Scatena v. Caffey

• Decision Date: 20 August 1919
• Citation: 260 F. 756
• Parties: SCATENA et al. v. CAFFEY, U.S. Atty., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

260 F. 756

SCATENA et al. v. CAFFEY, U.S. Atty., et al.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

August 20, 1919

Samuel Seabury, of New York City (Samuel Seabury, John Z. Lowe, L Hamilton Rainey, and George Trosk, all of New York City, of counsel), for complainants.

Francis G. Caffey, U.S. Atty., of New York City (Earl B. Barnes Asst. U.S. Atty., of New York City, of counsel), for defendants.

AUGUSTUS N. HAND, District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

Under the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of this Circuit in the recent case of Jacob Hoffmann Brewing Co. v McElligott, Acting and Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue, etc., and Francis G. Caffey, United States Attorney, etc., 259 F. 525, . . . C.C.A. . . ., this court would apparently have jurisdiction of both of the defendants. Here the complainants sue upon the ground that the act under which the defendants are proceeding is wholly unconstitutional. In the Jacob Hoffmann Brewing Company Case the court reversed a preliminary injunction restraining the United States attorney upon the ground that jurisdiction did not lie where he was attempting to proceed under a valid act and his interpretation of the act was the only thing in question.

The Circuit Court of Appeals, in the last-named case, expressly held the Act of November 21, 1918, constitutional, although I understand that the argument was made in the Circuit Court of Appeals, and it was certainly made in the District Court, that no war emergency then existed. Counsel for the complainant said in their brief filed before me:

'So in the case at bar the test is whether or not an emergency or necessity now exists which warrants the government in enforcing the prohibitions of the Act of November 21, 1918, against these complainants to the destruction of their very valuable property and their several businesses with the inevitable and uncontroverted consequence of incalculable damage. No such war emergency now exists.'

I also, in my opinion in that case, suggested that the question of constitutionality depended upon whether prohibition of the liquor traffic--

'bears any substantial relation to the conduct of the war, either in contributing to the support of armies or to their safe and efficient demobilization.'

I think the valid exercise of the war power depends, not merely upon whether the means employed is adapted to aid in the immediate prosecution of the war, but also whether it can be said to have any substantial relation to conditions directly growing out of the termination of hostilities. So long as the treaty of peace is not ratified there is some chance of the resumption of hostilities, though I place but the slightest weight upon this. A...