Scarlett, In re, No. 2--57223

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: Heard before MOORE; LeGRAND
• Citation: 231 N.W.2d 8
• Docket Number: No. 2--57223
• Decision Date: 25 June 1975
• Parties: In re the Interest of Baby Boy SCARLETT, a child, Appellee. STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Doris Ethel SCARLETT, Appellant.

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231 N.W.2d 8 In re the Interest of Baby Boy SCARLETT, a child, Appellee.
STATE of Iowa, Appellee,
v.
Doris Ethel SCARLETT, Appellant. No. 2--57223. Supreme Court of Iowa. June 25, 1975.

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Oscar E. Jones, Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Michael P. Murphy and Lorna Lawhead Williams, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee, State of Iowa.

James W. Hughes, Des Moines, for appellee, Baby Boy Scarlett.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and RAWLINGS, LeGRAND, REYNOLDSON and UHLENHOPP, JJ.

LeGRAND, Justice.

This appeal arises out of a hearing under Chapter 232, The Code, which resulted in terminating the parent-child relationship existing between Doris Ethel Scarlett, hereafter called Doris, and her son, who is designated in these proceedings as Baby Boy Scarlett. His true name is Jeremy John Scarlett. We refer to him hereafter as Jeremy. In terminating Doris' parental rights, the trial court directed that 'said child (Jeremy) be and remain in the custody of the court for the purpose of transfer of his legal custody and guardianship of his person to suitable persons in accordance with § 232.48 of the 1973 Code of Iowa.' We affirm the trial court.

Cases involving the severance of parent's right to children are invariably steeped in both drama and trauma. This is even more lamentably true in the present matter because it was apparent even before Jeremy was born that his mother's chances to keep and rear her child were in jeopardy.

Doris was 12 years old when she became pregnant and 13 when her son was born. The father of the child has never been identified. Both before and during her pregnancy, Doris herself was under the custody of the juvenile court of Polk County following a determination she was a delinquent child. She remained in that status through all of the proceedings which we are now reviewing.

Shortly after Jeremy's birth, he was found to be a dependent and neglected child within the provisions of § 232.2. No appeal was taken from this determination, which we therefore accept as a verity for present purposes.

Three months later a petition was filed by the Polk County Director of Court Services asking that the parent-child relationship between Doris and Jeremy be terminated.

This petition came on for hearing on October 8, 1973. Voluminous testimony was taken. Doris was represented by counsel; Jeremy's interests were protected by a guardian ad litem. On December 27, 1973, the trial court ordered the parental rights of Doris terminated.

The court's determination was based on § 232.41, subds. 2(d) and 2(e), The Code, which we here set out:

'The court may upon petition terminate the relationship between parent and child:

(1) * * *

(2) If the court finds that one or more of the following conditions exist:

(a) * * *

(b) * * *

(c) * * *

(d) That the parents are unfit by reasons of * * * or other conduct found by the court likely to be detrimental to the

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physical or mental health or morals of the child.

(e) That following an adjudication of neglect or dependency, reasonable efforts under the direction of the court have failed to correct the conditions leading to the termination.'

This appeal raises two issues for review. Doris alleges the trial court erred in receiving testimony 'which had no probative value.' She insists, too, that the evidence was insufficient to warrant terminating her parental rights to her son.

Our review is de novo; the controlling consideration is the best interest of the child; the petitioner has the burden of establishing facts justifying the termination by a preponderance of the evidence. In the Interest of Kester Children, 228 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Iowa 1975); In the Interest of Wardle, 207 N.W.2d 554, 556--557 (Iowa 1973); § 232.46, The Code, 1973.

I. We consider first the objection to the reception of certain evidence.

Doris states the court erroneously considered reports and staff evaluations from various social agencies containing hearsay when the makers of the reports were not available for cross-examination. She also objects that the testimony of Mrs. Dell, a social worker, taken subject to objection, was improperly received.

In equity cases objections to testimony are ordinarily not ruled on, and all evidence is received subject to the objections so that the entire record may be available to the reviewing court on appeal. In re the Marriage of Erickson, 228 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1975).

As to the merits of the objections, we believe the matter is controlled by the following portion of § 232.46, The Code, 1973:

'* * * Relevant and material information of any nature including that contained in reports, studies or examinations, may be admitted and relied upon to the extent of its probative value. When information contained in a report, study, or examination is admitted in evidence, the person making such report, study or examination shall be subject to both direct and cross-examination when reasonably available.'

This statute justifies the...