Schackmann v. Cathedral High School, No. A04-2435 (MN 8/30/2005)
| Decision Date | 30 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. A04-2435.,A04-2435. |
| Parties | Richard Schackmann, Sandra Schackmann, parents and natural guardians of Adam Schackmann, and Adam Schackmann, Appellants, v. The Cathedral High School, St. Cloud, Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court, Stearns County, File No. C2-03-1352.
Gordon H. Hansmeier, Rajkowski Hansmeier Ltd., St. Cloud, MN, for appellants.
Peter A. Donohue, Michael E. Novak, Donohue Novak at Law, St. Cloud, MN, for respondent.
Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Stoneburner, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellants challenge the dismissal by summary judgment of their claims against respondent school for defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, due process, and breach of contract. Appellants also contend that the timing of the summary judgment motion violated the scheduling order. We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to consider the summary judgment motion. Further, because appellants were not compelled to self-publish statements made by the school, because negligent infliction of emotional distress requires a viable defamation claim, because the school is not a state actor for purposes of due-process rights, and because there is no evidence of recoverable damages to sustain recovery on the breach-of-contract claim, we affirm.
Adam Schackmann was a senior at respondent Cathedral High School (school), and Richard and Sandra Schackmann are his parents. The school is incorporated as a private, not-for-profit educational corporation and is associated with the Roman Catholic Diocese of St. Cloud.
On Saturday, December 1, 2001, the school was burglarized and vandalized. Adam had basketball practice at the school early in the day. That evening, he and two of his classmates returned to the locked school. Adam represented that their reasons for returning were to retrieve items that he and one of his friends had left. Adam said he saw a police vehicle at the school as they arrived. Adam and his friends entered the school through a door that one of the friends had propped open earlier in the day. They brought a flashlight, walked through several areas of the school and were in the building for half an hour. Adam did not retrieve the items for which he had allegedly come. At one point, the three went to see what the police were investigating. They were arrested as they stepped out of an elevator. At the police station, the boys were interviewed, and according to one of the officers, their statements differed regarding when they saw the police and why they went to the school. Fingerprints, blood, and broken glass were found at the scene of the burglary; Adam and his friends consented to giving police fingerprint samples and turned over their shoes and sample clothing to be tested for physical evidence.
Police evaluation of the situation was mixed. On the night of the burglary, one unidentified officer informed a group of individuals, including the president of the school, that in that officer's opinion, Adam and his friends were not involved in the burglary. This information was conveyed to the principal and the dean of students. However, the officer responsible for the investigation was suspicious of Adam and his friends because of inconsistencies in their statements. Although the boys' prints and clothing did not match the evidence collected from the scene, the police continued to investigate them for a year. Ultimately, no charges were filed against them.
Approximately two days after the burglary, the school principal and the dean of students met with Adam and his parents, as well as the two other students. The principal and the dean of students found the students' statements inconsistent and felt that Adam did not tell the whole truth. Adam and his parents left the meeting "feeling that [the principal] and [the dean of students] felt that our son had lied, and that he was involved in this incident at Cathedral with a fourth person."
The principal and the dean of students determined that the three students had committed the following violations: entered the building without authorization, evaded the police, were not honest with the principal or the dean of students, and endangered their own safety. Although the principal and the dean of students are ultimately responsible for disciplining the students, they referred the matter to the Student Assistance Team (SAT) for review and possible sanctions. One of the members of SAT is a school counselor who is employed by the school district with public funds.
The SAT recommended that the three students be suspended from school for the remainder of the semester and from extracurricular activities for the remainder of the school year. The principal and the dean of students decided to follow that recommendation. The school then notified appellants that Adam had three choices: accept the suspension, appeal the decision, or withdraw from school. Adam chose to withdraw. Adam enrolled in St. Cloud Technical High School, a public school, where he played lacrosse and participated in the band. The other two students served their suspensions and remained at the school.
In March 2003, Adam and his parents filed a complaint against the school claiming negligent and intentional infliction of emotion distress, defamation, denial of due process, and breach of contract. On September 3, 2004, the school filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted, dismissing the case. This appeal followed.
The first issue is whether the district court erred in hearing the school's motion for summary judgment after the deadline established in the scheduling order for dispositive motions. The scheduling order was entered pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 16, which governs pretrial matters. A district court's decision to modify a pretrial order is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Cortroneo v. Pilney, 343 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Minn. 1984). Minn. R. Civ. P. 16.05 states that a pretrial order entered after a conference with parties shall be modified only to prevent manifest injustice. The following factors determine whether modification is appropriate: (1) the degree of prejudice to the party seeking the modification; (2) the degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification; (3) the impact of a modification at that stage of the proceedings; and (4) the degree of willfulness, bad faith, or inexcusable neglect by the party seeking the modification. Cortroneo, 343 N.W.2d at 649.
In June 2003, the district court issued a scheduling order that stated that all dispositive motions must be served and filed no later than March 1, 2004. The scheduling order also stated that discovery should be completed by February 1, 2004; that the pretrial settlement conference should take place on March 1, 2004; that both parties should file complete witness and exhibit lists for the pretrial conference; and that the trial should begin on March 15, 2004.
The scheduling order timetable was modified. Discovery continued throughout 2004 and included appellants serving a request for the production of documents in October 2004. The trial was rescheduled for December 2004.
Next, we apply the Cortroneo factors to this case. The first is prejudice to respondent. Respondent would have been prejudiced by a failure to depart from the scheduling order because disposition by summary judgment avoided the time and expense of proceeding with a trial. The second factor is prejudice to appellant. Prejudice to appellants was minimal because they already had the benefit of extended discovery. In any event, appellants had an opportunity to respond to the motion and did not indicate that they intended to file any additional evidence. The third factor is impact on the proceeding. Respondent filed its motion for summary judgment in September, approximately three months before the rescheduled trial was to begin. Except for the original scheduling order, nothing at that stage of the proceeding would preclude respondent from bringing a motion for summary judgment. Finally, there are no allegations of bad faith or inexcusable neglect. In these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in hearing the summary judgment motion.
The second issue is whether the district court erred in dismissing appellants' claim for defamation.
In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, appellate courts determine if there are any genuine issues of material fact and if the district court erred in its application of the law. N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Metro. Council, 684 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2004). This court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted." Westrom v. Minn. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 686 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Minn. 2004). "[A] `genuine issue' of material fact for trial `must be established by substantial evidence.'" DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Minn. 1970) (quoting Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 307 Minn. 344, 351, 240 N.W.2d 507, 512 (1976)). "The party opposing summary judgment may not establish genuine issues of material fact by relying upon unverified and conclusory allegations, or postulated evidence that might be developed at trial, or metaphysical doubt about the facts." Dyrdal v. Golden Nuggets, Inc., 689 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 2004).
To establish a claim for defamation, the claimant must offer proof of (1) a false statement; (2) communication to a third party; and (3) resulting harm to the claimant's reputation and standing in the community. Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667, 673 (Minn. 2003); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980). Ordinarily, the originator...
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