Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast
Decision Date | 29 January 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 07-2038.,07-2038. |
Citation | 554 F.3d 470 |
Parties | Brian SCHAFFER, a minor, by his parents and next friends, Jocelyn and Martin SCHAFFER; Jocelyn Schaffer; Martin Schaffer, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jerry WEAST, Superintendent Montgomery County Public Schools; Board Of Education Of Montgomery County, Maryland, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Michael Eig, Michael J. Eig & Associates, P.C., Chevy Chase, Maryland, for Appellants. Audrey Jane Anderson, Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
ON BRIEF:
Zvi Greismann, Montgomery County Public Schools, Rockville, Maryland; Maree F. Sneed, Jessica L. Ellsworth, Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge MICHAEL and Judge TRAXLER joined.
Brian Schaffer and his parents seek reimbursement for Brian's private school tuition in the eighth grade under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 ("IDEA"). Brian, who graduated from high school in 2003, had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and other learning disabilities as a student. Brian's parents rejected an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") that the Montgomery County Public School System ("MCPS") proposed for Brian's eighth-grade year. The Schaffers later accepted an IEP that MCPS proposed for Brian's tenth-grade year. The Schaffers introduced the tenth-grade IEP in district court as "additional evidence," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii), that they say demonstrates the inadequacy of the eighth-grade IEP. The district court did not attach weight to the tenth-grade IEP, and the court granted summary judgment for MCPS. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to penalize MCPS for revising Brian's IEP in the tenth grade, we affirm.
Brian Schaffer struggled academically in his studies at Green Acres School, a private institution, through the seventh grade. After officials at Green Acres told Mrs. Schaffer that the school could not properly accommodate Brian's learning disabilities, she contacted MCPS and requested that Brian be placed in a special-education program for his eighth-grade year in 1998-99.
MCPS convened a committee to evaluate Brian's disability and to create an IEP, as the IDEA requires. 20 U.S.C. § 1414.* The committee held two meetings that were attended by MCPS officials, the Schaffers, and the Schaffers' attorney. At those meetings, the committee discussed evaluations by three MCPS officials who had met with Brian, observed him in the classroom, and administered tests to assess his disabilities and needs. The committee also considered the results of two private evaluations obtained by the Schaffers. The private evaluators had concluded that Brian had an auditory processing disorder and that he would do best in small special-education classes.
Based on all of the available information, the committee concluded that Brian had a learning disability and proposed an IEP. The IEP set a number of goals for Brian, the first being "[t]o demonstrate improved auditory perception and comprehension." And the IEP provided that Brian would receive numerous forms of special-education support at Herbert Hoover Middle School, a public school near Brian's home.
At Herbert Hoover, Brian would have attended "inclusion model" classrooms for half of his courses (English, Science, and World Studies), totaling 15.3 hours per week. Inclusion model classes are designed to include special-education students within the general-education environment: one teacher oversees the entire class, and a second, special-education teacher focuses solely on a handful of disabled students. Brian also would have received 45 minutes of speech-language therapy per week. And in place of learning a foreign language, he would have been given 45 minutes per day of reading and writing support in a self-contained special-education classroom. Brian would have attended general-education classes for his remaining courses (Art, Math, and Physical Education). In all of his classes, Brian would have received accommodations that included the use of a computer, copies of lecture notes, preferential seating, repetition of directions, and test-taking with extended time and in small groups.
The Schaffers objected to the proposed IEP. They told MCPS that the class sizes at Herbert Hoover were too large to meet Brian's needs. MCPS then offered to place Brian at Robert Frost Middle School, another nearby public school. In addition to all of the services proposed at Herbert Hoover, Brian would have attended a small special-education class for English at Robert Frost, rather than the inclusion model. There also would have been only three other special-education students in Brian's inclusion-model classes at Robert Frost (compared to four or five at Herbert Hoover).
The Schaffers remained dissatisfied. They decided to reject the IEP and to send Brian to the private McLean School of Maryland for his eighth-grade year. The Schaffers had applied to McLean shortly after requesting that MCPS evaluate Brian. Before the Schaffers received MCPS's proposed IEP, Brian was accepted at McLean, and the Schaffers paid the enrollment fee to reserve a spot for Brian at McLean at that time. After receiving the IEP and deciding on McLean, the Schaffers requested a due process hearing to challenge the IEP and to seek reimbursement for Brian's tuition and expenses at the private school in the 1998-99 school year. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).
An Administrative Law Judge in Maryland's Office of Administrative Hearings held a three-day hearing to determine whether the eighth-grade IEP would have provided Brian the necessary "free appropriate public education" under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The ALJ heard testimony from Mrs. Schaffer, the Schaffers' two private evaluators, and four MCPS officials who had worked on Brian's IEP. He found that the case was close and that the "assignment of the burden of proof [was] critical" to the outcome. He assigned the burden to the Schaffers. And, applying the standard expressed by the Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), the ALJ held that the eighth-grade IEP offered Brian a free appropriate public education because the IEP was "reasonably calculated by MCPS to provide educational benefit and to meet [Brian's] educational needs."
The Schaffers then filed a civil action to challenge the ALJ's decision. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The district court reversed and remanded, holding that the ALJ should have assigned the burden of proof to MCPS. Brian S. v. Vance, 86 F.Supp.2d 538, 545 (D.Md.2000). A series of appeals and remands followed. See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004); Schaffer v. Vance, 2 Fed.Appx. 232 (4th Cir.2001); Weast v. Schaffer, 240 F.Supp.2d 396 (D.Md.2002). In the interim, the ALJ reconsidered the case and— after denying a request by the Schaffers to introduce additional evidence—decided that reversing the burden of proof also reversed the outcome. However, the Supreme Court eventually held that the Schaffers had the burden of proof in the administrative hearing because they were the party seeking relief. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005). The Supreme Court then remanded the case for a decision on the merits under the correct burden of proof.
Before the district court could reach the merits, however, the Schaffers moved to introduce "additional evidence" under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii). The evidence included letters between the Schaffers and MCPS in 2000, the transcript of an IEP meeting in 2000, and an IEP created in 2000 for Brian's tenth-grade year. The evidence showed that MCPS had offered, and the Schaffers had accepted, a tenth-grade IEP that placed Brian in the Secondary Learning Center at Walter Johnson High School. At Walter Johnson, Brian attended small special-education classes for all of his courses other than physical education and an elective in the arts. The tenth-grade IEP also stated that Brian's academic difficulties were due to "auditory processing and memory." According to the Schaffers, the new language and services in the tenth-grade IEP amounted to a concession by the school system that Brian's eighth-grade IEP was inadequate.
The district court accepted briefing and held a hearing on the Schaffers' additional evidence. The court then admitted the evidence. The court also allowed MCPS to offer additional evidence in rebuttal. MCPS did so, offering two declarations from MCPS officials who stated that Brian's tenth-grade IEP was based on both new assessments of his disability—in particular, Brian scored differently in 2000 on the same IQ test that he took in 1998—and Brian's transition from middle school to high school. MCPS's evidence also showed that Brian had attended more general-education classes over time and that he had graduated from Walter Johnson in 2003 with a 3.4 grade point average in his final term.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The parties again briefed and orally argued the relevance of the Schaffers' additional evidence. The district court then granted summary judgment in favor of MCPS in a bench ruling. The court discussed the Schaffers' evidence and the relevant case law, focusing on our analysis of the limitations on "additional evidence" in Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 134 F.3d 659 (4th Cir.1998). The court then stated that it was "not prepared to conclude that, two years after the fact, the position that [MCPS] may have taken, vis-a-vis the child, would reflect on whether what [it] did two years earlier was appropriate or not." The court therefore decided that it would not attach...
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