Sch. City of Elwood v. State ex rel Griffin, No. 26145.

• Docket Nº: No. 26145.
• Citation: 203 Ind. 626, 180 N.E. 471
• Case Date: March 29, 1932
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

203 Ind. 626
180 N.E. 471

SCHOOL CITY OF ELWOOD et al.
v.
STATE ex rel GRIFFIN et al.

No. 26145.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 29, 1932.

Appeal from Madison Circuit Court: Alonza L. Bales, Special Judge.

Action by the State, on the relation of Mattie Griffin and others, against the School City of Elwood and others. Judgment for relatrices, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Ralph Daly and Sid Cleveland, both of Anderson, for appellants.

Oswald Ryan, of Anderson, for appellees.

MARTIN, J.

Mattie Griffin, a teacher in the public schools of the city of Elwood, instituted this action in mandamus to compel the school trustess of that “school city” to restore her to such teaching position. (The action was brought in the name of the state on the relation

[180 N.E. 472]

of Mattie Griffin, as provided in sections 1244, 1245, Burns' Ann. St. 1926, and was later consolidated with two other like actions instituted on behalf of Grace Doerman and Mary L. Records.)

The complaint alleged that relatrix was a “permanent teacher of such school corporation and the holder and possessor of an indefinite contract as a public school teacher under and by virtue of the laws of the state” (chapter 97, Acts 1927, sections 6967.1-6967.6, Burns' Ann. St. Supp. 1929);¹ that on February 3, 1931 the school trustees adopted a resolution that in the future no married women should be employed as teachers in the Elwood schools, and that necessary steps be taken to terminate the indefinite contracts of all married women teachers in the school corporation, and notified such teachers (including written notice to relatrix on March 4, 1931) that the trustees would, at their regular monthly meeting on April 7, 1931, take up consideration of the cancellation of the indefinite contracts held by them; that on March 28, 1931, at the written request of the relatrix, the trustees notified her in writing that “the reason for said consideration of the cancellation of her said indefinite contract was that *** the school board *** had resolved that no married women should be employed as teachers in said school after the end of the school year 1930-1931”; that the meeting and hearing was held, and the school board “did then and there unlawfully, unreasonably, arbitrarily and capriciously order that the indefinite contract of relatrix be cancelled and that she be dismissed as a teacher in said school corporation and did *** give as their reason therefor that the relatrix was a married woman.”

It is averred that relatrix has since demanded that she be restored to her rights as a permanent teacher, and be allowed to retain her place as a teacher in said school corporation, which demand the defendant trustees refused, and still refuse, to comply with; that the sole and only reason for the action of the trustees in canceling the indefinite contract of relatrix and in dismissing and discharging her was that she was a married woman; that such action by the board was unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, and without good and just cause; that it is the duty of the trustees to reinstate relatrix and restore her to her rights as a permanent teacher in said corporation, which duty they refuse to perform, and that, unless they are required and compelled by the court to reinstate her, etc., she will be deprived of her right to continue as a permanent teacher in said corporation. A prayer for an order in mandate followed.

To the complaint, the defendants (appellants) filed a plea in abatement setting up the action of the school board, viz. “the board now hereby cancels said contracts and each of them for the reason that said teachers are married and each of them are married women,” which action they allege is final and not subject to any appeal or review by the court, and that the court by reason thereof has no jurisdiction in the proceedings. The court sustained a demurrer to this plea in abatement. The defendants then filed a demurrer to the complaint on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, and that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This demurrer was overruled, and upon the refusal of the defendant to plead further to the complaint, the court made a finding in favor of the three relatrices, and rendered judgment thereon ordering the defendants to reinstate the relatrices in their indefinite contracts and restore them to their full rights as permanent teachers in said school corporation.

[1][2][3] By assigning as error the sustaining of plaintiffs' demurrer to their plea in abatement and the overruling of their demurrer to

[180 N.E. 473]

the complaint, appellants present the question of whether the Madison circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action. They contend that exclusive jurisdiction was conferred upon them as a school board by section 2, c. 97, Acts 1927, section 6967.2 Burns' Ann. St. Supp. 1929, to hear and determine the question of canceling appellees' “indefinite permanent” teaching contracts, and that their decision of such question was final and not subject to appeal to, or review by, the courts. The Teachers' Tenure Law specifically enumerates the causes for which a teacher may be removed or dismissed, and provides that “the decision of the school board shall be final.” If a school board dismisses a teacher for a cause named in the statute, such action is conclusive and is not subject to review by the courts, unless the board in taking the action acted in bad faith, arbitrarily, corruptly, fraudulently, or in gross abuse of its discretion. Greathouse v. Board, etc. (1926) 198 Ind. 95, 151 N. E. 411;Keener School Tp. v. Eudaly (Ind. App. 1931) 175 N. E. 363, 366; 56 C. J. 409, note 69; School District, etc. v. Davies (1904) 69 Kan. 162, 76 P. 409;People ex rel. v. Hubbell (1899) 38 App. Div. 194, 56 N. Y. S. 642;Board of Directors, etc., v. Burton (1875) 26 Ohio St. 421;McCrea v. School-Dist. (1891) 145 Pa. 550, 22 A. 1040;Gillan v. Board, etc. (1894) 88 Wis. 7, 58 N. W. 1042, 24 L. R. A. 336. Where the statute specifically enumerates the causes for which a teacher may be removed or dismissed, the teacher cannot be removed or dismissed for any other cause, Kennedy v. San Francisco Bd. of Education (1890) 82 Cal. 483, 22 P. 1042;Butcher v. Charles (1895) 95 Tenn. 532, 32 S. W. 631, and, where the school board in removing or dismissing the teacher acted outside of its jurisdiction or power under the statute, the action of the board is not final, but is subject to review of the courts, Courtright v. Mapleton (1927) 203 Iowa, 26, 212 N. W. 368;Custer v. School District of Borough of Prospect Park (1899) 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 102.

[4] The appellants admit that they did not take the action complained of because of the “incompetency, insubordination, *** neglect of duty, (or) immorality” of the teachers involved, nor...