Schaefer v. Lynch
Decision Date | 16 November 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 81-C-1409,81-C-1409 |
Citation | 406 So.2d 185 |
Parties | 7 Media L. Rep. 2302 Roy B. SCHAEFER, Jr. v. Bill LYNCH and the Times Picayune Publishing Corporation. |
Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Jack M. Weiss, Rutledge C. Clement, Shawn B. Rafferty of Phelps, Dunbar, Marks, Claverie & Sims, New Orleans, F. W. Middleton, Jr. of Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips, Baton Rouge, for defendant-relator.
Robert L. Kleinpeter of Kleinpeter, Kleinpeter & Kleinpeter, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-respondent.
The issue in this defamation case is whether defendants are entitled to a summary judgment.
Plaintiff is Roy B. Schaefer, Jr. and defendants are Bill Lynch and the Times Picayune Publishing Corporation. Schaefer alleged that a news article which was printed in the New Orleans States-Item Newspaper was false and defamatory. 1 He also alleged that Bill Lynch wrote the article with the malicious purpose of discrediting Schaefer and effecting his removal as Director of the Louisiana State Employees Retirement System. The States-Item Newspaper, now defunct, was owned by the Times Picayune Publishing Corporation.
Defendants moved for a summary judgment, contending that they had printed no false statements of fact. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the words, even if true, had a libelous imputation. The First Circuit Court of Appeal declined a writ of review and this court granted one. Schaefer v. Lynch, 401 So.2d 1193 (La.1981).
Summary judgment is designed to dispose of frivolous demands and defenses. It is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966. There is no right to appeal from a court's refusal to render a summary judgment. LSA-C.C.P. art. 968. Official revision comment (d) under that article states:
"Since a trial court's action in overruling a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or for summary judgment, is merely an interlocutory judgment causing no irreparable injury, it cannot be appealed, except under the appeal from the final judgment rendered in the case."
However, a defendant is constitutionally entitled to summary dismissal of a libel suit unless plaintiff can show malice. Batson v. Time, Inc., 298 So.2d 100 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1974), writ denied 299 So.2d 803 (La.). Otherwise, the threat of litigation would have a "chilling" effect on freedom of the press. The writ was granted to determine whether trial on the merits of this libel action would infringe on the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Batson v. Time, Inc., supra.
Since the news article involves a matter of public interest and a public official, it is governed by the principles enunciated in New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).
Madison v. Bolton, 234 La. 997, 102 So.2d 433 (1958) held that a truthful statement conveying a defamatory insinuation is actionable. Lynch's article conveys the impression that Schaefer used his official position to influence lending institutions for the benefit of his investment in the Beef Corral restaurant. An affidavit by Hazen A. Ross Jr., indicates that this innuendo was motivated by ill-will. Lynch told Ross "... he would run Roy B. Schaefer, Jr., out of state government if it was the last thing he did."
Schaefer specifically admitted in deposition that, as far as he knew, there was nothing factually incorrect in the article. 2 However, "the way people looked at the thing" he was accused of misusing state funds for personal benefit (Depo. p. 49). Schaefer admitted that, if he had not been honest, he could possibly have manipulated the investments he made in certificates of deposit. However, he said that he tried to avoid even the appearance of wrongdoing. As a result of the article, business at the Beef Corral suffered. The business went bankrupt and Schaefer was left with some of the loan obligations.
There is evidence of malice and ill-will on the part of Lynch. Malice, in the sense of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, requires publication of falsehoods with knowledge of their falsity or with a reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. Here, there is actual malice but no untruth.
The article is defamatory in the sense that it tends to diminish the public's respect for Schaefer. A defamatory meaning is insinuated. See Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio N.Y. Reports 347 (1845). 3 When truthful statements carry a defamatory innuendo, the implication should also be true to justify publication. See Spiegel, "Defamation by Implication-In The Confidential Manner", 29 So.Cal.L.Rev. 306. Nonetheless, the publication of true statements is generally encouraged even if published Truth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned. " " Garrison, supra, 379 U.S. 64, at 74, 85 S.Ct. 209 at 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 at 133 (1964). Even a publication which intentionally inflicts harm on a public official is not actionable unless false. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 85 S.Ct. 992, 13 L.Ed.2d 892 (1965).
Madison v. Bolton, supra, correctly held that truthful statements which carry a defamatory implication can be actionable. However, that is only true in the case of private citizens and private affairs. Even false statements about public officials are constitutionally protected unless known to be false or printed with a reckless disregard for the truth. New York Times Company v. Sullivan, supra. It surely follows that all truthful statements are also constitutionally protected. Even though a false implication may be drawn by the public, there is no redress for its servant. Where public officers and public affairs are concerned, there can be no libel by innuendo. The holding of Madison v. Bolton, supra, that a public officer can recover damages for truthful statements containing false and defamatory implications, is overruled. A public official cannot recover damages because a defamatory publication is motivated by ill-will unless the publication is also false. Compare Mihalik v. Duprey, --- Mass.App. ---, 417 N.E.2d 1238 (1981).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court herein is reversed and the case is remanded for entry of a summary judgment in favor of defendants.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1 The news article was as follows:
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