Schadt v. Soc. Sec. Admin.
| Decision Date | 25 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:11-CV-159 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Vermont |
| Parties | Sandra Schadt, Plaintiff, v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, Defendant. |
(Docs. 7, 13)
Plaintiff Sandra Schadt brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act, requesting review and remand of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for disability insurance benefits. Pending before the Court are Schadt's motion to reverse the Commissioner's decision (Doc. 7), and the Commissioner's motion to affirm the same (Doc. 13). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Schadt's motion, in part; DENIES the Commissioner's motion; and REMANDS for further proceedings and a new decision.
Schadt was thirty years old on her alleged disability onset date of October 15, 1990. She has a college degree, and has worked as a retail sales clerk, a waitress, a group home supervisor, and a park maintenance worker and forewoman. Her date last insured is December 31, 1995, and thus her alleged disability period is from October 1990 through the end of 1995. Schadt's last significant work occurred in 1990;and in 1991, she and her husband had a son. During that period, her typical day involved playing with and caring for her son, doing household chores, and spending time with her husband. (AR 23-25.)
Schadt reports that, in 1979, she experienced her first serious allergic reaction. (AR 20, 458, 469.) After having unpacked new clothes at a clothing store, she broke out in hives; her throat swelled up; she became nauseas; and she ultimately went into anaphylactic shock, resulting in hospitalization. (Id.) From then on, she has experienced symptoms ranging from mild-to-severe, in reaction to chemicals contained in substances found in the environment, including but not limited to leather, new clothes, new cars, new carpet, new pavement, pine wood, perfume, fabric softener, deodorant, pesticides, and gasoline. (AR 31.) These symptoms include headache, runny nose, sore throat, back pain, joint pain, swelling, respiratory infection, abdominal pain, and anaphylactic shock. (AR 27-29.) Given her environmental sensitivities, Schadt has made modifications to her home environment, including installing a special air filter, removing all carpeting, and disposing of all mainstream products containing strong chemicals or scents, including soap, shampoo, laundry detergent, and cleaning sprays. (AR 36, 327.) She has also minimized her exposure to environments that she is unable to control. (AR 33-34.) In an effort to accommodate Schadt's environmental sensitivities, Schadt's now-grown son has had to take such precautions as refraining from wearing new shoes around Schadt, washing his new clothes multiple times before wearing them around Schadt, and removing his clothes and showering when returning home after having been exposed to outside environments. (AR 327-28.)
In July 2009, Schadt filed an application for disability insurance benefits. Therein, she alleged that she had been unable to work since October 15, 1990, due to multiple chemical sensitivity ("MCS")1 , fatigue, chronic pain, and "problems focusing and functioning." (AR 271.) She explained that she could not go out in public except to the grocery store, could not be around people, and had a "very weak" immune system. (AR 272.) On December 15, 2010, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Thomas Merrill conducted a hearing on the disability application. (AR 14-73.) Schadt appeared and testified, and was represented by counsel. Schadt's sister, medical advisor Dr. Bruce Biller, and vocational expert Howard Steinberg also appeared and testified at the hearing.
On February 4, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Schadt was not disabled under the Social Security Act from her alleged disability onset date through her date last insured. (AR 9-13.) A few months later, the Decision Review Board notified Schadt that it was affirming the ALJ's decision, thus making it the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 1-4.) Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Schadt filed the Complaint in this action on June 20, 2011. (Doc. 1.)
The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to evaluate disability claims. See Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 380-81 (2d Cir. 2004). The first step requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not soengaged, step two requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has a "severe impairment." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the ALJ finds that the claimant has a severe impairment, the third step requires the ALJ to make a determination as to whether the claimant's impairment "meets or equals" an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("the Listings"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). The claimant is presumptively disabled if the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment. Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1984).
If the claimant is not presumptively disabled, the ALJ is required to determine the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), meaning "the most [the claimant] can still do despite [his or her mental and physical] limitations," based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545, 416.920(e), 416.945. The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant's RFC precludes the performance of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Finally, at the fifth step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can do "any other work." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her case at steps one through four, Butts, 388 F.3d at 383; and at step five, there is a "limited burden shift to the Commissioner" to "show that there is work in the national economy that the claimant can do," Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009) ().
ALJ Merrill denied Schadt's claim at step two of the sequential analysis, finding that Schadt did not have a "medically determinable impairment" during the relevant period. (AR 12.) Relying on Dr. Biller's testimony, the ALJ stated:
[Schadt] has not substantiated the existence of any medically determinable impairment through the use of medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. As the medical examiner Dr. Biller testified, [Schadt] has not shown the existence of any objective evidence documenting the existence of a medically determinable impairment. Dr. Biller noted that it is a difficult condition to diagnose as no single test exists that can prove [its] existence . . . .
(Id.) The ALJ concluded that Schadt was not under a disability from her alleged onset date of October 15, 1990 through December 31, 1995, her date last insured. (AR 13.)
The Social Security Act defines the term "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person will be found disabled only if it is determined that his "impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In reviewing a Commissioner's disability decision, the court limits its inquiry to a "review [of] the administrative record de novo to determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the . . . decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correctlegal standard." Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A court's factual review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether "substantial evidence" exists in the record to support such decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991); see Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990) (). "Substantial evidence" is more than a mere scintilla; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Poupore, 566 F.3d at 305. In its deliberations, the court should consider that the Social Security Act is "a remedial statute to be broadly construed and liberally applied." Dousewicz v. Harris, 646 F.2d 771, 773 (2d Cir. 1981).
Schadt argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she did not have a medically determinable impairment, and failed to properly develop the record. Additionally, Schadt seeks appointment of a different ALJ and medical advisor on remand. In response, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ properly concluded that Schadt failed to establish the presence of a medically determinable impairment; and that, if the matter is remanded, the Commissioner should retain the discretion to select an ALJ and, if necessary, a medical advisor. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds in favor of Schadt with respect to the ALJ's step-two analysis and development of the record, but does not find that a new ALJ or medical advisor is required on remand.
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