Schaffer v. Ames Dept. Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 3:94CV724 (DJS).,3:94CV724 (DJS).
• Citation: 889 F. Supp. 41
• Parties: Kim SCHAFFER, Plaintiff, v. AMES DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

889 F. Supp. 41

Kim SCHAFFER, Plaintiff, v.AMES DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 3:94CV724 (DJS).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

May 26, 1995.

Anne Goldstein, Gregg D. Adler, Gould, Livingston, Adler & Pulda, Hartford, CT, for Kim Schaffer.

Burton Kainen, Vaughan Finn, Kainen, Starr, Garfield, Wright & Escalera, Hartford, CT, for Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., Ronald Raymond.

Richard S. Conti, Bruce J. Comollo, Garrity, Diana, Conti & Houck, Manchester, CT, Joshua A. Hawks-Ladds, Sorokin, Sorokin, Gross, Hyde & Williams, Hartford, CT, Julia M. Wiellette, Diana, Conti, Tunila & Comollo, Manchester, CT, for Russell Paquette.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SQUATRITO, District Judge.

I.INTRODUCTION

This cause is now before the court on the motions to dismiss Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint,¹ filed by Defendants, Russell G. Paquette("Paquette") and Ronald Raymond("Raymond") on July 5, 1994.Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).Documents # 15 & # 20.

Plaintiff, Kim Schaffer("Schaffer"), filed this action against Paquette, Raymond and Ames Department Stores, Inc.("Ames") on May 4, 1994.She alleges violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., commonly known as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, as well as several state law claims.She seeks compensatory and punitive damages, equitable relief, costs and fees.Schaffer has properly alleged this court's federal question and supplemental jurisdiction.28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1367.

For the reasons stated below, Paquette's and Raymond's motions to dismiss are granted.

II.BACKGROUND

The Complaint alleges the following facts.

Schaffer has been employed by Ames since on or about October 3, 1988.Amended Complaint¶ 10.In August 1992, she was promoted to the position of Loss Prevention Assistant Regional Director for Region I. Id.¶ 11.As a result of her promotion, her immediate supervisor became Paquette, who was Ames' Loss Prevention Regional Director for Region I. Id.

From on or about September 1992 through on or about March 1993, Paquette repeatedly made unwanted sexual comments, innuendos and advances toward Schaffer.Id.¶ 13.She, however, consistently rebuffed these advances.Id.¶ 14.During the period between October and December of 1993, Paquette's harassing behavior included looking down Plaintiff's blouse and confronting her at a company Christmas party and suggesting that they have a child together.Id.¶¶ 16 & 20.

Between January and June of 1993, Paquette became hostile towards Schaffer.His conduct during this period included: (1) giving Schaffer permission to leave a meeting early but yelling at her for doing so and then reporting her to Raymond, Ames's Senior Vice President for Asset Protection; (2) smoking in her presence even though he knew it aggravated her respiratory condition²; (3) refusing to cease smoking unless Plaintiff made it "worth his while"; (4) hiring a job applicant whom Schaffer never met for a position it was Schaffer's responsibility to fill; (5) instructing Schaffer to delay going to the emergency room even though she was experiencing severe breathing difficulties; (6) putting his arm around Schaffer and kissing her; (7) preventing her from traveling even though it was central to her job; and (8) interfering with her work.Id.¶ 22-30.

Between February 1993 and May 1994, Schaffer complained about Paquette's conduct to Raymond, Leo Choman("Choman"), Raymond's assistant, and Dan Pachecos, Ames's Personnel Manager.Id.¶ 28.During this period, Schaffer maintains that Raymond engaged in discriminatory conduct.His actions allegedly included: (1) informing Schaffer that it was inappropriate for a woman to disagree with her supervisor; (2) reprimanding Schaffer for leaving a meeting notwithstanding the fact that Paquette gave her permission to leave; and (3) criticizing her for complaining about Paquette's conduct and implying that she would be fired if she did not stop complaining.Id.¶¶ 31-37.

On or about June 10, 1993, Schaffer took a medical leave of absence from Ames, based on the advice of her doctor.Id.¶ 40.³On or about August 18, 1993, Schaffer filed a claim for disability benefits.Subsequently, Ames denied the claim in part.Id.¶ 42.

On May 4, 1994, Schaffer filed this suit against Paquette, Raymond and Ames.In her five-count Complaint, she alleges that all three defendants have violated Title VII by (1) discriminating against her based on her gender (Count I) and (2) retaliating against her because of her opposition to their discriminatory practices (Count II).Moreover, Schaffer contends that both Paquette and Raymond are liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Counts III & IV), and that Paquette is liable for invasion of privacy (Count V).In response, Paquette and Raymond filed the instant motions.

III.STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court may dismiss a complaint only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims in the complaint that would entitle him or her to relief.Hishon v. King & Spalding,467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59(1984);Conley v. Gibson,355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80(1957);see alsoAllen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc.,945 F.2d 40, 44(2d Cir.1991).The court will accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and view them in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.Hishon,467 U.S. at 73, 104 S.Ct. at 2232;Cohen v. Koenig,25 F.3d 1168, 1172(2d Cir.1994);Easton v. Sundram,947 F.2d 1011, 1014-15(2d Cir.1991), cert. denied,504 U.S. 911, 112 S.Ct. 1943, 118 L.Ed.2d 548(1992).Moreover, the court is aware that the threshold that a complaint must meet to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is exceedingly low.

IV.DISCUSSION

Paquette and Raymond argue that Counts I and II should be dismissed, to the extent that they relate to them, because Title VII does not provide for individual liability on behalf of employees.The court agrees.

Under Title VII, it is unlawful "for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condition, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's sex...."42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.The term "employer" is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or proceeding calendar year, and any agent of such person...."42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

Federal courts are presently divided on the issue of whether individuals may be held liable under Title VII.Note, Who, Me?: A Supervisor's Individual Liability for Discrimination in the Workplace, 62 FordhamL.Rev. 1835, 1836(1994).At the heart of the debate is the statute's definition of "employer."Specifically, courts have split on the question of whether the "and any agent" language⁴ was intended by Congress simply to provide respondeat superior liability or was intended to include "agents" within the definition of "employers" who may be held liable for violations of the Act.

To date, a majority of courts have held that supervisory employees cannot be subjected to personal liability.Schallehn v. Central Trust & Sav. Bank,877 F.Supp. 1315, 1331(N.D.Iowa1995)(conceding that majority view rejects supervisor's liability under Title VII);Wilson v. Wayne County,856 F.Supp. 1254, 1264-65(M.D.Tenn.1994)("Greatest weight of legal authority, ... does not recognize individual liability for Title VII violations.").Amongst the courts of appeals to have addressed this issue, the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have held that individual liability may not be imposed against supervisory employees under Title VII or the ADA.Sims v. KCA Inc.,28 F.3d 113(10th Cir.1994);Grant v. Lone Star Co.,21 F.3d 649, 651-53(5th Cir.), cert. denied,___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 574, 130 L.Ed.2d 491(1994);Sauers v. Salt Lake County,1 F.3d 1122, 1125(10th Cir.1993);Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l,991 F.2d 583, 587-88(9th Cir.1993), cert. denied sub nom.Miller v. La Rosa,___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1049, 127 L.Ed.2d 372(1994);Busby v. City of Orlando,931 F.2d 764, 772(11th Cir.1991).⁵On the other hand, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have either held or implied that individual liability may be imposed.Paroline v. Unisys Corp.,879 F.2d 100, 104(4th Cir.1989), vacated in part on reh'g on other grounds,900 F.2d 27(4th Cir.1990);Jones v. Continental Corp.,789 F.2d 1225, 1231(6th Cir.1986).But seeBirkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp.,30 F.3d 507(4th Cir.1994)(distinguishingParoline and holding that actions against decisionmakers may not be maintained under ADEA), cert. denied,___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 666, 130 L.Ed.2d 600(1994);Johnson v. University Surgical Group Assocs.,871 F.Supp. 979, 983(S.D.Ohio1994)(Sixth Circuit's discussion of individual liability in Jones is dicta).

In the absence of controlling precedent,⁶the court is obligated to conduct an independent review of the issue.As a general rule of statutory construction courts should defer to the plain meaning of the language within a statute.Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766(1980).A court must move beyond the plain language of a statute, however, when literal application would produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973(1982).

As a result of its own review of the statute and the plethora of cases, the court finds that supervisory employees cannot be held personally liable under Title VII.Because of the ample discussion on the issue available in prior decisions from other courts, little would be gained from a rehashing of all the arguments...