Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. v. C.B.
| Decision Date | 09 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 0:17–cv–62371–UU |
| Citation | 315 F.Supp.3d 1312 |
| Parties | SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, Plaintiff, v. C.B. individually and as parent of J.A.B., a minor, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Hudson Carter Gill, Michael Thomas Burke, Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke, Piper & Hochman, PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.
Stephanie Langer, Disability Independence Group, Inc., Miami, FL, for Defendant.
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Record and for Summary Judgment (the "Motion"). D.E. 17.
THE COURT has considered the Motion, the pertinent portions of the record and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
Plaintiff is a governmental entity organized under the laws of the State of Florida, operating public schools in Broward County, Florida (the "School Board"). D.E. 20 ¶ 5(a). Among the educational services provided by Plaintiff are special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. , ("IDEA"). Id. Defendant C.B. is a resident of Broward County, Florida and is the parent of J.A.B., a child who receives special education services, including weekly language therapy, from the School Board due to his autism and language impairment. Id. ¶ 5(b).
The IDEA grants financial assistance to States that provide educational services to disabled children consistent with the IDEA's standards and requirements in order to ensure that disabled children receive a Free and Appropriate Public Education ("FAPE"). § 1400. The IDEA requires that educational institutions develop an individualized education program ("IEP"), in collaboration with parents and school officials, that addresses each disabled student's educational needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4), 1414(d)(4)(a). If the parents of the child or the school district dispute the IEP or its implementation, they can file a complaint with the relevant State administrative agency and obtain a due process hearing before a hearing officer or administrative law judge to resolve the dispute. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(a). In Florida, such due process hearings are conducted by an administrative law judge from the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to a contract between the Florida Department of Education and the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings. Fla. Stat. 1003.57(1)(c). If the school or the parents dispute the outcome of the due process hearing, they may file an appeal with the appropriate state court or United States District Court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).2 A district court also has the power to award "reasonable attorneys' fees" to the parent of a child with a disability who was the "prevailing party" at the due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). In 2004 Congress reauthorized the IDEA, subject to certain changes to the IEP process.
On November 10, 2016, the School Board finalized an IEP reducing the amount of weekly language therapy J.A.B. was to receive. D.E. 20 ¶ 5(e); D.E. 1–1 ¶¶ 16–17. On November 29, 2016, J.A.B., through his mother, C.B., filed a request for a due process hearing, which was forwarded to the Florida Department of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings before Administrative Law Judge Jessica E. Varn (the "ALJ"). D.E. 20 ¶ 5(f); J.A.B. Petitioner, v. School Board of Broward County, Florida , Case No. 16–7021E, State of Florida Division of Administrative Hearings (Administrative Law Judge Jessica E. Varn). The due process request alleged: (1) that the November 10, 2016, IEP was finalized without C.B., and the classroom teacher being present at the IEP meeting, (2) that the IEP overstated J.A.B.'s need for intensive instruction in an Exceptional Student Education classroom and therefore denied J.A.B. a FAPE under the IDEA, and (3) that J.A.B. had been removed from the Florida State Standards Curriculum without his mother's consent. D.E. 1–1 at 2. The School Board responded to the complaint and admitted that the IEP meeting had been convened without C.B. being present. D.E. 1–1 at 7–8. On April 18, 2017, the ALJ issued an Amended Final Order, finding that the IEP was prepared and implemented without parental input in violation of the IDEA, that J.A.B. was entitled to 30 minutes of weekly language services as compensation, and that J.A.B. was entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A–6.03311(9)(x). D.E. 1–1 at 18. The ALJ dismissed all of J.A.B.'s remaining claims. Id.
The parties were unable to agree on the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded and consequently, C.B. filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs before the ALJ on June 1, 2017. D.E. 22–1. The School Board responded to the motion on June 12, 2017, arguing that the ALJ had no authority to award attorney's fees. D.E. 22–2. In the alternative, the School Board argued that J.A.B. should not have been awarded attorney's fees because J.A.B. had not been the "prevailing party" at the due process hearing, and the relief finally awarded to J.A.B. was less than Plaintiff's previous settlement offer. D.E. 1–2 at 2. Both parties agreed that no further evidence was required to resolve this dispute. Id. On September 7, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision finding that she had jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees and she awarded J.A.B. attorneys' fees in the amount of $16,706.00 and costs in the amount of $3,629.95 (the "Order on Attorneys' Fees"). D.E. 1–2. On December 4, 2017, Plaintiff filed this action appealing the ALJ's Order on Attorneys' Fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). D.E. 1.
On December 4, 2017, the School Board filed its complaint against Defendant, appealing the ALJ's Order on Attorneys' Fees. On January 4, 2018, Defendant filed its Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, D.E. 6. Defendant's Affirmative Defenses are failure to state a claim, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and waiver. Id. Defendant's counterclaims include: a demand that the Court enforce the ALJ's Order on Attorneys' Fees (Count One), a separate judgment against Plaintiff for attorney's fees and costs (Count Two), violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Three), violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 – 12165 (the "ADA") (Count Four), and violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 29 U.S.C. § 706 (Count Five). D.E. 6. Plaintiff answered Defendant's counterclaim on January 22, 2018. D.E. 7.
On February 9, 2018, the Court entered its Scheduling Order for Pretrial Conference and Trial, setting a dispositive motion deadline of June 1, 2018. D.E. 9. On the deadline, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Judgment on the Record and Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion"). D.E. 17. In the Motion, Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a judgment on the record as to its claim that the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to award Defendant fees under the IDEA and Florida law. D.E. 17. The Motion also argues that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in its favor on each of Defendant's counterclaims and affirmative defenses. Id. The Motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition.
"A Motion for Judgment on the Record, in the context of the IDEA, is a request that the Court enter a final judgment in what is essentially ‘a bench trial on a stipulated record.’ " Slama ex rel. Slama v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2580, 259 F.Supp.2d 880, 882 (D. Minn. 2003) (quoting Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson , 4 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 825, 115 S.Ct. 90, 130 L.Ed.2d 41 (1994). Under this form of review, the usual Rule 56 summary judgment principles are inapplicable and the Court may make decisions on the merits based on a preponderance of the evidence even in the face of disputed issues of material fact. Loren F. ex rel. Fisher v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys. , 349 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2003) ().
"In a judicial proceeding under the IDEA, a reviewing court is required to conduct a modified de novo review, giving ‘due weight’ to the underlying administrative proceedings." M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist. , 341 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir.), opinion withdrawn, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester County v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) ). The Court "[m]ust be careful not to substitute its judgment for that of the state educational authorities." Walker Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Bennett , 203 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir.2000).
Although district courts must afford judicial deference to the local administrative agency judgment, such deference is "[t]ypically limited to matters calling upon educational expertise." Loren , 349 F.3d at 1314 n.5 (citation omitted). R.L. v. Miami–Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. , 757 F.3d 1173, 1178 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations and quotation marks omitted). "Where the district court does not receive any additional evidence or testimony, this court stands in the same shoes as the district court in reviewing the administrative record and may, therefore, accept the conclusions of the ALJ and district court that are supported by the record and reject those that are not." Loren , 349 F.3d at 1314 (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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