Scardelletti v. Rinckwitz
| Decision Date | 03 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-1013.,02-1013. |
| Parties | ROBERT A. SCARDELLETTI; FRANK FERLIN, JR.; JOEL PARKER; DON BUJOLD, as Trustees of the Transportation Communications International Union Staff Retirement Plan, <I>Plaintiffs-Appellees,</I> v. FREDERICK RINCKWITZ, individually and as representative of all of the members of the class, <I>Defendant-Appellant,</I> GEORGE THOMAS DEBARR, Individually and as representative of a class of all persons similarly situated; ANTHONY SANTORO, SR., <I>Defendants-Appellees,</I> THOMAS J. HEWSON, <I>Party in Interest-Appellant,</I> and DONALD A. BOBO; R. I. KILROY; F. T. LYNCH; FRANK MAZUR; ANDREW HAGAN, <I>Defendants,</I> v. ROBERT J. DEVLIN; RETIRED EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION, <I>Movants-Appellants,</I> and A. MEADERS; JAMES H. GROSKOPF; THOMAS C. ROBINSON; DOYLE W. BEAT; MIRIAM E. PARRISH; ROBERT A. PARRISH; DESMOND FRASER; JAMES L. BAILEY, DOROTHY DEERWESTER; CLAY B. WOLFE; KENNETH B. LANE; BRIAN A. JONES; CHARLES O. SWASY, <I>Parties in Interest.</I> |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (CA-97-3464-JFM).
ARGUED:
Arthur McKee Wisehart, WISEHART & KOCH, New York, New York, for Appellants. Carmen Rose Parcelli, GUERRIERI, EDMOND & CLAYMAN, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
ON BRIEF:
John A. Edmond, Jeffrey A. Bartos, GUERRIERI,
EDMOND & CLAYMAN, P.C., Washington, D.C.; William F. Hanrahan, Lonie Anne Hassel, GROOM LAW GROUP, CHARTERED, Washington, D.C.; Barbara Kraft, BEINS, BODLEY, AXELROD & KRAFT, Washington, D.C.; Kenneth M. Johnson, TUGGLE, DUGGINS & MESCHAN, P.A., Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Robert J. Devlin appeals from the district court's order enjoining him from pursuing litigation in other courts collaterally attacking the settlement of this class action. Devlin contends that the district court's injunction fails to satisfy the requirements of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). We find no error in the district court's resolution of this matter, and we affirm.
This dispute arose in the fall of 1997, when the trustees of the Transportation Communications International Union amended the union's Staff Retirement Plan (the "Plan") to rescind a 1991 cost-ofliving adjustment (the "1991 COLA") in its entirety.1 The 1991 COLA increased participants' pensions by an amount equal to the increase in the COLA index for every three years following a participant's retirement.
The trustees — who were elected after the 1991 COLA was enacted — later learned that the decision to enact the 1991 COLA was based upon an incorrect valuation of the Plan's liabilities. (The 1991 COLA increased the Plan's liabilities by about $20 million.) Rather than rescinding the 1991 COLA outright, the trustees amended the Plan to freeze the COLA with respect to active employees only; thus, the 1991 COLA remained in place for participants who had already retired when the COLA took effect.
The trustees sued their predecessors for breach of fiduciary duty and sought a declaration that the 1991 COLA was void. The district court ruled in favor of the trustees and declared that the 1991 COLA was void as to all retirees, including pre-1991 retirees. With this ruling in hand, the trustees amended the Plan again in 1997 to rescind the 1991 COLA in its entirety.
The trustees promptly filed this class action in an attempt to forestall likely challenges to the rescission of the 1991 COLA. The trustees sought a declaration that the 1997 rescission of the 1991 COLA was appropriate and binding on all Plan participants or, alternatively, that the 1991 COLA was void as to all Plan participants. Although Devlin — who was retired when the 1991 COLA took effect — was initially named as a representative for the Retiree Subclass, he declined to accept the position. Another class representative was substituted for Devlin.
In May 1999, the trustees and the named defendants reached a settlement that called for the district court to enter a consent order declaring the 1991 COLA void from its inception. The settlement also provided for a release of all claims "concerning the 1991 COLA Amendment and any and all actions and recommendations taken up through the effective date of [the settlement] concerning the 1991 COLA Amendment or directly related to its effects." In addition, the settlement provided that any disputes concerning the settlement were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
After the parties reached this settlement, Devlin moved to intervene in the case. The motion was denied as untimely. Nevertheless, the district court heard Devlin's objections to the settlement at a fairness
hearing conducted in November 1999. The court rejected Devlin's arguments and approved the settlement.
The district court's approval of the settlement did not deter Devlin from pursuing similar litigation in the Southern District of New York. Back in 1995 — while the trustees' initial lawsuit against their predecessors was pending in the district court — Devlin filed two lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York relating to death benefits and medical benefits under the Plan. See Devlin v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, No. 95 Civ. 0742 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Devlin I"); Devlin v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, No. 95 Civ. 10838 ("Devlin II") (S.D.N.Y. 1995). These cases were later consolidated in the Southern District of New York.
Significantly, Devlin II included a claim that the trustees' thenintention to rescind the 1991 COLA was motivated by discriminatory animus against retirees. Once the trustees enacted the 1997 amendment rescinding the COLA in its entirety, Devlin moved in Devlin II for a preliminary injunction to restore the COLA. The Southern District of New York denied this request, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Devlin v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 131-32 (2d Cir. 1999). According to the Second Circuit, Id. at 132.
On remand from the Second Circuit (certain non-COLA issues were sent back to the Southern District of New York), Devlin filed an amended complaint in the consolidated cases to assert the very same COLA claims that were previously rejected. Devlin's new complaint sought a declaration that "the automatic Cost of Living Adjustment for the Retirement Plan must be retained," as well as restitution for "[a]ll Cost of Living Adjustments withheld." He requested that the court adopt findings that "the entire proceeding in Maryland" had
been "tainted." The Southern District of New York denied Devlin's motion for leave to amend his complaint.
After the Maryland district court approved the settlement in this case, Devlin filed his third lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. Devlin v. Scardelletti, No. 00 Civ. 0043 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Devlin III"). The complaint in Devlin III alleged that the trustees' prosecution of this action in Maryland amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty and that the settlement was procured by collusion. Devlin sought declaratory relief and compensatory damages relating to the rescission of the 1991 COLA.
In response to the filing of Devlin III, the trustees moved the Maryland district court for an injunction under the All Writs Act to stop Devlin's continued attacks on the settlement. The district court initially granted the motion in March 2000, ordering Devlin to dismiss Devlin III and enjoining him "from making any filing in any forum against any person, including counsel in this case or their law firms, that raises issues encompassed within the settlement of this action or that directly or collaterally attacks the settlement of this matter, except in this Court or on appeal from Orders of this Court."
Devlin appealed to this Court, challenging the district court's (1) denial of his motion to intervene, (2) approval of the settlement, and (3) entry of the All Writs Act injunction. We affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to intervene as untimely, and we further held that Devlin lacked standing to challenge the fairness of the settlement. Scardelletti I, 265 F.3d at 202-10.2 With respect to the All Writs Act injunction, we rejected Devlin's assertion that he had been denied access to the courts. Id. at 213 n.21. Nevertheless, we concluded that the district court's injunction failed to comply with the
requirement in Rule 65 that an order granting an injunction must state the reasons for issuance of the injunction. Id. at 212-13. Although we were "reluctant" to impose any unnecessary burden on the district court's ability to protect its judgment from collateral attack, we remanded the case for "clarification" as to the reasons supporting the injunction.
On remand, the district court gave the parties another opportunity to be heard on the injunction issue. The trustees filed a memorandum in support of the injunction, incorporating by reference the evidentiary materials they filed in support of the first injunction. Devlin responded by filing an affidavit with exhibits. After considering these additional materials, the district court reissued its All Writs Act injunction in November 2001, explaining its reasons as follows:
The reason for my issuance of the injunction is that Robert Devlin has, by his...
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