Sch. of Domestic Arts & Sci. v. Carr

• Decision Date: 28 October 1926
• Docket Number: No. 17213.,17213.
• Citation: 153 N.E. 669,322 Ill. 562
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: SCHOOL OF DOMESTIC ARTS AND SCIENCE v. CARR, County Collector.

322 Ill. 562

153 N.E. 669

SCHOOL OF DOMESTIC ARTS AND SCIENCE

v.CARR, County Collector.

No. 17213.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 28, 1926.

Bill by the School of Domestic Arts and Science against P. J. Carr, County Collector. From a decree of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded.Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Denis E. Sullivan, judge.

Lynden Evans and Granville W. Browning, both of Chicago, for appellant.

Robert E. Crowe, State's Atty., and William H. Duval, both of Chicago, for appellee.

FARMER, J.

This was an amended bill for injunction filed by the appellant, the School of Domestic Arts and Science, against the county treasurer and ex officio county collector of Cook county, to enjoin the collection of taxes assessed against certain personal property of the appellant for the year 1922. A demurrer was filed to the amended bill and sustained by the chancellor. A decree was thereafter entered dismissing the bill for want of equity at appellant's cost, and from that decree an appeal has been prosecuted to this court.

The facts alleged in the bill and admitted by the demurrer are that appellant is an Illinois corporation, not for percuniary profit, created by charter granted in 1901, and since that time has made annual schedules of its personal property to the Cook county board of assessors, but has at no time paid personal property taxes because it is and has been exempt therefrom under the Constitution and statutes of Illinois. Two tax statements for the year 1922 are involvedherein, one for $69.66 assessed against personal property at No. 6 North Michigan avenue (the Tower building), in Chicago, and the other for $43.14 assessed against personal property at 350 Belden avenue, Chicago. All the property of appellant located at the places mentioned consists only of school furniture and fixtures used in teaching cooking, serving, and other branches of domestic arts and science, and of the necessary equipment for a home for such pupils of the school as live at 350 Belden avenue, and all of said property is used exclusively for school purposes. The bill also alleged that, pursuant to its charter, the school teaches cooking for various purposes; that it trains young women to cook for restaurants and institutions and teaches nurses and others interested in preparing cooking food for the sick; that it teaches the scientific and nutritive values of food, as well as the purchasing of food stuffs and tests for the freshness of various kinds of food; that it teaches various methods for the more economical use of fuel, whether coal, wood, gas, or electricity, and teaches young women to become waitresses and to handle meals skillfully and quietly; that it teaches sewing in all its branches, millinery, the methods of testing the strength and quality of textiles and of distinguishing shoddy from genuine materials; that it teaches the methods of proper household accounting, how to make a budget, and by example instructs as to the proper conduct of a model apartment of seven rooms, with the methods of ascertaining the cost of such an apartment, together with giving actual experience in running such an apartment; that it teaches methods of washing without destroying the strength or texture of clothing, and in general teaches whatever pertains to the management of a private home, and to the training of women in wage-earning employments connected with the feeding or clothing of a family or for the management of restaurants and institutions. The bill further alleges that appellant operates a night school on the fifth floor of the Tower building, and that at the time of the filing of the bill herein 699 pupils were enrolled, and that up to the seating capacity of the school no woman is turned away because she has no money to pay for her tuition or for the food used in the practice of cooking; that its students for the current year number 1,854; that some of the pupils at appellant's school pay as much tuition as they can afford, some are taught free and many for a nominal sum on account of their small means. The bill further alleged that a restaurant is maintained at No. 6 North Michigan avenue where meals are served to the public, and that the restaurant is maintained to provide an outlet for the food cooked and prepared by the pupils of the school, and that the school could not be successfully maintained if the products made by such pupils could not be sold; that the moneys received from the restaurant are all used in buying materials for the school and food to be used by the pupils in learning cooking by practice, for paying teachers, and meeting other necessary expenses of the school; that some of the girls living at the home receive their board free and some pay board as they can afford it, but that all moneys paid for such board or derived from the restaurant are actually and exclusively used in the expenses and operation of the school; that neither appellant nor any of its officers, nor any other person derives any profit or pecuniary benefit from the operation of the restaurant, the school, or the home, and that the receipts from all sources never meet the expense of the school, and the deficit arising each year from the operation of the school and home is taken care of by contributions received from benevolent women.

The bill also refers to section 3 of article 9 of our Constitution, authorizing the exemption of certain property from taxation, and further refers to the first and second paragraphs of section 2 of the Revenue Act as enacted and thereafter amended by the Legislaturepursuant to such constitutional authority. There is inaccuracy in the bill in the wording of paragraph 1 of section 2 as amended in 1909 and as it now exists, but that is of no material consequence.

It is argued in the brief of appellant that the exemption is claimed under the second and seventh paragraphs of section 2 of the Revenue Act. Smith's Stat. 1925, pp. 2105-2106. Appellee's contention is that the first paragraph of section 2 of the Revenue Act, pertaining to the exemption of property of schools, was held unconstitutional in People v. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249 Ill. 132, 94 N. E. 162; that the second paragraph of section 2 limits exemption of school property to schools where the use is a ‘school and religious use,’ and that appellant cannot claim under the seventh paragraph of section 2 because that paragraph was not intended to include property of schools, but only that of charitable organizations; and, further, that if appellant is a charitable organization its property is not used exclusively for charitable purposes and not for profit. We think we are warranted in treating the case as if no reference was made in the bill to any particular paragraph of section 2 of the Revenue Act. There was an allegation of exemption claimed under the Constitution and statutes of Illinois. Where a conclusion of law is stated in the bill, it is mere surplusage, and should not influence the court in its determination of the legal effect of the facts well pleaded and admitted...