Schaeffer v. Schaeffer

• Decision Date: 06 March 1942
• Parties: SCHAEFFER v. SCHAEFFER.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

25 A.2d 243

128 Conn. 628

SCHAEFFER

v. SCHAEFFER.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 6, 1942.

Rehearing Denied April 8, 1942.

Action by Viola M. Schaeffer, a wife, against Hugo J. M. Schaeffer, her husband, for support, wherein defendant filed a cross-complaint asking for an adjudication of the property rights of the parties, to which cross-complaint plaintiff filed a demurrer which was overruled. There was a judgment for defendant on the complaint and ordering that an accounting should be taken and the plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Before MALTBIE, C. J, and AVERY, BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS, JJ.

Frederick C. Hesselmeyer and Thomas A. Grimes, both of New Haven, for appellant.

Daniel D. Morgan and Alfred F. Celentano, both of New Haven, for appellee.

ELLS, Judge.

A principal question of law involved in this appeal is whether a Connecticut court must give full faith and credit to a decree of divorce obtained in Florida by the husband, formerly a resident of Connecticut, from his wife, still residing in Connecticut based on service of process upon her by ordinary mail. She entered her special appearance in the divorce action for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the Florida court on the ground that the husband had not established a residence in that state sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, was fully heard, and the issue was decided against her. She did not appeal, and took no further part in the proceedings. The case was referred to a special master to find the facts. He found that the wife had been guilty of extreme cruelty and wilful desertion, and upon his report the court entered a final decree of divorce. The issue arises in an action for support brought in Connecticut by the wife and a plea by the defendant that the Florida divorce terminated his obligation to furnish support. He also filed a cross-complaint asking for an adjudication of the property rights of the parties. The trial court held that if the validity of the divorce decree could be re-examined in this case it must be found that although the husband had been in Florida for the required period of ninety days he had not acquired a legal domicil there, because during that period his intention was to return to Connecticut unless he soon found permanent employment in Florida; but that the judgment of the Florida court that he had acquired a residence in that state sufficient to comply with the requirements of its statutes was conclusive, owing to the wife's appearance in the Florida court and its decision of the issue. The court further found that the Florida court had jurisdiction of the marital domicil and that full faith and credit must be given to its decree, and entered judgment for the defendant upon the complaint. It also adjudicated the property rights of the parties. The plaintiff wife appealed to this court.

The questions involved were much in controversy in the various state courts until settled by decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The controlling cases are Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867, 5 Ann.Cas. 1, and Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 59 S.Ct. 3, 83 L.Ed. 26, 118 A.L.R. 1518. In the Haddock case the abbreviated facts were these: the wife, a resident of the state of New York, sued the husband for divorce in that state in 1899, and there obtained personal service upon him. The answer alleged, among other things, that the husband had, in 1881, obtained in a court of the state of Connecticut a divorce which was conclusive. At the trial, the Connecticut divorce judgment was offered by the husband and was objected to because the Connecticut court had not obtained jurisdiction over the person of the defendant wife, as the notice of the pendency of the petition was by publication and she had not appeared in the action. There was a second ground of objection not applicable to the present situation. Upon appeal the Supreme Court of the United States held that the decree of the Connecticut court, rendered under the circumstances stated, was not entitled to obligatory enforcement in the state of New York by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution. It said, however at page 570 of 201 U.S., at page 527 of 26 S.Ct, 50 L.Ed. 867, 5 Ann.Cas. 1: "* * * where a bona fide domicil has been acquired in a state by either of the parties to a marriage, and a suit is brought by the domiciled party in such state for a divorce, the courts of that state, if they acquire personal jurisdiction also of the other party, have authority to enter a decree of divorce, entitled to be enforced in every state by the full faith and credit clause," citing Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 76 U.S. 108, 19 L.Ed. 604. The doctrine of the Haddock case is that the courts of one state are not required to give full faith and credit to a decree of divorce secured in another state unless the plaintiff has acquired a residence there sufficient to comply with the requirements of its laws as to the jurisdiction of its courts over divorce and (1) the defendant has appeared, or (2) process has been served on the defendant in that state, or (3) the marital domicil was in that state.

The first question is whether the decision of the Florida court that the defendant had acquired a residence in that state sufficient to comply with its laws concerning jurisdiction over divorce is binding upon the courts of this state in view of the fact that the plaintiff filed a special appearance in that court to contest the issue and did actively contest it, and it was decided against her. The recent Davis case, supra, decides this question. The applicable facts are essentially similar. The husband, having obtained a divorce a mensa et thoro from his wife in the District of Columbia, went into Virginia and after he had remained there for the statutory period sued for an absolute divorce. The wife, who had continued her residence in the District of Columbia, entered the action specially for the sole purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the Virginia court on the ground that the husband was not a bona fide resident of that state. After a full hearing, the Virginia court decided against her, found that the husband was a bona fide resident of Virginia and held that it had jurisdiction. Later it granted the divorce. The husband some years later came into the District of Columbia court, 68 App. D.C. 240, 96 F.2d 512, and asked for a modification of the order for support which had been entered against him in the divorce a mensa et thoro, setting up the Virginia divorce. The Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, held that, having submitted to the Virginia court the question of her husband's domicil, the wife was concluded by the judgment of that court on the subject. It was res judicata against her and she could not again litigate that matter in the courts of another jurisdiction. The court, by Mr. Justice Butler, says in part at page 40 of 305 U.S., at page 6 of 59 S.Ct, 83 L. Ed. 26, 118 A.L.R. 1518: "As to petitioner's domicil for divorce and his standing to invoke jurisdiction of the Virginia court, its finding that he was a bona fide resident of that State for the required time is binding upon respondent in the courts of the District. She may not say that he was not entitled to sue for divorce in the state court, for she appeared there and by plea put in issue his allegation as to domicil, introduced evidence to show it false, took exceptions to the commissioner's report, and sought to have the court sustain them and uphold her plea. Plainly, the determination of the decree upon that point is effective for all purposes in this litigation." The court therefore held that the Virginia decree was entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of the District of Columbia.

The decision is placed squarely upon the ground not that the special appearance of the defendant was enough to give the court the right to pass on the question of jurisdiction but that in consequence of that appearance, having actively contested the issue of jurisdiction, the judgment of the...