Schaefer v. Spider Staging Corp.

• Decision Date: 11 September 2001
• Docket Number: 01-2216 and 01-2594,Nos. 01-1008,s. 01-1008
• Citation: 275 F.3d 735
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2002) Mark A. Schaefer, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Spider Staging Corporation, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Schaefer & Sons Roofing, Inc., Third Party Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Spider Staging Corporation, Appellee, v. Schaefer & Sons Roofing, Inc., Appellant. Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 735

275 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2002)

Mark A. Schaefer, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Spider Staging Corporation, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Schaefer & Sons Roofing, Inc., Third Party Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Spider Staging Corporation, Appellee, v. Schaefer & Sons Roofing, Inc., Appellant.

Nos. 01-1008, 01-2216 and 01-2594

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: September 11, 2001

Filed: January 7, 2002

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before LOKEN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

These four consolidated appeals arose out of an accident in which roofers Mark Schaefer and Wayne Rothgeb, employees of Schaefer and Sons Roofing, Inc. ("Schaefer Roofing"), were injured when a scaffolding platform rented from Spider Staging Corporation ("Spider Staging") collapsed. Rothgeb fell twenty-five feet before safety equipment stopped his fall. Schaefer fell four feet and then struck the side of the building they were re-roofing. Schaefer and Rothgeb filed separate negligence actions against Spider Staging in the Eastern District of Missouri. The cases were assigned to different District Judges. Spider Staging filed a third party claim against Schaefer Roofing in each action, seeking indemnity under a provision of the equipment rental agreement.

After trial of Mark Schaefer's case, the jury found Spider Staging seventy-five percent at fault and Schaefer twenty-five percent at fault. The jury awarded damages of $1,750,000, for a net award of $1,313,000. District Judge E. Richard Webber concluded the verdict was excessive and granted Spider Staging's motion for new trial or a remittitur, ordering a new trial unless Schaefer accepted a net award of $200,000. Schaefer refused to accept $200,000, and the case was retried. The second jury awarded Schaefer $30,000. In Case No. 01-1008, Schaefer appeals the district court's order granting a remittitur or a new trial.

Prior to Schaefer's first trial, Judge Webber granted summary judgment on Spider Staging's indemnity claim against Schaefer Roofing. Following the second trial, Judge Webber awarded Spider Staging $315,358.62 for the costs and attorney's fees incurred by Spider Staging in defending Schaefer's action. In Case No. 01-2216, Schaefer Roofing appeals these rulings. In Case No. 01-2594, Spider Staging cross appeals the district court's refusal to grant prejudgment interest on this award.

Wayne Rothgeb settled with Spider Staging before trial. District Judge Carol E. Jackson granted summary judgment on Spider Staging's indemnity claim against Schaefer Roofing, relying on Judge Webber's earlier ruling construing the same equipment rental agreement. Judge Jackson awarded Spider Staging $185,752.34 for its loss in defending Rothgeb's claim -- $130,000 to fund the Rothgeb settlement plus $55,752.34 in costs and attorney's fees in defending the Rothgeb lawsuit. Judge Jackson allowed prejudgment interest on the total award. In Case No. 01-1617, Schaefer Roofing appeals the grant of indemnity, the amount of attorney's fees awarded, and the award of prejudgment interest.

We affirm all but the award of prejudgment interest in Case No. 01-1617.

I. The Remittitur Issue.

Following Mark Schaefer's first trial, Judge Webber granted Spider Staging relief from the jury's $1,750,000 compensatory damage award by ordering a remittitur to $200,000 or a new trial. In reaching that decision, the court applied Missouri substantive law to determine whether the jury's award was excessive. But the court looked at all the trial evidence, consistent with federal law standards governing trial court review of a jury verdict. See Dominium Mgmt. Serv., Inc. v. Nationwide Housing Group, 195 F.3d 358, 366 (8th Cir. 1999) ("the district court may rely on its own reading of the evidence and grant a new trial even where substantial evidence exists to support the verdict").

On appeal, Mark Schaefer argues the district court erred by failing to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict holder, as Missouri law requires. He cites no direct authority for the contention that state law governs this issue. The argument is without merit. In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 426-38 (1996), the Supreme Court confirmed that state law substantive standards that do not conflict with the commands of the Seventh Amendment must be followed in reviewing jury verdicts in diversity cases. But the decision whether to grant a remittitur -- unlike the legal standard to be applied in making that decision -- "is a procedural matter governed by federal, rather than state, law." Parsons v. First Investors Corp., 122 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). As the Supreme Court explained in the context of a punitive damages award:

In a diversity action . . . the propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question, and the factors the jury may consider in determining their amount, are questions of state law. Federal law, however, will control on those issues involving the proper review of the jury award by a federal district court . . . . [T]he role of the District Court is to determine whether the jury's verdict is within the confines set by state law, and to determine, by reference to federal standards developed under Rule 59, whether a new trial or remittitur should be ordered.

Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278-79 (1989). Thus, in this case, Judge Webber applied the correct substantive and procedural standards in determining that a remittitur was required. His order of March 23, 2000, granting Spider Staging a remittitur or new trial is affirmed.

II. Indemnity Issues.

The equipment rental agreement between Spider Staging and Schaefer Roofing included an indemnity provision in which Schaefer Roofing agreed to indemnify Spider Staging, even for Spider Staging's own negligence.

[Schaefer Roofing] agrees to indemnify [Spider Staging] and to hold [Spider Staging] harmless from any and all claims, actions, suits, proceedings, costs, expenses, damages and liabilities, including costs of suits and attorney's fees, asserted by any person . . . arising out of, or connected with the use, erection, maintenance and possession of equipment by [Schaefer Roofing], including, without limitation, improper use or lack of use of proper safety equipment, and also including any acts of negligence by [Spider Staging] in connection with the equipment, and for any defects in said equipment for which [Spider Staging] might otherwise be liable which may be claimed to have caused, contributed to, or be a concurrent cause of any claimed injury or damage. This indemnification includes the claims of any employees of [Schaefer Roofing] . . . .

(Emphasis added.) In Mark Schaefer's lawsuit, Judge Webber granted summary judgment in favor of Spider Staging on its indemnity claim against Schaefer Roofing, applying the proper standards for the grant of summary judgment and concluding that (i) the indemnity provision is enforceable because the agreement to indemnify Spider Staging for its own negligence was "clear and unequivocal," as Missouri law requires, see Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Federal Construction Corp., 351 S.W.2d 741, 745 (Mo. 1961); (ii) the provision clearly applies to Schaefer's claim; and (iii) the rental equipment agreement was not signed by Mark Schaefer on behalf of Schaefer Roofing under duress or undue influence. Schaefer Roofing appeals those rulings. After careful review of the record, we reject Schaefer Roofing's contentions for the reasons stated in Judge Webber's thorough Memorandum and Order dated October 7, 1999. See 8th Cir. Rule 47B; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Housing Auth. of the City of Poplar Bluff, 114 F.3d 693, 695-98 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment enforcing an indemnity agreement).

In Wayne Rothgeb's lawsuit, Schaefer Roofing appeals Judge Jackson's grant of summary judgment in favor of Spider Staging on its indemnity claim, based upon Judge Webber's earlier decision. In the two cases, Spider Staging seeks indemnity under the same equipment rental agreement for two personal injury claims arising out of the same accident. We have now affirmed...