Scarborough v. State of Ariz.
Decision Date | 15 March 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 74--3412,74--3412 |
Citation | 531 F.2d 959 |
Parties | Kenneth Robert SCARBOROUGH, Petitioner-Appellee, v. STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Before BARNES and TRASK, Circuit Judges, and LUCAS, * District Judge.
Petitioner Kenneth Robert Scarborough was charged in the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, with the offenses of robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. He was convicted by a jury of both crimes and was sentenced to not less than eighteen or more than twenty-five years in the Arizona State Prison on the robbery charge and not less than five or more than ten years on the assault with a deadly weapon charge, both counts to run concurrently. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction for robbery and reversed the conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. Two members of the five-judge Arizona court dissented, contending that Scarborough's conviction for robbery should also be reversed. See State v. Scarborough, 110 Ariz. 1, 514 P.2d 997 (1973). Thereupon, petitioner petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari, which was subsequently denied without opinion. See Scarborough v. Arizona, 415 U.S. 1000, 94 S.Ct. 1598, 39 L.Ed.2d 892 (1974).
In June, 1974, petitioner then filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Federal District Court. On August 15, 1974, the District Judge granted the relief requested by petitioner unless the State of Arizona afforded him a new trial within sixty days. Said Order by the District Judge was stayed pending a final determination of this matter on appeal. Thereupon, the State appealed the District Judge's Order to this Court.
We now affirm the District Court.
At the time of his arrest, petitioner Scarborough was given the Miranda warnings and refused to make a statement or answer questions regarding his involvement in the offense. In his opening argument at the close of trial, the prosecutor stated:
(CT 19); (RT 278--79).
Scarborough's counsel, immediately following the prosecutor's argument, moved for a mistrial. The trial Judge suggested that a cautionary instruction might cure the error, but the prosecutor successfully objected on a unique ground--' That of course takes away from my final argument,' (CT 19); (RT 290). The Court refused to give such a remedial instruction.
We find that the prosecutor's statement constituted fundamental error. To hold that the State in this circumstance may utilize the defendant's silence against him would violate the spirit of the Fifth Amendment. The case before us is distinguishable from the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), where the Supreme Court acted where there was a conflict in the Circuits. In Hale, the defendant, advised of his Miranda rights at the time of arrest, remained silent. At trial, he testified asserting his innocence. On cross-examination, the prosecutor inquired why he had not given the officers his alibi when they had questioned him shortly after his arrest. The trial judge instructed the jury to ignore the colloquy but declined to declare a mistrial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error by permitting cross-examination of the defendant regarding his silence during police interrogation. Exercising its supervisory authority over the lower federal courts, the Court held that Hale was entitled to a new trial. 422 U.S. at 181, 95 S.Ct. at 2139, 45 L.Ed.2d at 107.
Unlike Hale, the prosecutor here did not use the defendant's silence at the time of his arrest as a means to impeach him on cross-examination. Rather, the prosecutor in this case commented to the jury in his opening argument that the defendant's guilt could be inferred by the fact that he remained silent at the time of arrest. Thus, this case is similar to that of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), where the prosecutor commented to the jury concerning the defendant's failure to testify. In holding that this misconduct constituted constitutional error (as opposed to error based on supervisorial authority), the Supreme Court stated:
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