Schackart v. Shinn
| Docket Number | CV-03-00287-TUC-DCB |
| Decision Date | 28 March 2022 |
| Parties | Ronald Dwight Schackart, Petitioner, v. David Shinn, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
DEATH-PENALTY CASE
Petitioner Ronald Dwight Schackart is an Arizona death row inmate. He seeks reconsideration of Claim 6(b) of his federal habeas petition, which alleges trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing for failing to “[r]equest a mitigation specialist or other trained and expert person to do a thorough investigation of Schackart's dysfunctional family origin and mental health status.” (Doc. 131 (Supp. Brief), at 11) (quoting Doc. 39 (Petition) at 31- 32.) Because Schackart did not raise this allegation in state court, this Court found the claim procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review. (Doc. 75 at 16-17, 56.) The Ninth Circuit has directed the Court to reconsider that ruling in light of intervening law, including Martinez v Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). (Doc. 125.)
On March 8, 1984, Schackart and a female friend, Charla Ryan, met for lunch to discuss his recent problems.[1] Upon discharge from the Army in July 1983, (see Doc. 131-1, Ex. 1 at 2), Schackart had allegedly returned home to find his wife, Alyda Pajkos, in bed with a man. Schackart also had been charged with sexually assaulting his wife, an accusation he denied. He was out of work and needed a place to stay. Charla agreed to drive Schackart to a Holiday Inn so he could rent a room. After talking for a while in the room, Schackart became upset thinking about his wife and, as he later contended, began confusing her with Charla. He pulled a gun out and asked Charla if she would have sex with him. After she refused, he forced her to comply at gunpoint. The two remained in the room for several hours. Schackart struck her on the neck with the gun butt when she appeared to be sleeping, allegedly to knock her out. The blow did not render her unconscious. Instead, she awoke and began screaming. Schackart then strangled her.
That evening he confessed to his pastor and his parents that he had killed a woman. He later confessed to police that he had sexually assaulted and killed the victim. Police found the victim where Schackart indicated, in a room at the Holiday Inn. Her body was under the covers on the bed and a large sock had been stuffed in her mouth. Subsequent medical examination revealed that she died of manual strangulation and that the sock had been stuffed in her mouth with sufficient force to tear the base of her tongue.
Schackart was prosecuted for first-degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault. Pima County Superior Court Judge Michael Brown presided over the trial and sentencing. Assistant Pima County Public Defenders Donald Klein and Karen Noble represented Schackart at trial. (See ROA at 16, 19, 33.)[2] On the second day of trial, acting against his counsel's advice, Schackart sought to dismiss his counsel and plead guilty. (RT 3/13/85 at 2-3; ROA 453-54.) The case proceeded to trial with counsel after Schackart failed to admit a sufficient factual basis for the plea. (RT 3/13/85 at 17-34; ROA 456); State v. Schackart (Schackart I), 175 Ariz. 494, 497, 858 P.2d 639, 642 (Ariz. 1993).
On March 16, 1985, a jury convicted Schackart of all charges and further found that Schackart intended to kill the victim. (ROA 490, 589); Schackart I, 175 Ariz. at 497, 858 P.2d at 642. Schackart waived counsel and represented himself during sentencing, with Klein and Noble acting as advisory counsel. (RT 3/27/85 at 4-6.) Judge Brown sentenced Schackart to death for the murder and to a term of years for the other counts.[3] (ROA at 830, 838.)
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions for all three crimes and the sentences for sexual assault and kidnapping. Schackart I, 175 Ariz. at 503, 858 P.2d at 648. The court vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the sentencing transcript was inadequate for review. Id. at 499, 858 P.2d at 644. Schackart's allocution and the statement of his defense counsel had not been transcribed. Id. The court noted, however, that the aggravation/mitigation hearing had been transcribed in full and was sufficient for review. Id.
After remand, Schackart was again sentenced to death for the first-degree murder conviction. (Resentencing ROA at 115.) The trial court concluded that the State had established the aggravating circumstances of a prior conviction of a violent felony under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2)[4] and that the murder was cruel, heinous or depraved under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6). State v. Schackart (Schackart II), 190 Ariz. 238, 245, 947 P.2d 315, 322 (Ariz. 1997).
On direct review, the Arizona Supreme Court struck the aggravating circumstance of Schackart's prior violent crime, but again found the crime was committed in an especially cruel manner and affirmed the death sentence after reweighing the remaining aggravating circumstance and the mitigation. Id. at 251, 258 & 260-61, 947 P.2d at 328, 335 & 337-38. The court explained that the trial court's cruelty finding was appropriate because:
The length of time Charla was held in the motel room, the presence of a gun, the sexual assault, the discussion about tying her up or drugging her, the blow to her head, the strangling, and her inevitable uncertainty about her ultimate fate all support the court's finding that this murder was especially cruel.
The court rejected the trial court's finding that the murder was also heinous or depraved because the record did not support a finding that Schackart relished the murder, that he inflicted unnecessary and gratuitous violence upon the victim, or that the killing was needless and unnecessary. Id. at 250, 947 P.2d at 327.
After counsel was appointed to represent Schackart in post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings, the court granted Schackart's subsequent motion to permit “hybrid representation, ” making him “co-counsel.”[5] (PCR ROA 2, 32, 35.) Schackart filed a PCR petition with the trial court and a subsequent addendum. (PCR ROA 166, 167.) After Judge Brown retired, the case was assigned to Pima County Superior Court Judge Jan Kearney. (See PCR ROA 161.) The PCR petition was denied without a hearing. (PCR ROA 185.) The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied Schackart's petition for review on May 28, 2003. (PR 26.)
Schackart filed a preliminary Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court on May 30, 2003, and an amended petition on May 3, 2004. (Docs. 1, 39.) Schackart asserted an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim based on counsel's failure to request “a mitigation specialist or other trained and expert person to do a thorough investigation of Schackart's dysfunctional family origin and mental health status.” (Petition at 31-32.)
The Court found the claim procedurally defaulted because it had never been fairly presented to the state courts. (Doc. 75 at 16-17.) Based on then-controlling law, the Court rejected Schackart's allegation that the ineffective assistance of his PCR counsel established cause for the default and dismissed the claim as procedurally barred. (Id. at 17.) On March 17, 2009, the Court denied Schackart's Amended Petition in its entirety. (Doc. 103 at 28.)
While Schackart's appeal from this Court's denial of habeas relief was pending, the Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan, which held that where ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims must be raised in an initial PCR proceeding, failure of counsel in that proceeding to raise a substantial trial IAC claim may provide cause to excuse the claim's procedural default. 566 U.S. at 17. Subsequently, Schackart moved the Ninth Circuit to stay his appeal and remand Claim 6(b).
The Ninth Circuit granted Schackart's motion for a limited remand, ordering the district court to reconsider Claim 6(b) in light of intervening law. (Doc. 125) (citing Martinez, 566 U.S. 1; Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)).
This Court ordered supplemental briefing to address whether cause exists under Martinez to excuse the procedural default of the claim and whether Schackart is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 126.) Schackart argues that post-conviction counsel acted ineffectively in litigating claims against sentencing counsel in state court, and requests evidentiary development and an evidentiary hearing to prove both “cause” under Martinez and the merits of Claim 6(b). (Supp. Brief.) Schackart also requests evidentiary development under Rules 6, 7 and 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.[6] Respondents have filed a response, and Schackart filed a reply. (Docs. 141 (Supp. Response), 144 (Supp. Reply).)
Federal review is generally unavailable for a claim that has been procedurally defaulted. In such situations, review is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice that excuses the default. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Coleman held that ineffective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings cannot establish cause for a claim's procedural default. Id.
In Martinez, the Supreme Court announced a new, “narrow exception” to that rule.
The Court explained that:
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no co...
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