Schaeffer v. Warren Cnty.
| Decision Date | 02 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14cv945-DPJ-FKB |
| Parties | JAMES D. SCHAEFFER PLAINTIFF v. WARREN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI and WARREN COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
This employment dispute is before the Court on Defendants Warren County, Mississippi, and the Warren County Board of Supervisors' Motion for Reconsideration [34]. Having fully considered the premises, the Court concludes that the Motion should be denied.
From 2006 through 2013, Plaintiff James Schaeffer was a licensed boat pilot for Defendant Warren County, Mississippi ("Warren County"). He lost his job after failing to appear at work for two days. Aggrieved, Schaeffer brought this suit contending that Defendants violated: (1) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by terminating his employment because of his age; (2) the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay overtime compensation; and (3) the FLSA's anti-retaliation provisions by terminating his employment shortly after he complained about entitlement to overtime pay.
Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment. Their motion [25] and supporting memorandum [26] addressed the ADEA claim and "Plaintiff's overtime claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . ." Defs.' Mot. [25] ¶ 2. Neither the motion nor the memorandum mentioned the retaliation claim. After briefing, the Court granted Defendants' motion with respect to the ADEA and overtime claims but ruled that the FLSA retaliation claim should proceed to trial. Defendants now seek reconsideration of that finding.
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to alter or amend a judgment. But reconsideration "is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly." Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). And "such a motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment." Id. (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)). Instead, "a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence and cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued." Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges two FLSA violations. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide him overtime pay he was due. See Compl. [1] ¶¶ 13-17. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants terminated his employment "after complaining about not receiving overtime pay." Id. ¶ 19. In their summary-judgment motion, Defendants expressly referenced "Plaintiff's overtime claim" under the FLSA. Defs.' Mot. [25] ¶ 2. Similarly, Defendants' initial legal memorandum included a section dedicated to Plaintiff's claim that Defendants "failed to pay him overtime compensation in the amount of $49.65." Defs.' Mem. [26] at 10. Defendants argued that Schaeffer was a seaman and therefore exempt from claiming overtime compensation under 29 U.S.C. § 207. Id. at 10-12. Defendants concluded this portionof their memorandum by arguing that Schaeffer's "claim of overtime payments in the amount of $49.65 should be denied as a matter of law . . . ." Id. at 12.
At no time in their motion or memorandum did Defendants mention "retaliation" or reference the anti-retaliation provisions found in 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Plaintiff noted this omission in his summary-judgment response, stating that the retaliation claim therefore survives. Defendants then replied that Plaintiff's exempt status also blocks his FLSA retaliation claim, but offered no support for that argument. See Defs.' Reply [31] at 6.
Because Defendants waited until their summary-judgment reply to mention the retaliation claim, and then offered no authority for it, the Court found that the issue was not properly raised. See Feb. 2, 2016 Order [33] at 9 .
Defendants now argue that [t]he Court . . . misapprehended the Defendants' position in its Motion as well as in its supporting Memorandum Brief," Defs.' Mot. [34] at 2, and that they "thought it was clear that their arguments in their opening summary judgment brief applied to all [FLSA] claims." Def.'s Reply [36] at 1.
A proper Rule 56 motion requires more. "A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphasis added). And, as the Supreme Court stated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion . . . ." 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Here, Defendants plainly sought dismissal of the "claim of overtime payments in the amount of $49.65." Defs.' Mem.[26] at 12. This argument cannot be construed as encompassing Plaintiff's separately pleaded retaliation claim.
Defendants offer a new argument in their reply to the instant motion, observing that the Court had discretion to consider the retaliation argument they first made in their summary-judgment reply. There is authority for that discretion, but the cases generally require some notice to the non-movant. See Defs.' Reply at 2 (). Defendants believe Plaintiffs had such notice and should have known that arguments regarding "overtime" were meant to cover "overtime retaliation." See Defs.' Reply [36] at 1. But again, overtime claims and retaliation claims are not the same thing and arise from distinct statutory provisions—only one of which Defendants addressed in their opening brief.
Defendants also argue that once the Court read their summary-judgment reply and realized that they intended for their overtime arguments to apply equally to the retaliation claim, the Court could have requested additional briefing. Defs.' Reply [36] at 4. That would have been an option, but Defendants' only argument in their summary-judgment reply was the exemption argument under § 207, and they offered no legal authority to support it. When the Court researched that issue, it concluded that Wirtz v. Ross Packaging Co. foreclosed it. See Feb. 2, 2016 Order [33] at 10 (citing 367 F.2d 549, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1966)). Additional briefing did not seem warranted, so the retaliation claim survived summary judgment.
Now that the issue is before the Court on a motion for reconsideration, Defendants have offered legal authority in their reply brief, citing York v. City of Wichita Falls, Texas, 944 F.2d 236, 238 (5th Cir. 1991). Though this argument comes late in the day, if Defendants are correct, it would necessitate judgment in their favor at the close of evidence. Accordingly, the Court will examine York in the interest of judicial economy.
In York, a fire battalion chief informed a superior officer that the United States Supreme Court had expanded overtime compensation to state employees in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 944 F.2d at 237-38. As a result, the city decreased the hourly wage rate for all firefighters, prompting a retaliation claim under § 8 of the 1985 Amendments to the FLSA. Section 8 added the following note to the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision, § 215(a)(3):
A public agency which is a State, political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency and which discriminates or has discriminated against an employee with respect to the employee's wages or other terms or conditions of employment because on or after February 19, 1985, the employee asserted coverage under section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 shall be held to have violated section 15(a)(3) of such Act.
Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 8, 99 Stat. 787, 791 (Nov. 13, 1985).
The district court in York concluded—as a matter of law—that fire captains and battalion chiefs were covered employees, so "the City was obligated to pay [them] overtime . . . ." Id. at 238. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that questions of fact precluded judgment in the plaintiffs' favor and remanded so the court could factually determine whether these employees were exempt. Id. at 242. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit stated:
To prove that pre-enactment actions violated § 8, a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she is an employee covered by the act, (2) he or she asserted coverage under the FLSA on or after February 19, 1985, and (3) the state or local governmental employer's action was intended to discriminate because of the assertion of coverage.
Id. at 241. The exemption issue was apparently dropped on remand, but the Fifth Circuit reiterated this standard when the case was again appealed. See York v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 48 F.3d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1995).
The York test obviously addresses § 8 of the 1985 Amendments, which expired by its terms on August 1, 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 8, 99 Stat. 787, 791 (Nov. 13, 1985); see also Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss., 911 F.2d 1102, 1103 (5th Cir. 1990). Defendants do not address this distinction, contending generally that York supports their exemption argument under § 215(a)(3).
Even if the York test remained valid after § 8 phased out, it is not clear whether it covered termination decisions under § 215(a)(3). The 1985 Amendments were designed to relieve the financial strain on public employers by giving them "certain exceptions and postponing the...
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