, he contends that pursuant to Maryland Rule 757(h) this Court should notice the alleged error. We decline to so exercise our discretion.

III Court's Witness

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in calling Laura Batts, mother of the appellant, as a court's witness. The state indicated at the time of the request that it could not vouch for the veracity of the witness because she was the mother of the appellant and because her hostility had manifested itself in her failure to appear in court after having received a subpoena. The state bolstered its argument by proffering to the court that upon speaking with the witness she had denied making the statement attributed to her by an investigating officer, namely, that on the morning of the...